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The Statement and Account Clause as a National
Security Freedom of Information Act
Lawrence Rosenthal*
The amount of the aggregate annual appropriations for the civilian
and military intelligence programs is the only aspect of intelligence
spending that is publicly disclosed. As a consequence, a great deal of
information about how public funds are spent remains secret,
potentially insulating from ordinary processes of political
accountability not only waste, inefficiency, and abuse, but also what the
public may regard as unwarranted intrusions on its privacy. This
Article offers a constitutional vehicle for greater transparency—the
Constitution’s Statement and Account Clause, which provides that “a
regular Statement and Account of the Receipts and Expenditures of all
public Money shall be published from time to time.” The scholarly
literature contains no comprehensive treatment of the clause; Part I fills
that gap, and contends that at least presumptively, information that is
material to the public’s assessment of the manner in which the
intelligence community spends public funds must be annually disclosed.
Part II turns to the question of judicial enforcement, widely thought
unavailable since the Supreme Court’s 1974 holding in United States v.
Richardson that a lawsuit asserting taxpayer standing to obtain
information about the CIA’s budget was nonjusticiable. Part II
demonstrates that jurisprudential developments since Richardson limit
its scope and suggest that it does not bar lawsuits brought by voters to
enforce the Statement and Account Clause. Richardson poses no
obstacle to suits seeking disclosure of information about intelligence
spending under the Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”), even if they
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also contend that the FOIA’s exemption of information about
intelligence matters from the statutory duty of disclosure is
unconstitutional as applied to information that must be disclosed under
the Statement and Account Clause.
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INTRODUCTION
Transparency can have dramatic effects on national security policy.
Consider three examples:
Example One: Shortly after the terrorist attacks of September 11,
2001, President Bush authorized the National Security Agency (“NSA”)
to undertake a number of new, highly classified intelligence activities,
including, in some circumstances, intercepting, albeit without legislative
authorization or court order, international communications when there
was “a reasonable basis to conclude that one party to the
communication is a member of al-Qa’ida, affiliated with al-Qa’ida, or a
member of an organization affiliated with al-Qa’ida.”1 This program
was first disclosed publicly in articles appearing in the New York Times
in December 2005.2 Public controversy ensued, as did litigation
pressing legal challenges to the program.3 An internal review of the
program by the Inspector Generals of the Departments of Defense and
Justice, the Central Intelligence Agency (“CIA”), the NSA, and the
Office of the Director of National Intelligence concluded that the
program was of uncertain efficacy.4 There was also debate about
whether the program violated statutory and constitutional restrictions on
electronic surveillance.5 In January 2007, the Attorney General
announced the suspension of surveillance by presidential directive and
indicated that the administration had agreed that surveillance should be
conducted pursuant to court order.6 In August 2007, Congress enacted
the Protect America Act, which created a system of judicial review of
the procedures utilized to determine which conversations would be
intercepted.7 In July 2008, the FISA Amendments Act of 2008 was
enacted, which provided for a more elaborate system of judicial review

1. OFFICES OF INSPECTORS GENS., U.S. DEP’T OF DEF. ET AL., UNCLASSIFIED REPORT ON THE
PRESIDENT’S SURVEILLANCE PROGRAM 6 (2009), https://fas.org/irp/eprint/psp.pdf. [hereinafter
UNCLASSIFIED IG REPORT] (footnote omitted).
2. Id. at 29–30.
3. See, e.g., Laura K. Donohue, The Shadow of State Secrets, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 77, 141–49
(2010).
4. UNCLASSIFIED IG REPORT, supra note 1, at 32, 36.
5. For a helpful overview of the legal issues raised by the program, see DAVID S. KRIS & J.
DOUGLAS WILSON, NATIONAL SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS AND PROSECUTIONS 2D §§ 15:1–
15:13 (2d ed. 2012).
6. See Eric Lichtblau & David Johnston, Court to Oversee U.S. Wiretapping in Terror Cases,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 18, 2007.
7. See Protect America Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-55, 121 Stat. 552.

DOCUMENT 2 (DO NOT DELETE)

4

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

10/9/15 6:17 PM

[Vol. 47

of the procedures for intercepting conversations.8
Example Two: Beginning in May 2006, the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Court issued orders directing specified telecommunications
carriers to turn over “telephony meta-data” to the NSA and the Federal
Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”), including information detailing the
originating and terminating telephone numbers, and the time and
duration of the call, for all telephone calls between the United States
and abroad, or wholly within the United States, including local calls.9
The program remained secret until its existence was disclosed by former
NSA contractor Edward Snowden.10 In the wake of those disclosures,
President Obama appointed a “Review Group” to assess the NSA’s
surveillance and its implications for both liberty and security.11 The
Review Group concluded that the program of collecting telephony
meta-data was of uncertain efficacy in preventing terrorist attacks and
had experienced significant compliance problems and recommended a
number of changes in the program that it believed would better protect
privacy and liberty without sacrificing the interests of national
security.12 The President subsequently announced that he agreed that a
number of reforms should be undertaken in the surveillance program to
restrict the access of intelligence agencies to phone records.13 Congress
thereafter enacted a variety of reforms imposing additional statutory
constraints on the program.14
Example Three: On December 8, 2004, in an open session of the
Senate, Senator Rockefeller rose to take what he characterized as “a
somewhat unprecedented action” to publicly oppose the 2005
8. See Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No.
110-261, § 702, 122 Stat. 2436, 2438–48 (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 1881a (2012)).
9. THE PRESIDENT’S REVIEW GRP. ON INTELLIGENCE & COMMC’NS TECHS., LIBERTY AND
SECURITY IN A CHANGING WORLD 94–97 (Dec. 12, 2013), https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/
default/files/docs/2013-12-12_rg_final_report.pdf [hereinafter LIBERTY AND SECURITY].
10. Charlie Savage, Extended Ruling by Secret Court Backs Collection of Phone Data, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 18, 2013, at A1.
11. LIBERTY AND SECURITY, supra note 9, at 10–13.
12. Id. at 104–24. For a thorough explication of the legal challenges against the program, see
Laura K. Donahue, Bulk Metadata Collection: Statutory and Constitutional Considerations, 37
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 757 (2014). For a survey of the debate over the program, see Susan
Freiwald, Nothing to Fear or Nowhere to Hide: Competing Visions of the NSA’s 215 Program, 12
COLO. TECH. L.J. 309 (2014).
13. See Mark Landler & Charlie Savage, Obama Outlines Calibrated Curbs on Phone Spying,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 18, 2014, at A1: Charlie Savage, Obama Says N.S.A. Curbs Would Address
Worries, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 26, 2014, at A10.
14. See U.S.A. Freedom Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-23, 129 Stat. 268.
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intelligence authorization conference report based on a “strenuous
objection—shared by many in our committee—to a particular major
funding acquisition program that I believe is totally unjustified and very
wasteful and dangerous to national security,” adding that he could not
fully discuss his objection in open session because of “the highly
classified nature of the programs.”15 A published account soon
appeared reporting that the program at issue was a $9.5 billion spy
satellite system that could operate only in daylight and clear weather
and that had been criticized as wasteful and duplicative of other
programs.16 Bush Administration officials reacted by requesting that
the Justice Department investigate whether classified information had
been improperly disclosed, and Senate Republicans considered referring
the matter to the Senate Ethics Committee.17 Nevertheless, a review of
the program was subsequently ordered and within a year a new Director
of National Intelligence had ordered work on the program halted.18 The
program was terminated in March 2008.19 It appears that Senator
Rockefeller’s public protest of continued funding for the program
played an important role in its demise.20
These examples illustrate the power of transparency—when these
previously secret programs came to light and faced public scrutiny, even
the presidential administrations that had undertaken them agreed to
important modifications or, in the final example, outright elimination.
Yet, transparency is limited in the intelligence community. The
Director of National Intelligence is given broad authority to “protect
intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure,”21
including authority to develop a system for classifying information in
order to limit its dissemination and disclosure.22
“Classified

15. 150 CONG. REC. S11957 (Dec. 8, 2004). Senator Wyden promptly echoed this objection.
See id. at S11957–58.
16. See Douglas Jehl, New Spy Plan Said to Involve Satellite System, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 12,
2004, at A11.
17. See David Johnson, Justice Dept. May Explore Leak on Spy Satellites, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
15, 2004, at A28.
18. See Douglas Jehl, Spy Satellite Programs Are in Upheaval, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 30, 2005, at
A17.
19. MARSHALL CURTIS ERWIN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40240, INTELLIGENCE
AUTHORIZATION LEGISLATION: STATUS AND CHALLENGES 1, 7 (2013).
20. See AMY B. ZEGART, EYES ON SPIES: CONGRESS AND THE UNITED STATES
INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY 107–09 (2011).
21. 50 U.S.C. § 3024(i)(1) (2012).
22. Id. § 3024(j)(2).
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information” is defined as “information or material designated and
clearly marked or clearly represented, pursuant to the provisions of a
statute or Executive Order . . . as requiring a specific degree of
protection against unauthorized disclosure for reasons of national
security.”23 An Executive Order, in turn, authorizes the classification of
any information that “pertains to . . . intelligence activities (including
covert action), intelligence sources or methods, or cryptology.”24
This legal framework for restricting the disclosure of any sources or
methods by which intelligence is gathered affords the government
enormous power to keep information about the activities of the
intelligence community confidential. After all, pretty much any aspect
of intelligence gathering can be characterized as a source or method.
Programs of intelligence gathering generally come into public view only
when, as in the examples above, an unauthorized leak of classified
information discloses their existence. Otherwise, these programs
frequently amount to examples of what Professor David Pozen has
labeled “deep secrecy”—not merely information that the public
understands it is being denied such as “the sailing dates of transports or
the number and location of troops,”25 but instead information about
governmental activities of which the public is entirely unaware.26
Among the objections to deep secrecy, Professor Pozen argues, is that it
undermines democratic accountability by enabling the government to
undertake a course of action that the public might see as immoral or
imprudent, but without fear of adverse political consequences because
the public has no inkling what its government is doing.27
It is easy to grasp the need for secrecy in the intelligence community,
where secrecy often facilitates success.28 Indeed, the Supreme Court

23. Id. § 3126(1).
24. Exec. Order No. 13,526, § 1.4, 75 Fed. Reg. 707, 709 (Jan. 5, 2010).
25. Near v. Minn. ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697, 716 (1931) (footnote omitted).
26. See David E. Pozen, Deep Secrecy, 62 STAN. L. REV. 257, 265–75 (2010). For a similar
bifurcation of governmental secrecy, see Heidi Kitrosser, Secrecy and Separated Powers:
Executive Privilege Revisited, 92 IOWA L. REV. 489, 514–15 (2007).
27. See Pozen, supra note 26, at 285–92. Professor Pozen is not alone in articulating these
concerns; for an argument along similar lines, see HEIDI KITROSSER, RECLAIMING
ACCOUNTABILITY: TRANSPARENCY, EXECUTIVE POWER, AND THE U.S. CONSTITUTION 12–14,
85–112 (2015).
28. For a helpful summary of the considerations supporting national security secrecy, see
Laura A. White, Note, The Need for Governmental Secrecy: Why the U.S. Government Must Be
Able to Withhold Information in the Interest of National Security, 43 VA. J. INT’L L. 1071, 1078–
85 (2003).
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has written that decisions to protect intelligence sources and methods
from disclosure “are worthy of great deference given the magnitude of
the national security interests and potential risks at stake.”29 Still, the
costs of deep secrecy are not insubstantial; deep secrecy is all too likely
to skew policymakers’ consideration of the costs and benefits of
intelligence-gathering programs.
There is considerable debate in the literature about the efficacy of the
current regime of intelligence oversight given a variety of institutional
limitations faced by Congress and the other participants in that
process.30 But, even putting that debate aside, policymakers are
unlikely to fully appreciate the costs of a particular course of action if
they believe that potentially improvident policies will never become
public. Nor do elected officials have much incentive to engage in
vigorous oversight if their efforts remain hidden from view.31 For
example, if policymakers can undertake surveillance with reasonable
confidence that the very existence of a program that compromises
privacy interests will remain undisclosed, they are likely to be
insufficiently attentive to the value of the privacy interests it
compromises, or the potential of abuse, waste, or inefficiency. The
same is true of any intelligence-gathering program that remains a deep
secret.
Deep secrecy means that the political incentive to protect national
security may not be appropriately tempered by ordinary processes of
political accountability for undertakings that may produce inefficiency,
abuse, or that are simply unwarranted. Officials may not be fully
sensitive to the costs of a program—monetary and otherwise—if they
believe that the electorate will never learn of them. The earlier
examples illustrate the point—once those surveillance programs became
public, programs that the executive and legislature had previously
29. CIA v. Sims, 471 U.S. 159, 179 (1985). For an elaboration on the prevalence of judicial
deference to such claims, see Margaret B. Kwoka, Deferring to Secrecy, 54 B.C. L. REV. 185,
211–16 (2013).
30. For a useful summary of criticisms of the current regime of intelligence oversight, see
Benjamin S. Mishkin, Note, Filling the Oversight Gap: The Case for Local Intelligence
Oversight, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1414, 1427–38 (2013).
31. Cf. KITROSSER, supra note 27, at 6 (“[I]t is often not in the political interests of individual
congresspersons to be fully informed as to what is going on in the executive branch. Where the
choice is between knowing enough to be held responsible should things go awry versus retaining
ignorance and preserving the flexibility to align or distance oneself from presidential actions as
events develop, ignorance can be bliss. This is particularly, though not exclusively, true in the
realm of national security.”).
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supported were reformed or eliminated. The cost-balance calculus of
policymakers, in short, was seemingly altered by the fact of public
disclosure. Thus, even proposals to embed within the intelligence
community officials responsible for advocating on behalf of liberty and
privacy interests are of uncertain efficacy. If officials responsible for
making policy need not fear political accountability for imprudent,
unwarranted, or potentially unlawful invasions of privacy, those
charged with advocating for privacy may find themselves without
sufficient influence.32
To be sure, deep secrecy is sometimes frustrated by leaks.33 There is,
however, reason to doubt that leaking supplies adequate transparency.
After all, leakers run enormous legal risks.
Despite the First
Amendment’s prohibition on laws “abridging the freedom of speech, or
of the press,”34 a public employee who leaks classified information is
likely to face criminal liability for the leak and even a media entity
publishing leaks and journalists working for such entities face a serious
risk of liability.35 An even more serious problem with relying on leaks
as a means to transparency involves the risks to national security posed
by leaking. Although some leaks are undertaken by senior officials to

32. For a discussion of the problems that inhere in maintaining the effectiveness of officials
within the intelligence community charged with protecting privacy by an advocate of such an
approach, see Margo Schlanger, Intelligence Legalism and the National Security Agency’s Civil
Liberties Gap, 6 HARV. NAT’L SECURITY. J. 112, 188–204 (2015).
33. See, e.g., Mark Fenster, The Implausibility of Secrecy, 65 HASTINGS L.J. 309 (2014).
34. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
35. See, e.g., JENNIFER K. ELSEA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41404, CRIMINAL
PROHIBITIONS ON THE PUBLICATION OF CLASSIFIED DEFENSE INFORMATION 8–17, 22–27
(2013); Christopher J. Markham, Punishing the Publishing of Classified Materials: The
Espionage Act and WikiLeaks, 23 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 1 (2014); David McCraw & Stephen
Gikow, The End to an Unspoken Bargain? National Security Leaks in a Post-Pentagon Papers
World, 48 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 473, 475–79 (2013); John D. Moore, In the Same Boat:
Leaks, the Press, and the First Amendment, 18 HOLY CROSS J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 137, 145–81
(2014); David E. Pozen, The Leaky Leviathan: Why the Government Condemns and Condones
Unlawful Disclosures of Information, 127 HARV. L. REV. 512, 522–27 (2013); Geoffrey R. Stone,
Secrecy and Self-Governance, 56 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 81, 85–95 (2011); Stephen I. Vladeck,
Inchoate Liability and the Espionage Act: The Statutory Framework and the Freedom of the
Press, 1 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 219 (2007); Developments in the Law—The Law of Media, 120
HARV. L. REV. 990, 1007–19 (2007). For somewhat more skeptical accounts of the scope of
prosecutorial power, see KITROSSER, supra note 27, at 58–66, 130–42; and Mary-Rose
Papandrea, Leaker Traitor Whistleblower Spy: National Security Leaks and the First Amendment,
94 B.U. L. REV. 449, 512–44 (2014). For arguments that different considerations come into play
when governmental secrecy conceals illegality, see, for example, Jenny-Brooke Condon, Illegal
Secrets, 91 WASH. U. L. REV. 1099, 1157–67 (2014); and Alexander J. Kasner, Note, National
Security Leaks and Constitutional Duty, 67 STAN. L. REV. 241, 264–82 (2015).
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advance official objectives, others are unauthorized and undertaken for
reasons that may be in tension with legitimate national security
interests.36 If leakers are free to disseminate confidential information
without impartial review by those with adequate information and
incentives to weigh national security interests fairly, it poses serious
risks to national security.37 As the Supreme Court observed in one of its
few encounters with this issue: “Without a dependable prepublication
review procedure, no intelligence agency or responsible Government
official could be assured that an employee privy to sensitive information
might not conclude on his own—innocently or otherwise—that it should
be disclosed to the world.”38 Thus, even leakers sincerely acting in the
belief that they are bringing misconduct to light may inadvertently
disclose information that poses serious risks to national security.
To the extent that the institutional press acts as an additional
safeguard by deciding whether to publish leaked government secrets,
there is still reason to doubt that national security concerns will receive
adequate consideration. As Cass Sunstein has noted, even if the press is
granted robust protection to publish leaks, given its institutional
incentive to disseminate information, the press may well undervalue the
government’s interest in confidentiality when making decisions about
whether to publish government secrets.39
Accordingly, if a judicially supervised process were created that
could provide sufficient transparency without unduly compromising
legitimate governmental interests, national security might be better
protected, and the incentive to engage in unauthorized leaks might be
reduced.40
36. For valuable efforts to develop a typology of leaks in terms of their motivation, see
STEPHEN HESS, THE GOVERNMENT/PRESS CONNECTION: PRESS OFFICERS AND THEIR OFFICES
75–77 (1984); GARY ROSS, WHO WATCHES THE WATCHMEN? THE CONFLICT BETWEEN
NATIONAL SECURITY AND FREEDOM OF THE PRESS 71–77 (2011), https://www.fas.org/sgp/
eprint/ross.pdf; and Pozen, supra note 35, at 532–34, 559–72.
37. For a helpful survey of the harm to national security caused by leaks, see ROSS, supra note
36, at 79–121. For a more anecdotal account, see GABRIEL SCHOENFELD, NECESSARY SECRETS:
NATIONAL SECURITY, THE MEDIA, AND THE RULE OF LAW 24–26, 30–32, 95–98, 108–40, 204–
05, 208–20, 255–59, 266–68 (2010).
38. Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507, 513 n.8 (1980) (per curiam). For a powerful
defense of the Court’s view, see Frank H. Easterbrook, Insider Trading, Secret Agents,
Evidentiary Privileges, and the Production of Information, 1981 SUP. CT. REV. 309, 339–53.
39. Cass R. Sunstein, Government Control of Information, 74 CALIF. L. REV. 889, 901–04
(1986). For a more elaborate argument along similar lines, see Note, Media Incentives and
National Security Secrets, 122 HARV. L. REV. 2228, 2234–44 (2009).
40. For a more elaborate argument along these lines, see Margaret B. Kwoka, Leaking and
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If the First Amendment were understood to grant the press or public a
right of access to confidential governmental information essential to
informed self-government, it might provide a satisfactory vehicle for
containing the scope of deep secrecy through a judicially supervised
process. Indeed, a number of scholars have advanced the view that the
First Amendment’s protection for free speech and a free press should
include a right of access to government information, although it is
unclear whether the right of access advocated by these scholars would
be sufficiently robust to protect disclosure in the face of the
government’s assertion of a national security justification need for
confidentiality.41 In any event, there is as yet little sign of a First
Amendment right of access to government secrets involving national
security. Although the Supreme Court has recognized a presumptive
right of access to judicial proceedings by stressing that such
proceedings have historically been open to public scrutiny,42 the Court
has otherwise steadfastly rejected a First Amendment right of access to
information.43 The Court’s position is understandable; when the media
are free to disseminate whatever information they wish, and are merely

Legitimacy, 48 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1387, 1454–56 (2015).
41. See, e.g., Vincent Blasi, The Pathological Perspective and the First Amendment, 85
COLUM. L. REV. 449, 489–95 (1985) (arguing for a right of access to information subject to
balancing of competing interests); Mary I.M. Cheh, Judicial Supervision of Executive Secrecy:
Rethinking Freedom of Expression for Government Employees and the Public Right of Access to
Government Information, 69 CORNELL L. REV. 690, 719–32 (1984) (advocating invalidation of
arbitrary limitations on access to information); Thomas I. Emerson, Legal Foundations of the
Right to Know, 1976 WASH. U. L.Q. 1, 14–20 (arguing for a right of access but recognizing
limitations for information about intelligence gathering and espionage); Steven Helle, The NewsGathering Publication Dichotomy and Government Expression, 1982 DUKE L.J. 1, 49–59
(arguing for a right of access to information subject to balancing of competing interests); Barry P.
McDonald, The First Amendment and the Free Flow of Information: Towards A Realistic Right
to Gather Information in the Digital Information Age, 65 OHIO ST. L.J. 249, 344–55 (2004)
(arguing for a right to information of general public concern for purposes of widespread
dissemination to the public); Timothy B. Van Dyck, Newsgathering, Press Access, and the First
Amendment, 44 STAN. L. REV. 927, 931–38 (1992) (advocating invalidation of selective and
arbitrary restrictions on access to information).
42. See, e.g., Press-Enter. Co. v. Super. Ct. of Cal. for Riverside Cnty., 478 U.S. 1, 6–10
(1986); Globe Newspaper Co. v. Super. Ct. for Norfolk Cnty., 457 U.S. 596, 603–07 (1982).
43. See, e.g., L.A. Police Dep’t v. United Reporting Publ’g Corp., 528 U.S. 32, 40 (1999)
(seeking access to names and addresses of arrestees); Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 12–16
(1978) (plurality opinion) (seeking access to prison); id. at 16 (Stewart, J., concurring) (same);
Saxbe v. Wash. Post Co., 417 U.S. 843, 850 (1974) (seeking access to prisoners); Pell v.
Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 833–35 (1974) (same); Kliendienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 762–70
(1972) (scholars contesting denial of visa permitting foreign scholar to travel to United States);
Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 16–17 (1965) (seeking ability to travel to Cuba to gather information).
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denied access to confidential government information, it is far from
clear that there has been any “abridge[ment]” of the freedom of speech
or the press within the meaning of the First Amendment.44
The discussion that follows offers an alternate constitutional vehicle
for greater transparency in national security—the Constitution’s
Statement and Account Clause, which provides that “a regular
Statement and Account of the Receipts and Expenditures of all public
Money shall be published from time to time.”45 Unlike the First
Amendment, the Statement and Account Clause expressly mandates the
disclosure of information.
The scholarly literature to date contains no comprehensive treatment
of the scope of the obligation imposed by the Statement and Account
Clause; Part I endeavors to fill that gap, and goes on to argue that the
clause guarantees the public access to a good deal of information about
the manner in which the government spends public funds for
intelligence-related purposes. It sketches an account of the disclosure
obligation that requires, at least presumptively, that information that is
material to the public’s assessment of the manner in which the
intelligence community spends public funds must be disclosed on an
annual basis. This standard of materiality, and the longstanding
practices for disclosure of nonintelligence spending, provides useful
yardsticks for identifying the constitutional standards for disclosure.
Part II turns to the question of judicial enforcement, widely thought
unavailable since the Supreme Court’s holding that a lawsuit seeking
information about the CIA’s budget under the Statement and Account
Clause was nonjusticiable in United States v. Richardson.46 Part II
44. Beyond that, perhaps the most powerful argument deployed against a putative First
Amendment right of access to confidential governmental information is premised on the
government’s unquestionably legitimate need to keep some information relating to national
security secret. Assessing competing interests in confidentiality and disclosure seemingly
enmeshes the courts in what is essentially a policy debate over the justification for treating
information as confidential; such claims, it is said, “invite[d] the Court to involve itself in what is
clearly a legislative task.” Houchins, 438 U.S. at 12 (plurality opinion). For valuable scholarly
discussions critical of an asserted First Amendment right of access to government information,
see, for example, LEE C. BOLLINGER, IMAGES OF A FREE PRESS 146–50 (1971); DAVID M.
O’BRIEN, THE PUBLIC’S RIGHT TO KNOW: THE SUPREME COURT AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT
30–54, 166–67 (1981); Lillian R. BeVier, An Informed Public, an Informing Press: The Search
for a Constitutional Principle, 68 CALIF. L. REV. 482, 497–516 (1980); and Louis Henkin, The
Right to Know and the Duty to Withhold: The Case of the Pentagon Papers, 120 U. PA. L. REV.
271, 273–76 (1971).
45. U.S. CONST. art I, § 9, cl. 7.
46. 418 U.S. 166 (1974).
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explains that although the precise holding of Richardson remains good
law, subsequent jurisprudential developments have greatly limited its
scope. There is a substantial argument that Richardson does not bar
lawsuits brought by voters under the Statement and Account Clause,
and an even stronger argument that it poses no obstacle to suits seeking
information about intelligence spending under the Freedom of
Information Act (“FOIA”). Richardson does not bar these actions, even
if they involve claims that the statutes that exempt information about
intelligence community from disclosure under the FOIA are
unconstitutional. In this fashion, the clause can function as a national
security freedom of information act.
I. THE SCOPE OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL OBLIGATION TO DISCLOSE
INFORMATION ABOUT INTELLIGENCE SPENDING
The first Congress, in the legislation creating the Department of the
Treasury, required that the Treasurer of the United States, “on the third
day of every session of Congress, lay before the Senate and the House
of Representatives, fair and accurate copies of all accounts” as well as
“a true and perfect account of the State of the Treasury.”47 In the
Second Congress, the House elaborated, passing a resolution that
obligated the Secretary of the Treasury to lay before it annually “an
accurate statement and account of the receipts and expenditures of all
public moneys . . . in which statements shall also be distinguished the
expenditures which fall under each head of appropriation.”48 This
obligation still persists today in substantially the same form; the
Secretary of the Treasury is obligated, at the opening of each session of
Congress, to “submit . . . a report for the prior fiscal year on the total
amount of public receipts and public expenditures listing receipts, when
practicable, by ports, districts, and States and the expenditures by each
appropriation.”49 The Treasury discharges this obligation through its
annual Combined Statement of Receipts, Outlays, and Balances.50

47. Act of Sept. 2, 1789, ch. 12, § 4, 1 Stat. 65, 66 (“An Act to establish the Treasury
Department”). For a helpful description of framing-era practice with respect to the reporting of
government spending, see FREDERICK C. MOSHER, THE GAO: THE QUEST FOR
ACCOUNTABILITY IN AMERICAN GOVERNMENT 27–31 (1979).
48. 2 ANNALS OF CONG. 302 (1791).
49. 31 U.S.C. § 331(c) (2012); see also id § 3513(a) (“The Secretary of the Treasury shall
prepare reports that will inform the President, Congress, and the public on the financial operations
of the United States Government.”).
50. See, e.g., BUREAU OF FISCAL SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, COMBINED STATEMENT
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This process does not apply to intelligence spending. Since the
creation of the intelligence community following the Second World
War, Congress has placed funds to be appropriated for intelligence
purposes primarily in military appropriations that are subsequently
transferred to intelligence uses.51 The actual appropriations for
intelligence purposes authorizing this procedure are placed in classified
portions of appropriations legislation.52 Congress provided a bit of
transparency in 2007, when it required that, “[n]ot later than 30 days
after the end of each fiscal year . . . , the Director of National
Intelligence shall disclose to the public the aggregate amount of funds
appropriated by Congress for the National Intelligence Program for such
fiscal year.”53 On the expenditure side, transparency remains nonexistent; Congress has granted the various intelligence agencies
authority to disregard the statutory obligations that are otherwise
imposed regarding disclosure of the manner in which public funds are
expended.54

RECEIPTS, OUTLAYS, AND BALANCES (2014), http://www. fiscal.treasury.gov/fsreports/rpt/
combStmt/current_rpt.htm [hereinafter COMBINED STATEMENT].
51. See MARSHALL C. ERWIN & AMY BELASCO, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42061,
INTELLIGENCE SPENDING AND APPROPRIATIONS: ISSUES FOR CONGRESS 10–11 (2013). For a
helpful summary of the history of intelligence appropriations practices since World War II, see
Richard A. Best, Jr. & Elizabeth B. Bazan, Intelligence Spending: Public Disclosure Issues, in
INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT AND DISCLOSURE ISSUES 53, 57–62 (Philip R. Haas ed., 2010).
52. See, e.g., WILLIAM C. BANKS & PETER RAVEN-HANSEN, NATIONAL SECURITY LAW AND
THE POWER OF THE PURSE 51–53 (1994); RICHARD A. BEST, JR., CONG. RESEARCH SERV.,
RL33539, INTELLIGENCE ISSUES FOR CONGRESS 6, 8–9 (2009); Vicki Divoll, The “Full Access
Doctrine”: Congress’s Constitutional Entitlement to National Security Information from the
Executive, 34 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 493, 506 n.45 (2011); Jennifer D. Kibbe, Conducting
Shadow Wars, 5 J. NAT’L SEC. L. & POL’Y 373, 382–83 (2012). For an example of a public
reference to the existence of a classified annex governing intelligence appropriations, see
Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2014, Pub. L. No. 113-76, § 8089(b), 128 Stat. 5, 1256.
53. Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act, Pub. L. No. 110-53, § 601,
121 Stat. 266, 335 (2007) (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 3306(b) (2012)). Congress subsequently
required the President, at the time the annual budget is sent to Congress, to “disclose to the public
the aggregate amount of appropriations requested for that fiscal year for the National Intelligence
Program.” Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-259, § 364, 124
Stat. 2654, 2702 (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 3306(a)). The “National Intelligence Program” is
defined to include all confidential nonmilitary intelligence-gathering activities. See 50 U.S.C.
§ 3003(6). For helpful discussions of the process by which the aggregate figures came to be
disclosed, see LOUIS FISHER, CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICTS BETWEEN CONGRESS AND THE
PRESIDENT 236–40 (6th ed. 2014); Steven Aftergood, An Inquiry into the Dynamics of
Government Secrecy, 48 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 511, 516–19 (2013); and Best & Bazan, supra
note 51, at 76–83.
54. See, e.g., 50 U.S.C. § 3038(c) (“[T]he Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency may
expend amounts made available to the Director under the National Intelligence Program for
OF
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Thus, for example, for fiscal year 2014, the Director of National
Intelligence announced that the “aggregate amount appropriated” for the
National Intelligence Program “was $50.5 billion,” and added, “[a]ny
and all subsidiary information . . . will not be disclosed.”55 Similarly,
the Department of Defense disclosed that “[t]he aggregate amount
appropriated” for the Military Intelligence Program “was $17.48
billion,” adding that “[n]o other MIP budget figures or program details
will be released, as they remain classified for national security
reasons.”56
These limited disclosures, coupled with the intelligence community’s
power to classify information that it regards as confidential, effectively
blocks the public’s access to information relating to intelligence
spending. For example, in an action under FOIA seeking disclosure of
aggregate intelligence budgets prior to the statutory requirement that
they be disclosed, a federal district court concluded that disclosure of
even aggregate budget amounts would reveal classified information,
“namely the allocation, transfer and funding of intelligence
programs,” and therefore fell under the FOIA’s exemption from the
obligation of disclosure for information “specifically exempted from
disclosure” by statute.57 This decision is no outlier; virtually all efforts
to obtain disclosure of any aspect of intelligence spending under the
FOIA have been rebuffed.58

human intelligence and counterintelligence activities for objects of a confidential, extraordinary,
or emergency nature, without regard to the provisions of law or regulation relating to the
expenditure of government funds.”); id. § 3510(b) (“The sums made available to the [Central
Intelligence] Agency may be expended without regard to the provisions of law and regulations
relating to the expenditure of Government funds; and for objects of a confidential, extraordinary,
or emergency nature, such expenditures to be accounted for solely on the certificate of the
Director and every such certificate shall be deemed a sufficient voucher for the amount therein
certified.”); id. § 3605(a) (“[N]othing in this chapter or any other law . . . shall be construed to
require the disclosure of the organization or any function of the National Security Agency, or any
information with respect to the activities thereof . . . .”).
55. Press Release, Office of the Dir. Nat’l Intelligence, DNI Releases Budget Figure for 2014
National Intelligence Program (Oct. 30, 2014), http://fas.org/irp/news/2014/10/nip-2014.html.
56. Press Release, Office of the Assistant Sec’y of Def., U.S. Dep’t of Def., DOD Releases
Military Intelligence Program (MIP) Appropriate Top Line Budget for Fiscal Year (FY) 2014
(Oct. 30, 2014), http://fas.org/irp/news/2014/10/mip-2014.html.
57. Aftergood v. CIA, 355 F. Supp. 2d 557, 5561–62 (D.D.C. 2005) (citing 5 U.S.C.
§ 552(b)(3) (2000)).
58. See, e.g., Halperin v. CIA, 629 F.2d 144, 146–53 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (exempting from FOIA
disclosure information relating to attorney retainer agreements, fee agreements, bills and
statements, and related correspondence between the CIA and any attorneys or law firms retained
by the CIA to provide legal services connected with classified activities). For a helpful summary
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There is great doubt about whether this state of affairs can be
reconciled with the Statement and Account Clause.59
A. The Character of the Statement and Account Clause Obligation
There are no precedents that authoritatively explicate the scope of the
obligation imposed by the Statement and Account Clause; the Supreme
Court has never “reach[ed] or decide[d] precisely what is meant by ‘a
regular Statement and Account.’”60 When one considers the clause’s
text, history, and constitutional ethos and structure, however, it becomes
plain that the clause requires that the public receive sufficient
information about the manner in which public funds are spent to enable
an informed judgment about the performance of the intelligence
community.61
of statutory and case law granting intelligence agencies the ability to shield information from
disclosure, see 1 JAMES T. O’REILLY, FEDERAL INFORMATION DISCLOSURE § 13:14 (rev. 2012).
59. In the wake of Richardson, a handful of student commentators contended that the thenextant regime, in which no information about appropriations or spending was disclosed, violated
the Statement and Account Clause, although none considered whether the disclosure of aggregate
appropriations or spending would pass constitutional muster. See Douglas P. Elliott, Note, Cloak
and Ledger: Is CIA Funding Constitutional?, 2 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 717, 738–52 (1975);
Robin Berman Schwartzman, Note, Fiscal Oversight of the Central Intelligence Agency: Can
Accountability and Confidentiality Coexist?, 7 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 493, 521–26 (1974);
Note, The CIA’s Secret Funding and the Constitution, 84 YALE L.J. 608, 621–35 (1975). In this
period as well, a Senate select committee concluded that the CIA’s current practices were
inconsistent with the Statement and Account Clause, without reaching a conclusion about
whether the publication of aggregate spending would be sufficient. See 1 S. REP. No. 94-755, at
367–84 (1976); see also S. REP. No. 95-274, at 9 (1977) (“While the courts have not defined the
constitutional requirements . . . as much information about appropriations and expenditures
should be made available to the public as is possible consistent with interests such as the
protection of the national security . . . .”). A House committee, in contrast, concluded that
“whether and to what extent budget disclosure is constitutionally mandated is a matter of policy
which Congress is best qualified to judge.” H.R. REP. NO. 95-1075, at 2 (1978). In congressional
testimony in 1977, two eminent scholars also opined that the CIA’s secret funding violated the
Statement and Account Clause without specifically addressing the sufficiency of disclosing
aggregate appropriations or spending. See Whether Disclosure of Funds Authorized for
Intelligence Activities Is in the Public Interest: Hearings Before the S. Select Comm. on
Intelligence, 95th Cong. 93–94 (1977) [hereinafter 1977 Senate Intelligence Funds Disclosure
Hearings] (statement of Ralph D. Spritzer); id. at 95–99 (testimony of Thomas I. Emerson). A
third, in contrast, opined that the clause granted considerable freedom to Congress. See id. at 88
(statement of Gerhard Casper). At a 1994 hearing, another scholar expressed a similar view. See
Public Disclosure of the Aggregate Intelligence Budget Figure: Hearings Before the Permanent
Select H. Comm. on Intelligence, 103d Cong. 161–65 (1994) [hereinafter 1994 House Intelligence
Funds Disclosure Hearings] (statement of Robert F. Turner).
60. United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 178 n.11 (1974).
61. In invoking text, history, ethos and structure, I refer to the various modalities of
constitutional interpretation identified by Philip Bobbitt. See PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL
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1. Text
The Statement and Account Clause appears in the Constitution paired
with the provision governing the authorization required to spend
government funds, the Appropriations Clause: “No Money shall be
drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence of Appropriations made
by Law; and a regular Statement and Account of Receipts and
Expenditures of all public Money shall be published from time to
time.”62
The text is unqualified—the obligation to publish information
regarding receipts and expenditures applies to all public funds,
regardless of the purpose for which they are spent. This textual
formulation stands in contrast to the Constitution’s limitation of a
parallel publication requirement in the Journal Clause, which requires
each House of Congress to “keep a Journal of its Proceedings, and from
time to time publish the same, excepting such parts as may in their
Judgment require Secrecy.”63
It is equally significant that the text makes no categorical distinctions
among types of spending, much less contains an exception to the
disclosure obligation when public funds are spent for military or other
national security purposes. Other provisions of the Constitution, in
contrast, expressly acknowledge the need for special rules relating to the
military or wartime. For example, the Third Amendment forbids the
quartering of troops in private houses, but permits a different rule in
time of war.64 The Fifth Amendment requires a grand jury indictment
“for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime,” but carves out an
exception for “cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia,
when in actual service in time of War or public danger.”65 And, the
Suspension Clause provides that “[t]he Privilege of the Writ of Habeas
Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or
Invasion the public Safety may require it.”66
The constitutional text alone does not shed much light about how
INTERPRETATION 11-22 (1991).
62. U.S. CONST. art I, § 9, cl. 7. In contrast to the Statement and Account Clause, there is a
fair amount of scholarship on the Appropriations Clause. For a leading example, see Kate Stith,
Congress’ Power of the Purse, 97 YALE L.J. 1343 (1988).
63. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 3.
64. See U.S. CONST. amend. III (“No Soldier shall, in time of peace be quartered in any house,
without the consent of the Owner, nor in time of war, but in a manner to be prescribed by law.”).
65. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
66. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2.
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often and how much information relating to expenditures must be
disclosed, or to whom. It does, however, cast great doubt on the claim
that the disclosure obligation imposed by the Statement and Account
Clause is somehow circumscribed, if not eliminated entirely, when it
comes to particular categories of spending, even if they involve a
perceived need for confidentiality.
2. Original Understanding
The Supreme Court has written that in undertaking constitutional
interpretation:
[W]e are guided by the principle that “[t]he Constitution was written
to be understood by the voters; its words and phrases were used in
their normal and ordinary as distinguished from technical meaning.”
Normal meaning may of course include an idiomatic meaning, but it
excludes secret or technical meanings that would not have been known
to ordinary citizens in the founding generation.67

On this view, the object of constitutional interpretation is to ascertain
“the original understanding” of constitutional text.68 This approach, of
course, is often labeled originalism, which “regards the discoverable
meaning of the Constitution at the time of its initial adoption as
authoritative for purposes of constitutional interpretation in the
present.”69
a. Framing and Ratification
In terms of its original semantic meaning, the Statement and Account
Clause is straightforward and little different from its contemporary
meaning. Framing-era sources, for example, define an “account” as a
record of debts and expenses,70 and “publish” as to disclose to the
public.71 This seemingly confirms the unqualified character of the
67. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 576–77 (2008) (quoting United States v.
Sprague, 282 U.S. 716, 731 (1931) (second alteration in original)).
68. Id. at 625.
69. Keith E. Whittington, The New Originalism, 2 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 599, 599 (2004).
70. See, e.g., 1 SAMUEL JOHNSON, A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 71 (1755)
(“A computation of debts or expences; a register of facts relating to money.”); NOAH WEBSTER,
AN AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 8 (1830) (“A sum stated on paper; a
registry of a debt or credit; of debts and credits, or charges; an entry in a book or on paper of
things bought or sold, of payments, services etc., including the names of the parties to the
transaction, date, and price or value of the thing.”).
71. See 2 JOHNSON, supra note 70, at 1598 (“To discover to mankind; to make generally and
openly known; to proclaim; to divulge.”); WEBSTER, supra note 70, at 653 (“To discover or make
known to mankind or to people in general what before was private or unknown; to divulge, as a
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obligation to disclose the manner in which public funds are spent.
Inquiry into the origins of the clause provides additional insight. The
Appropriations Clause was inserted into the draft of what became the
Constitution relatively early in the Constitutional Convention, and
provoked little in the way of comment.72 Relatively late in the
Convention, a draft emerged that added the phrase “and a regular
statement and account of the receipts and expenditures of all publick
money shall be published from time to time.”73 George Mason moved
to require annual publication, but Gouverneur Morris objected that this
“w[ould] be impossible in many cases,”74 and Rufus King argued that
“the term expenditures went to every minute shilling. This would be
impracticable,” adding that Congress “might indeed make a monthly
publication, but it would be in such general Statements as would afford
no satisfactory information.”75 James Madison then moved to strike
“annually” from Mason’s proposal, substituting instead “from time to
time,” contending that this formulation “would enjoin the duty of
frequent publications and leave enough to the discretion of the
Legislature. Require too much and the difficulty will beget a habit of
doing nothing.”76 Thomas Fitzsimons added, “[i]t is absolutely
impossible to publish expenditures in the full extent of the term,” and
James Wilson said that “[m]any operations of finance cannot be
properly published at certain times.”77 Madison’s motion carried.78
private transaction; to promulgate or proclaim, as a law or edict.”).
72. See 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 523, 524, 526, 538–39
(Max Farrand ed., 1911); 2 id. at 14, 16, 154, 164, 178, 280, 568, 596.
73. Id. at 610 n.2.
74. Id. at 618.
75. Id. at 618.
76. Id. at 618–19.
77. Id. at 619.
78. Id. The Statement and Account Clause has no obvious antecedent. Its closest parallel in
the Articles of Confederation required only semi-annual reports of debt incurred; Article IX
authorized Congress “to borrow money, or emit bills on the credit of the United States,
transmitting every half year to the respective States an account of the sums of money so borrowed
or emitted.” ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1777, art. IX, reprinted in 1 THE FEDERAL AND
STATE CONSTITUTIONS: COLONIAL CHARTERS, AND OTHER ORGANIC LAWS OF THE STATES,
TERRITORIES, AND COLONIES 14 (Francis Newton Thorpe ed., 1909) [hereinafter FEDERAL AND
STATE CONSTITUTIONS]. The state charters or constitutions in effect at the time of the framing,
to the extent that they addressed the matter, made the monitoring of public spending a legislative
responsibility. For example, see N.C. CONSTITUTION of 1776, reprinted in 5 FEDERAL AND
STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra, at 2791 (“[T]he Governor, for the time being, shall have the
power to draw for and apply such sums of money as shall be voted by the general assembly, for
the contingencies of government, and shall be accountable to them for the same.”).
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Thus, the Convention seems to have endorsed a measure of discretion
when it came to the timing of disclosure. It believed that disclosure of
every “minute shilling” would be impracticable, but there was no talk of
a categorical exception to the disclosure obligation for types of
spending that might be thought to demand confidentiality.
Since the Constitution was drafted in secret, the Convention’s
deliberations might be regarded as having little probative value in
ascertaining the framing-era public’s understanding of its terms,
although the drafting history could offer some evidence of the context in
which the text reached the public and the manner in which the Framers
expected the public would understand the text.79
The public
conventions at which ratification of the Constitution was debated surely
shed useful light on the framing-era public’s understanding of the
obligation imposed by the Statement and Account Clause.
At the ratifying conventions, discussion of the Appropriations Clause
and Statement and Account Clause was limited but still illuminating,
reflecting the view that the clauses helped to secure the accountability
of elected officials for the manner in which public funds were spent.
For example, at the Maryland Convention, James McHenry explained
“the People who give their Money ought to know in what manner it is
expended.”80 To similar effect, at the New York Convention,
Chancellor Robert Livingston, addressing the charge that the
Constitution was all too likely to generate corruption, included in his
response a rhetorical question: “Are not Congress to publish, from time
to time, an account of their receipts and expenditures?”81
The discussion most plainly directed to the relationship between the
Statement and Account Clause and governmental secrecy came in the
Virginia Convention, when George Mason objected to the clause’s
“loose expression of ‘publication from time to time’” that, he feared,
could “be extended ever so much,” and, the report of the proceedings
added: “In matters relative to military operations and foreign
negotiations, secrecy was necessary sometimes; but [Mason] did not
conceive that the receipts and expenditures of the public money ought

79. For powerful arguments along these lines, see Vasan Kesavan & Michael Stokes Paulsen,
The Interpretive Force of the Constitution’s Secret Drafting History, 91 GEO. L.J. 1113, 1183–87
(2003).
80. 3 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 72, at 149–50.
81. 2 JONATHAN ELLIOT, THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONSTITUTIONAL
CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 292 (1891).

DOCUMENT 2 (DO NOT DELETE)

20

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

10/9/15 6:17 PM

[Vol. 47

ever to be concealed.”82 Richard Henry Lee responded that he found
the publication requirement “sufficiently explicit and satisfactory” in
that it “must be supposed to mean, in the common acceptation of
language, short, convenient periods.”83 Madison agreed, stating that
“by giving them an opportunity of publishing them from time to time, as
might be found easy and convenient, they would be more full and
satisfactory to the public, and would be sufficiently frequent,” adding
that “it was impossible, in such short intervals, to adjust the public
accounts in any satisfactory manner.”84 In this discussion, there was
again no suggestion that the Statement and Account Clause admitted of
categorical exceptions, whether for expenditures relating to national
security or otherwise, or that it permitted indefinite delays in
publication.85 Nor, as we have seen, did anyone disagree when Mason
opined that even when it came to military affairs and foreign relations,
the manner in which public funds are spent must always be publicly
disclosed. The clause’s proponents argued only that it granted
reasonable discretion as to the timing of publication in order to render
the disclosure obligation practicable.
b. Post-Ratification Commentary
Post-ratification commentary can also provide important insights into
original meaning. Indeed, the Supreme Court has written that to
ascertain the original understanding of a constitutional provision, it is
82. 3 id. at 459. Patrick Henry echoed this criticism, complaining that “publication from time
to time . . . may conceal what they think requires secrecy.” Id. at 462.
83. Id. at 459.
84. Id. at 460.
85. Also illuminating in this regard is Madison’s statement on the allowance for secrecy in the
proposed constitution:
The congressional proceedings are to be occasionally published, including all receipts
and expenditures of public money, of which no part can be used but in consequence of
appropriations made by law. This is a security which we do not enjoy under the
existing system. That part which authorizes the government to withhold from the
public knowledge what in their judgment may require secrecy, is imitated from the
[Articles of] [C]onfederation . . . .
Id. at 331. The “part” to which the final sentence refers is the Journal Clause, as only it permitted
Congress to keep some matters secret and had an antecedent in the Articles of Confederation.
See ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1777, art. IX, para. 7, reprinted in FEDERAL AND STATE
CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 78, at 15 (“The Congress of the United States shall . . . publish the
journal of their proceedings monthly, except such parts thereof relating to treaties, alliances or
military operations, as in their judgment requiry secresy . . . .”). In this fashion, Madison seems
to have acknowledged that the Statement and Account Clause created a new and unqualified
disclosure obligation distinct from the Journal Clause.
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appropriate to undertake “the examination of a variety of legal and other
sources to determine the public understanding of a legal text in the
period after its enactment or ratification,” adding that “[t]hat sort of
inquiry is a critical tool of constitutional interpretation.”86
Although most framing-era sources give scant attention to the
Appropriation Clause and Statement and Account Clause,87 some
provide helpful explications, stressing the role of the clauses in
producing political accountability.
In his American edition of
Blackstone’s Commentaries, St. George Tucker described the clauses as
a vehicle to enable the people to monitor the exercise of governmental
power:
All the expences of government being paid by the people, it is the
right of the people, not only, not to be taxed without their own
consent, or that of their representatives freely chosen, but also to be
actually consulted upon the disposal of the money which they have
brought into the treasury; it is therefore stipulated that no money shall
be drawn from the treasury, but in consequence of appropriations,
previously made by law; and, that the people may have an opportunity
of judging not only of the propriety of such appropriations, but of
seeing whether their money has been actually expended only, in
pursuance of the same; it is further provided, that a regular statement
and account of the receipts and expenditures of all public money shall
be published from time to time. These provisions form a salutary
check, not only upon the extravagance, and profusion, in which the
executive department might otherwise indulge itself, and its adherents
and dependents; but also against any misappropriation, which a
rapacious, ambitious, or otherwise unfaithful executive might be
disposed to make. In those governments where the people are taxed
by the executive, no such check can be interposed. The prince levies
whatever sums he thinks proper; disposes of them as he thinks proper;
and would deem it sedition against him and his government, if any
account were required of him, in what manner he had disposed of any
part of them. Such is the difference between governments, where
there is responsibility, and where there is none.88

86. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 605 (2008).
87. For example, William Rawle’s treatise contained only a brief discussion of the
Appropriations Clause in the context of the Treaty Clause, and no explication of the Statement
and Account Clause. See WILLIAM RAWLE, A VIEW OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA 70–73 (William S. Hein & Co. 2003) (1829).
88. 1 ST. GEORGE TUCKER, BLACKSTONE’S COMMENTARIES: WITH NOTES OF REFERENCE,
TO THE CONSTITUTION AND LAWS, OF THE UNITED STATES; AND THE COMMONWEALTH OF
VIRGINIA app. at 362 (Phila., William Young & Abraham Small 1803) (footnote omitted).
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In his treatise, Justice Story offered an account that tracked Tucker’s:
The object is apparent upon the slightest examination. It is to secure
regularity, punctuality, and fidelity, in the disbursements of public
money. As all the taxes raised from the people, as well as the
revenues arising from other sources, are to be applied to the discharge
of the expenses, debts, and other engagements of the government, it is
highly proper, that congress should possess the power to decide, how
and when any money should be applied for these purposes. If it were
otherwise, the executive would possess an unbounded power over the
public purse of the nation; and might apply all its monied resources at
his pleasure. The power to control, and direct the appropriations,
constitutes a most useful and salutary check upon profusion and
extravagance, as well as upon corrupt influence and public peculation.
In arbitrary governments the prince levies what money he pleases
from his subjects, disposes of it, as he thinks proper, and is beyond
responsibility or reproof. It is wise to interpose, in a republic, every
restraint, by which the public treasure, the common fund of all, should
be applied, with unshrinking honesty to such objects, as legitimately
belong to the common defence, and the general welfare. Congress is
made the guardian of this treasure; and to make their responsibility
complete and perfect, a regular account of the receipts and
expenditures is required to be published, that the people may know,
what money is expended, for what purposes, and by what authority.89

Accordingly, important post-ratification commentary understood the
clause as a vehicle for the public to hold elected officials accountable
for the manner in which public funds are spent.
c. Framing-Era Practice
Beyond evidence of how the public understood the meaning of
constitutional text, framing-era practice, such as the actions of the early
Congresses as they endeavored to operationalize the Constitution, can
also shed considerable light on the original understanding of the
Constitution.90
As we have seen, the early Congresses required the Secretary of the
Treasury to make annual reports of receipts and expenditures, broken

89. 3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 1342, at 213–14 (Cambridge, Brown, Shattuck & Co. 1833).
90. See, e.g., Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3151–
52 (2010); Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 723–24 (1986); Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783,
790–91 (1983). For a powerful scholarly argument along these lines, see Caleb Nelson,
Originalism and Interpretive Conventions, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 519, 525–39 (2003).
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down by head of appropriation.91 Thus, for example, in his report of
estimated receipts and expenditures for 1791–92, Secretary Hamilton
reported expenditures by reference to the appropriations that had been
previously made.92 Accordingly, one must consult the underlying
appropriations to understand the report of expenditures.
The first appropriation enacted could hardly have been briefer; a
single paragraph, it appropriated fixed sums “for defraying the expenses
of the civil list, . . . defraying the expenses of the department of
war[,] . . . discharging the warrants issued by the late board of treasury,
and . . . paying the pensions to invalids.”93 One scholar has speculated
that the brevity of this appropriation “seems to have arisen because of
the unpreparedness and lack of time on the part of the members [of the
First Congress].”94 That theory seems sound in light of the greater
specificity that was reflected in subsequent appropriations. The
following two annual appropriations added specific categories to the
military appropriation and referenced the estimates of the Secretary of
the Treasury as the basis for the sums appropriated.95 The estimates
were detailed, listing, for example, the number of officers employed by
the Department of War and their salaries and the costs of ordinance.96
Given the estimates’ reference in the appropriations themselves, as one
historian put it, “these estimates were, in effect, integral parts of the
appropriation acts, and they were set out in considerable detail.”97
The reason for this change in practice seems to be the complaints of
Senator William Maclay; although the Senate met in secret and
published only a skeletal account of its proceedings,98 in his journal,
91. See supra text accompanying notes 47–48.
92. See Alexander Hamilton, Estimates of Receipts and Expenditures for 1791–2, in 1
AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: CLASS III: FINANCE 144–46 (William S. Hein & Co. 1998) (1832)
[hereinafter AMERICAN STATE PAPERS].
93. Act of Sept. 29, 1789, ch. 23, § 1, 1 Stat. 95, 95 (“An Act making Appropriations for the
Service of the present year”).
94. VINCENT J. BROWNE, THE CONTROL OF THE PUBLIC BUDGET 35 (1949).
95. See Act of Mar. 26, 1790, ch. 4, § 1, 1 Stat. 104, 104 (“An Act making appropriations for
the support of government for the year one thousand seven hundred and ninety”); Act of Feb 11,
1791, ch. 6, § 1, 1 Stat. 190, 190 (“An Act making appropriations for the support of government
for during the year one thousand seven hundred and ninety-one, and for other purposes”).
96. E.g., Alexander Hamilton, Public Credit, in AMERICAN STATE PAPERS, supra note 92, at
15, 36–37.
97. LUCIUS WILMERDING, JR., THE SPENDING POWER: A HISTORY OF THE EFFORTS OF
CONGRESS TO CONTROL EXPENDITURES 22 (1943) (footnote omitted).
98. See, e.g., 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 15–93 (1789) (Joseph Gales ed., 1834) (ed. note). The
Senate was not opened to the public until February 1794. See DANIEL N. HOFFMAN,
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Maclay indicated that he had objected to lump-sum appropriations as
“giving the Secretary the money for him to account for as he pleases.”99
As one account put it:
Maclay’s critique struck a sympathetic chord. The next appropriation,
by incorporating the executive’s estimates into the statutory text and
dividing the military appropriation under twelve heads, was more
specific. When the House offered an equally or more specific bill for
1793, the Senate initially balked, amending it in favor of a single lump
sum and a small sum for unspecified contingencies. An unidentified
participant in the ensuing debate argued that such appropriation in
gross would vest too much discretion in secretary of war and, by
keeping expenditures out of public view, would make it difficult to
require a public accounting. The Senate gave in, and the more specific
House bill was enacted.100

Thus, the framing-era annual reports of spending, in light of the
appropriations and spending estimates they referenced, provided great
detail about national security spending, down to the numbers and
salaries of military officers employed. In addition to those reports,
pursuant to his statutory charge, the Treasurer sent Congress periodic
reports on receipts and expenditures.101 The surviving reports detail the
individual warrant reflecting each payment made by the Treasurer by
payee, and include a brief description of the purpose of the payment
(sometimes referring to an appropriation).102 These reports, coupled
with those of Secretary Hamilton and the underlying appropriations,
offered the public a comprehensive account of federal spending.
The closest Congress came in the framing era to addressing the
propriety of confidential spending came when Congress authorized the

GOVERNMENTAL SECRECY AND THE FOUNDING FATHERS: A STUDY IN CONSTITUTIONAL
CONTROLS 84–88 (1981).
99. WILLIAM MACLAY, JOURNAL OF WILLIAM MACLAY: UNITED STATES SENATOR FROM
PENNSYLVANIA 1789-1791, at 221 (Frederick Ungar Publ’g Co. 1965) (1810).
100. BANKS & RAVEN-HANSEN, supra note 52, at 34 (footnotes omitted). For an account to
similar effect, see David P. Currie, The Constitution in Congress: Substantive Issues in the First
Congress, 1789-91, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 775, 795–96 (1994).
101. See, e.g., 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 1103–04 (1790) (Joseph Gales ed., 1834); 2 ANNALS OF
CONG. 1653-54, 1717–18 (1790); 2 ANNALS OF CONG. 1839–40 (1791); 3 ANNALS OF CONG.
143–44, 227–28 (1791); 3 ANNALS OF CONG. 671–72, 731–32 (1792); 3 ANNALS OF CONG. 897–
98 (1793); 4 ANNALS OF CONG. 141–42, 667–68, 783–84, 949–50 (1794).
102. For the surviving reports, and corresponding entries in the Treasurer’s daybook, see VIII
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS, 4 MARCH 1789–3 MARCH 1791:
PETITION HISTORIES AND NONLEGISLATIVE OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS 790–834 (Kenneth R.
Bowling et al. eds., 1998).
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President to withdraw up to $40,000 annually until the next session of
Congress “for the support of such persons as he shall commission to
serve the United States in foreign parts, and for the expenses incident to
the business in which they may be employed.”103 The appropriation
also provided that:
the President shall account specifically for all such expenditures of the
said money as in his judgment may be made public, and also for the
amount of such expenditures as he may think it advisable not to
specify, and cause a regular statement and account thereof to be laid
before Congress annually, and also lodged in the proper office of the
treasury department.104

Public reports were subsequently laid before Congress disclosing the
annual spending pursuant to this authorization.105 The Second Congress
extended this authorization, and required that the President “mak[e] a
certificate or certificates . . . of the amount of such expenditures, as he
may think it advisable not to specify; and every such certificate shall be
deemed a sufficient voucher.”106
Representative Scott said that the President’s confidential fund was
justified in order to conceal the extent to which the United States varied
in the money spent in different diplomatic posts, which might, if
disclosed, suggest “invidious distinctions between foreign nations.”107
Beyond that, it was widely understood that among the duties of
Americans engaged in diplomacy abroad was espionage. Consider, for
example, what Publius wrote to the people of New York, as they
considered ratification of the Constitution:
It seldom happens in the negotiation of treaties, of whatever nature,
but that perfect secrecy and immediate despatch are sometimes
requisite. These are cases where the most useful intelligence may be
obtained, if the persons possessing it can be relieved from
apprehensions of discovery. Those apprehensions will operate on
those persons whether they are actuated by mercenary or friendly
motives; and there doubtless are many of both descriptions, who

103. Act of July 1, 1790, ch. 22, § 1, 1 Stat. 128, 128 (“An Act providing the medium of
intercourse between the United States and foreign nations”).
104. Id. at 129.
105. See, e.g., Thomas Jefferson, Expenses of Foreign Intercourse (1792), reprinted in I
AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: FOREIGN RELATIONS (William S. Hein & Co. 1998) (1833).
106. Act of Feb. 9, 1793, ch. 4, § 2, 1 Stat. 299, 300 (“An act to continue in force for a limited
time, and to amend the act instituted ‘An act providing the means of intercourse between the
United States and foreign nations’”).
107. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 1127 (1790) (Joseph Gales ed., 1834) (statement of Rep. Scott).
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would rely on the secrecy of the President, but who would not confide
in that of the Senate, and still less in that of a large popular assembly.
The convention have done well, therefore, in so disposing of the
power of making treaties, that although the President must, in forming
them, act by the advice and consent of the Senate, yet he will be able
to manage the business of intelligence in such a manner as prudence
may suggest.108

Thus, the character of the appropriation would likely have placed the
public on notice that the confidential expenditures it authorized likely
included payments to secret agents operating abroad.
The Third Congress increased the sum available in the confidential
fund to one million dollars.109 Gerhard Casper regarded this as a
particularly important precedent given its size—”if . . . expended in 1
year it would have been 14 percent of the total outlays of the Federal
Government”—and opined that it seemingly confirmed “Presidential
discretion to withhold details from the public eye” since the money
“was for ransoming American hostages held by Algiers.”110 Although a
treaty with Algiers was concluded in 1796, “[t]he account of receipts
and expenditures for the year ending September 30, 1796, made no
reference to Algiers-related expenses.”111 The fact that the government
made secret payments to ransom Americans held hostage by a foreign
power would seem to support the view that the Constitution did not
require the disclosure of expenditures bearing on sensitive matters
relating to national security. Yet, there is more to this story; as
Professor Casper acknowledged, the House subsequently voted “to lift
the injunction of secrecy.”112
Although the ransom payments were not disclosed to the public when
they were made sometime the previous year, in February 1797, after a

108. THE FEDERALIST No. 64, at 390–91 (John Jay) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
109. See Act of Mar. 20, 1794, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 345 (“An Act making further provision for the
expenses attending the intercourse of the United States with foreign nations, and further to
continue in force the act entitled ‘An act providing the means of intercourse between the United
States and foreign nations’”). A version of this statute remains in force. See 22 U.S.C. § 2364(c)
(2012).
110. 1977 Senate Intelligence Funds Disclosure Hearings, supra note 59, at 90. In his
congressional testimony, Professor Turner also regarded this as an important precedent
supporting the constitutionality of confidential intelligence spending. See 1994 House
Intelligence Funds Disclosure Hearings, supra note 59, at 162 (statement of Robert F. Turner).
111. 1977 Senate Intelligence Funds Disclosure Hearings, supra note 59, at 91.
112. Id. For a more complete account, see Gerhard Casper, An Essay in Separation of
Powers: Some Early Versions and Practices, 30 WM. & MARY L. REV. 211, 242–55 (1989).
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public debate in which some members expressed the view that the
President should make a public accounting of sums expended to pay
ransom, the House voted to adopt a resolution calling for an
accounting.113 After receiving a communication from the President, the
House debated the matter in closed session in light of the President’s
request that his communication be kept confidential, but ultimately
voted against confidentiality.114
The communication from the
President, which contained detailed estimates and an accounting of both
the costs of the agreement and accounts of the negotiations seeking to
free the American sailors held hostage, was then published in the
Annals of Congress.115 Although we cannot know what was said in
closed session, it may well be that the House believed that the Statement
and Account Clause compelled it to reject the President’s request for
confidentiality, at least when it came to expenses of this magnitude. In
any event, the ransom payment was made public within about a year; so
this is hardly a precedent for indefinite nondisclosure of information
about the manner in which public funds are spent.
Another instance of confidentiality in financial affairs in which
Congress again ultimately opted for disclosure occurred in 1811, when
Congress secretly appropriated $100,000 for the costs of preparing a
military occupation of territory south of Georgia.116 Similar to the
Algiers precedent, the next year Congress voted to make the
appropriation public.117
113. See 6 ANNALS OF CONG. 1763–67 (1797). For accounts of the ransom negotiations and
payments, see RAY W. IRWIN, THE DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES WITH THE
BARBARY POWERS 69–81 (1931); and RICHARD B. PARKER, UNCLE SAM IN BARBARY: A
DIPLOMATIC HISTORY 91–124 (2004).
114. See 6 ANNALS OF CONG. 2235 (1797).
115. See id. at 2235–45. The Secretary of the Treasury estimated “[t]he whole expense of
fulfilling the treaty” at $992,463.25. Id. at 2239. Relatedly, it was the President’s earlier request
that certain presidential communications relating to negotiations to pay ransom to the Barbary
powers be kept confidential that led the House to conclude that it had the power to make public
communications that the President had conveyed confidentially. See HOFFMAN, supra note 98, at
100–04.
116. See Act of Jan. 15, 1811, 3 Stat. 471 (authorizing the occupation of territory and
appropriating funds); Act of Mar. 3, 1811, 3 Stat. 472 (providing that the previous act not be
printed or published). In 1813, Congress again authorized the President to use the military to
occupy the territory, appropriating $20,000. See Act of Feb. 12, 1813, 3 Stat. 472 (“An Act
authorizing the President of the United States to take possession of a tract of country lying south
of the Mississippi territory and west of the river Perdido”).
117. For reasons that are unclear, the 1811 appropriations were not actually published in 1818,
see 3 Stat. 471 (1818) (ed. note), although the injunction of secrecy as to the 1811 appropriation
had been removed by resolution of the House on July 6, 1812. See 24 ANNALS OF CONG. 1692–
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Thus, in the framing era, confidential spending was limited to the
President’s confidential fund, which had a defined, rather specific and
fairly well-understood purpose—the support of those abroad acting on
behalf of the United States, who might have to undertake confidential
activities related to sensitive diplomatic affairs. When Congress
thought there was a compelling justification for additional secret
expenditures—such as money for ransom or to occupy foreign
territory—they were made public rather promptly after the exigency that
had given rise to the perceived need for confidentiality had passed.
Until the twentieth century, the only confidential spending that
Congress authorized involved the President’s confidential fund, for
which the President’s certificates were used as public documentation.118
To this extent, there was public disclosure of both the purpose and the
amount of these expenditures. The size of the confidential fund was
modest; by 1899, the annual appropriation for the confidential fund had
reached only $63,000.119 In short, framing-era practice suggests that the
original understanding was that the details of every single expense need
not be disclosed, but the essential character of all significant expenses
must be published within a year or so.
In the twentieth century, confidential spending proliferated.
Although it is difficult to gather relevant information given the opacity
with which Congress had authorized confidential spending, Congress
authorized confidential accounts in a variety of instances, though as
with the President’s confidential fund for intercourse with foreign

93 (1812). For a detailed review of the relevant enactments and the sequence of their enactment
and subsequent publication, see DAVID HUNTER MILLER, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, SECRET
STATUTES OF THE UNITED STATES 5–10 (1918). For a helpful account of the secret preparations
to occupy this territory, which resulted in an occupation later withdrawn in the face of diplomatic
pressure, see ALEXANDER DECONDE, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 121–24 (2d
ed. 1971).
118. See Louis Fisher, Confidential Spending and Government Accountability, 47 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 347, 348, 355–57 (1979). There was at least one effort to breach confidentiality,
and it enjoyed some success. In 1846, the House asked President Polk to account for payments
on presidential certificate from the confidential fund for foreign intercourse during the period in
which Daniel Webster had served as Secretary of State under President Tyler, and President Polk
refused. See id. at 355–56; Herman Wolkinson, Demands of Congressional Committees for
Executive Papers: Part I, 10 FED. B.J. 103, 119–21 (1949). Subsequently, President Tyler and
former Secretary of State James Buchanan testified before congressional committees, and former
President Adams submitted a deposition, explaining the use of the contingent fund. See 1
RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOWAK, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: SUBSTANCE
AND PROCEDURE § 7.1(c)(iii), at 948–49 (4th ed. 2009).
119. See FISHER, supra note 53, at 234.
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nations, Congress required certification of confidential spending by a
designated official in all but a handful of instances, involving
exceptional cases such as the Manhattan Project, the Atomic Energy
Commission, White House operations, and the President’s own
expenses.120 Nevertheless, “[o]vershadowing other confidential funds,
both in dollar amount and in character of operation, are those spent on
the U.S. intelligence community.”121
It seems evident that twentieth- and twenty-first-century confidential
spending has gone well beyond any framing-era precedent. To be sure,
the demands on the intelligence community may have exponentially
increased as America became a preeminent world power, but framingera practice amounts to a slender reed supporting the contemporary
regime of confidential intelligence spending, in which only annual
aggregate appropriations are disclosed.
3. Constitutional Ethos and Structure
Another approach for fleshing out the meaning of the Constitution’s
text involves consideration of underlying principles; constitutional text
frequently reflects fundamental ethical or structural principles that aid
constitutional interpretation.122 One famous example is when the Court
held that the First Amendment offered protection for allegedly
defamatory speech to a degree unknown in the framing era, reasoning
that protection for “criticism of . . . official conduct” was “the central
meaning of the First Amendment,”123 a point to which the Court
repeatedly turned in the subsequent doctrinal evolution of the
constitutional protection for freedom of speech.124
That a fundamental ethical and structural principle is reflected in the
Statement and Account Clause seems evident. As we have seen, the
framing generation understood the clause in just this fashion—
120. See Fisher, supra note 118, at 358–82.
121. FISHER, supra note 53, at 236.
122. For Professor Bobbitt’s description of ethical and structural argument, see BOBBITT,
supra note 61, at 14–16, 20–22. For a similar approach resting interpretative practice on
underlying principles derived from constitutional text, see JACK M. BALKIN, LIVING
ORIGINALISM 259–73 (2011).
123. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 273 (1964).
124. See, e.g., Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 534–35 (2001); Phila. Newspapers, Inc. v.
Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 771–78 (1986); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 342–48 (1974).
For the seminal commentary on the significance of Justice Brennan’s characterization of the First
Amendment’s meaning, see Harry Kalven, Jr., The New York Times Case: A Note on “The
Central Meaning of the First Amendment,” 1964 SUP. CT. REV. 191.
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advancing a basic republican value by enabling the people to hold their
government effectively accountable for the manner in which public
funds are spent. This understanding has both ethical and structural
resonance. The clause suggests an ethical duty on the part of those
who decide how the public’s money will be spent to disclose their
decisions. It also has a structural role in ensuring that the electorate
has adequate information available to hold officials accountable for
their decisions about how public funds are spent through the electoral
process that the Constitution also mandates.125
Scholars advocating a right of access to government information
frequently frame their case in terms of enhancing the republican values
embedded
within
the
Constitution
regarding
democratic
accountability.126 The judicial opinions that have gone furthest in
advocating a First Amendment right of access to governmental
information have invoked similar principles.127 The Statement and
Account Clause has a similar function; as one scholar put it, the clause
represents a “commitment to political accountability.”128 The clause
reflects both an ethical obligation to provide information to the people
and a precondition for achieving representative democracy through the
Constitution’s electoral machinery. It is part of the constitutional ethic
and infrastructure of political accountability.
The clause’s placement with the Appropriations Clause, moreover,
reinforces this role. The Appropriations Clause has long been
understood to require that all spending be authorized by congressional
appropriation,129 and it follows, as Kate Stith has observed:
Both clauses make Congress accountable to the public for all federal
spending. The appropriations requirement mandates that government

125. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2 (popular election to the House of Representatives); id. art. II.
§ 1 (electoral college to choose the President); id. amend. XII (electoral college to choose the
President); id. amend. XVII (popular election to the Senate).
126. See, e.g., Adam Samaha, Government Secrets, Constitutional Law, and Platforms for
Judicial Intervention, 53 UCLA L. REV. 909, 916–23 (2006); Barry Sullivan, FOIA and the First
Amendment: Representative Democracy and the People’s Elusive “Right to Know,” 72 MD. L.
REV. 1, 24–43 (2012).
127. See, e.g., Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 587–88 (1980)
(Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment); Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 30–32 (1978)
(Stevens, J., dissenting).
128. Gia B. Lee, Persuasion, Transparency, and Government Speech, 56 HASTINGS L.J. 983,
1016 (2005).
129. For a summary of precedent on this point, see 1 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE,
GAO-04-261SP, PRINCIPLES OF FEDERAL APPROPRIATIONS LAW ch. 2 (2004 & Supp. 2014).
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expenditure be authorized by legislative action. The statement and
account requirement provides a means of enforcing the requirement
that spending be duly authorized. . . . As a matter of textual coherence,
the two phrases should be regarded as synonymous.130

Thus, even though the Statement and Account Clause is found in
Article I along with other enumerated powers of Congress, like the
Appropriations Clause with which it is paired, it is both a grant of
authority and a constraint. Indeed, the constraining character of both
clauses is confirmed by their placement in Article I’s Section 9, along
with other limitations on governmental powers.131
This discussion has two implications. First, the Statement and
Account Clause creates a mandatory duty that binds the political
branches; not merely a discretionary power of publication. It would
make little sense to place the clause in the Constitution if it did no more
than authorize publication when Congress or the Executive found it
convenient; as one scholar wrote, “we hardly need the Statement[] and
Account[] Clause to tell Congress to publish as much of the federal
budget as it politically decides ought to be published.”132 Similarly, the
clause is unnecessary to enable Congress to demand from the Executive
whatever information about federal spending it deems necessary—
Congress can simply refuse to appropriate until it receives whatever
information about spending it wants, or attach reporting requirements to
the appropriations it enacts. The clause is superfluous if understood as a
grant of power to the political branches; it is meaningful only if
understood as an ethical and structural constraint on the political
branches. Disclosure pursuant to the clause is part of the process
specified in the Constitution by which officials are accountable to the
130. Stith, supra note 62, at 1357. For a contrasting view, arguing that in some circumstances, the President can authorize spending, see J. Gregory Sidak, The President’s Power of the
Purse, 1989 DUKE L.J. 1162. Even on this view, however, a politically accountable official must
authorize public spending, and the Statement and Account Clause ensures that the public is in a
position to hold the Executive responsible for these expenditures.
131. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9 (limiting power to ban the slave trade, suspend habeas corpus,
impose direct taxes, prohibiting bills of attainder, ex post facto laws, taxes or duties on articles
imported from another state, preferences for any port, and granting titles of nobility).
132. Jonathan R. Siegel, A Theory of Justiciability, 86 TEX. L. REV. 73, 129 (2007)
[hereinafter Siegel, A Theory of Justiciability]. Elsewhere, Professor Siegel has added that the
political process is often an unsatisfactory method for producing compliance with constitutional
norms because elections are generally not focused on single issues such as the incumbents’
compliance with constitutional norms, but instead turn on a far more complex amalgam of
factors. See Jonathan R. Siegel, The Institutional Case for Judicial Review, 97 IOWA L. REV.
1147, 1169–71, 1178–80 (2012) [hereinafter Siegel, The Institutional Case for Judicial Review].
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electorate, not an option to be utilized in the political branches’
discretion.
Second, the clause, properly understood, requires disclosure
sufficiently frequent and detailed to facilitate real political
accountability, not mere formality. Justice Frankfurter once wrote of
the Fourth Amendment and its requirement that searches ordinarily be
authorized by warrant:
It makes all the difference in the world whether one recognizes the
central fact about the Fourth Amendment, namely, that it was a
safeguard against recurrence of abuses so deeply felt by the Colonies
as to be one of the potent causes of the Revolution, or one thinks of it
as merely a requirement for a piece of paper.133

So it is with the Statement and Account Clause: it makes all the
difference whether one views it as an obligation to release a number, or
instead as a requirement for disclosure sufficient to enable the public to
hold elected officials accountable for the manner in which public funds
are spent. Viewed purely as a formal requirement requiring publication
of a number, no matter how unhelpful, the clause has little point.
Viewed as a requirement that articulates a precondition for effective
political accountability, it requires that the government publish
sufficiently detailed and comprehensible information so that the people
can understand the workings of their government, and, if necessary,
hold elected officials accountable at the next election.
4. Constitutional Pragmatism
Pragmatism has purchase as well in constitutional interpretation; in
the context of national security in particular, the Court has long since
embraced Justice Jackson’s warning: “[I]f the Court does not temper its
doctrinaire logic with a little practical wisdom, it will convert the
constitutional Bill of Rights into a suicide pact.”134 Pragmatism
accordingly might be thought to argue for reading the Statement and
Account Clause to permit the government to offer a “statement and
account” that conceals sensitive categories of spending the disclosure of
which would do serious harm to national security.

133. United States v. Rabinowitz, 338 U.S. 56, 69 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
134. Terminiello v. City of Chi., 337 U.S. 1, 37 (1949) (Jackson. J., dissenting). For a
particularly pertinent case embracing this admonition see Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 306–10
(1981), which rejected claims that revocation of the passport of a former CIA agent who had
disclosed classified information without authorization infringed freedom to travel, free speech,
and due process.
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It is easy to state this pragmatic argument for concealing intelligence
spending; it was nicely summarized by then-Director of Central
Intelligence Stansfield Turner even as he agreed that aggregate
appropriations should be disclosed, as he explained why any additional
disclosure would be prejudicial to national security: “Were we to
intentionally or inadvertently disclose further details of the budget
figure, we would expose those areas of emphasis and expertise
regarding collection and analysis of intelligence, and over time, trends
in such emphasis would become obvious.”135
Similarly, then-Acting Director of Central Intelligence John
McLaughlin, while also supporting disclosure of aggregate
appropriations, opposed any further breakdown of individual agency as
“giv[ing] too much opportunity for adversaries to understand how we
are moving our money from year to year, from technical programs to
human source collection and to other objectives.”136
Yet, a measure of skepticism is warranted toward this type of
speculation. Disclosure may compromise legitimate concerns for
secrecy, but it also facilitates accountability and exposes mistakes.
Thus, incumbents have incentive to err on the side of secrecy, some less
legitimate than others.
Even Director Turner acknowledged,
“intelligence communities in general are very reluctant to see any
information released whatsoever.”137 More recently, a presidential
commission that included former members of the intelligence
community observed:
The reasons why government officials want secrecy are many and
varied. They range from the truly compelling to the patently
illegitimate. Sometimes government officials want secrecy because
they rightly fear that the disclosure of certain information might
seriously undermine the nation’s security. Sometimes they want
secrecy because they do not want to have to deal with public criticism
of their decisions or because they do not want the public, Congress, or
the courts to override their decisions, which they believe to be wise.
Sometimes they want secrecy because disclosure will expose their

135. 1977 Senate Intelligence Funds Disclosure Hearings, supra note 59, at 6–7 (testimony of
Admiral Stansfield Turner). To similar effect, see id. at 46 (statement of William E. Colby).
136. Building an Agile Intelligence Community to Fight Terrorism and Emerging Threats:
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Gov’t Operations, 108th Cong. 17 (2004) (testimony of John E.
McLaughlin) [hereinafter Senate Government Operations Hearings].
137. 1977 Senate Intelligence Funds Disclosure Hearings, supra note 59, at 14 (testimony of
Admiral Stansfield Turner).
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own incompetence, noncompliance, or wrongdoing. Some of those
reasons for secrecy are obviously more worthy of deference than
others.138

Similarly, in a debate about disclosing the intelligence budget,
Senator Moynihan once opined: “Secrecy congeals intelligence. It
conceals failure, and it conceals mistakes.”139
An illustration of the need for caution when assessing the intelligence
community’s objections to financial transparency is provided by thenDirector of Central Intelligence William Colby’s claim in 1975, in
response to litigation seeking disclosure of CIA budgeting information,
that disclosure of even aggregate appropriations, in combination with
other publicly available information, would be of considerable use to a
hostile power.140 In 1994, the Director of Central Intelligence and a
number of his predecessors similarly opposed disclosure of aggregate
annual appropriations, expressing a litany of concerns that disclosure
would inhibit future budgeting and assist potential adversaries.141 In
2004, the Director of the FBI voiced a similar concern about disclosure
of aggregate appropriations aiding adversaries,142 and at his
confirmation hearing later that year, Director of Central IntelligenceDesignate Porter Goss also opposed disclosure of aggregate
expenditures: “It served us well not to put that top line out when we
were in what I will call a bipolar stand-off with the Soviet Union.”143
Also that year, when a proposal to require disclosure of aggregate
appropriations was removed from pending legislation, the Bush
Administration applauded: “Disclosing to the nation’s enemies,
especially during wartime, the amounts requested by the President, and
provided by the Congress, for the conduct of the nation’s intelligence
138. LIBERTY AND SECURITY, supra note 9, at 125.
139. 139 CONG. REC. S15560 (1993). For Senator Moynihan’s argument that secrecy had a
corrosive effect on intelligence gathering during the Cold War, see DANIEL PATRICK MOYNIHAN,
SECRECY: THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE 178–201 (1998).
140. 1977 Senate Intelligence Funds Disclosure Hearings, supra note 59, at 345–46
(interrogatory answers of William E. Colby). For a summary of the arguments that were made
against disclosure of aggregate appropriation levels, see Best & Bazan, supra note 51, at 17–21.
141. 1994 House Intelligence Funds Disclosure Hearings, supra note 59, at 6–11 (statement
of R. James Woolsey); id. at 73–76 (statement of Robert Gates); id. at 76–77 (statement of
Richard Helms).
142. See Senate Government Operations Hearings, supra note 136, at 18 (testimony of Robert
S. Mueller III).
143. Nomination of the Honorable Porter J. Goss To Be Director of Central Intelligence:
Hearings Before the S. Select Comm. on Intelligence, 108th Cong. 37 (2004) (testimony of Porter
J. Goss).

DOCUMENT 2 (DO NOT DELETE)

2015]

National Security Freedom of Information Act

10/9/15 6:17 PM

35

activities would harm the national security.”144 Yet, as we have seen,
Congress directed disclosure of aggregate appropriations in 2007,
without apparent ill effects.145
This is not the only instance in which intelligence officials’
predictions about the adverse effects of disclosure of classified
information have proven overblown. Mark Fenster, for example, has
amassed considerable evidence that the massive disclosure of classified
information through WikiLeaks did not generate anything like the
adverse effects predicted by government officials.146 Similarly, it seems
likely that those who designed the three programs considered in the
three examples that introduced this article regarded secrecy as essential,
and the programs as necessary to address profound, perhaps even
existential threats to national security in the post-9/11 landscape. Yet,
once those programs were disclosed to the public, even the presidential
administrations that had previously supported them retreated.
Apparently, these programs seemed less essential to national security in
the face of the political accountability that transparency can produce.
To be sure, disclosure that breaks down intelligence spending beyond
the aggregate annual intelligence budget poses some particular risks.
Director Colby, for example, explained that if the CIA had been
required to disclose that it was spending large sums on a new
surveillance aircraft, the disclosure might have alerted adversaries, and
could have led them to target likely manufacturers for espionage, or to
advance their own efforts to develop similar technology.147 He also
argued that as more information is publicly released by the United
States, it becomes cheaper and easier for adversaries to learn about
United States intelligence capacities.148 But, an adversary might make
similar use of information about spending by the military to develop a
new aircraft, and yet the military does not insist that this type of
spending be concealed, even though its disclosure presents largely
144. The Nomination of Dr. Condoleeza Rice To Be Secretary of State: Hearings Before the S.
Comm. on Foreign Relations, 109th Cong. 283 (2005) (letter of October 18, 2004 of Joshua B.
Bolten & Condoleeza Rice).
145. See text accompanying notes 53–56.
146. See Mark Fenster, Disclosure’s Effects: Wikileaks and Transparency, 97 IOWA L. REV.
753 (2012).
147. 1977 Senate Intelligence Funds Disclosure Hearings, supra note 59, at 346–47
(interrogatory answers of William E. Colby).
148. See U.S. Intelligence Agencies and Activities: Intelligence Costs and Fiscal Procedures:
Hearings Before the Select Comm. on Intelligence, U.S. H.R.: Part One, 94th Cong. 116–18
(1975) (testimony of William E. Colby).
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indistinguishable risks to national security.
Nevertheless, there is little doubt that detailed disclosure could
compromise intelligence gathering—comprehensive disclosure that
reveals the specifics of ongoing operations and tactics, for example,
would likely alert targets and thereby provoke countermeasures that
could jeopardize their success. But, disclosure obligations could be
tailored to avoid disclosing operational detail. For one thing, the
Statement and Account Clause may not require such detailed
disclosure—a question considered below. For another, even apparently
unqualified constitutional text may admit of exceptions on sufficiently
compelling circumstances. As an example, despite the seemingly
absolute protection for free speech and a free press in the First
Amendment, it may well be that on a compelling showing of imminent
and serious danger to national security, a restraint on publication might
be constitutionally permissible.149
Limiting seemingly absolute rights in this fashion is one device for
ensuring that the Constitution does not become Justice Jackson’s suicide
pact. For just this reason, perhaps a limiting principle could be applied
to the Statement and Account Clause that excuses disclosure to the
extent that it would create a serious and demonstrable threat.150
Congress’s decision to delay disclosure of ransom payments in 1797
and the 1811 appropriation for the expense of the secret military
preparations to occupy territory south of Georgia offers some framingera support for delaying disclosure during periods when secrecy is
essential for avoiding prejudice to ongoing negotiations or
operations.151 The possibility that particular disclosures might produce
particular risks, however, surely cannot sustain a regime that as a matter
of course, and without requiring any particularized justification,
discloses nothing but aggregate intelligence appropriations.
When canvassing the pragmatic considerations, it is worth noting as

149. See, e.g., N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 725–27 (1971) (Brennan, J.,
concurring).
150. In congressional testimony, Professor Thomas Emerson suggested tracking Justice
Brennan’s position on the permissibility of prior restraints, that “prohibition of disclosure on the
basis of national security was permissible only when there was ‘Governmental allegation and
proof that publication must inevitably, directly, and immediately cause the occurrence of an event
kindred to imperiling the safety of a transport already at sea.’” 1977 Senate Intelligence Funds
Disclosure Hearings, supra note 59, at 98 (testimony of Thomas I. Emerson) (quoting N.Y.
Times, 403 U.S. at 726–27 (Brennan, J., concurring)).
151. See supra text accompanying notes 109–17.
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well that disclosure may entail risks, but it may also yield benefits. It is
notable that the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks (the “9/11
Commission”) recommended that aggregate appropriations for the
intelligence community and its component agencies should no longer be
secret, not based on constitutional considerations but to improve the
performance of the intelligence community.152 Perhaps the 9/11
Commission’s proposal was too modest given the problem it identified.
When only aggregate appropriations or spending is disclosed, this may
also conceal particular programs that involve the kind of waste and
inefficiency that could not bear public scrutiny, such as the satellite
system described in the third example that opened this Article, and
which proved unable to retain political support once the public got a
glimpse of a debate that had previously been conducted only in secret.
In this respect, facilitating public scrutiny of intelligence spending may
strengthen the intelligence community when compared to that of an
adversary that is not subject to an effective regime of political
accountability. When officials know they will be held publicly
accountable for successes and failures alike, they may exercise greater
prudence in decision making.
Pragmatic considerations, in short, offer no clear guide for
interpreting the Statement and Account Clause—secrecy has its virtues
but also its vices. Perhaps pragmatism argues for an approach to the
clause developed with this dualism in mind.
B. Ascertaining the Scope of the Obligation to Disclose
Intelligence Spending
As we have seen, intelligence spending is exempted from any
obligation of public disclosure; only the total aggregate figures for the
National and Military Intelligence Programs requested by the President
and appropriated by the Congress are disclosed. At first blush, it seems
impossible to reconcile this regime with the Statement and Account
Clause.
Under the current regime, although limited information is released
about appropriations, no information whatsoever is released about
expenditures. The possibility that expenditures might diverge from
appropriations is more than theoretical; both the Secretary of Defense
and the Director of National Intelligence are granted authority to
152. See NAT’L COMM’N ON TERRORIST ATTACKS, THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT 410, 416
(2006) [hereinafter 9/11 REPORT].
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transfer appropriated funds that are available for intelligence
activities.153 Accordingly, disclosure of appropriations is hardly
equivalent to a publication of expenditures as required by the Statement
and Account Clause. The same is true with respect to information about
intelligence spending given to Congress. It is unclear what classified
intelligence information about intelligence appropriations and spending
is shared with Congress, though apparently all members are permitted to
review the classified annexes to appropriations legislation for
intelligence spending.154 But, even if comprehensive information about
intelligence spending is shared with Congress, the rules of both Houses
forbid members to disclose classified information to the public.155 As
we have seen, however, information must be disclosed to the public at
large if the clause is to fulfill its function of enabling the electorate to
hold officials accountable for the manner in which public funds are
spent.
In light of the absence of any publication of intelligence
expenditures, there are only two types of arguments that could reconcile
this regime with the Statement and Account Clause. The first is a claim
that when it comes to sensitive matters at the intersection of national
security and foreign affairs in which a need for confidentiality presents
itself, the clause is properly understood to accommodate that need. The
second is a claim that the disclosure of aggregate appropriations is
sufficient to comport with the clause. An inquiry into these arguments
sheds considerable light on the scope of the obligation imposed by the
Statement and Account Clause.

153. See 10 U.S.C. § 429 (2012) (Secretary of Defense); 50 U.S.C. § 3024(c)(5)(B), (d)
(2012) (Director of National Intelligence).
154. See, e.g., BEST, supra note 52, at 12; 1994 House Intelligence Funds Disclosure
Hearings, supra note 59, at 11 (statement of R. James Woolsey). In addition, when funds are to
be used for other than an appropriated purpose, the necessary congressional committees must be
notified. See 50 U.S.C. § 3094.
155. See JOHN V. SULLIVAN, CONSTITUTION, JEFFERSON’S MANUAL, AND RULES OF THE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, H.R. DOC. NO. 111–157, at X.11(g), XXIII.13 (prohibiting
disclosure of classified information unless the House votes to disclose and requiring members to
take an oath prior to gaining access to classified information); U.S. SENATE SELECT COMM. ON
INTELLIGENCE, RULES OF PROCEDURE app. A, § 8 (prohibiting disclosure of classified
information unless select committee votes to do so and gives notice to majority and minority
leaders and the president and Senate fails to timely vote to prevent disclosure).
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1. The Argument for a National Security Exception to the
Publication Requirement
The argument that the Statement and Account Clause tolerates
secrecy upon adequate justification rests on a straightforward pragmatic
claim that the clause accommodates concerns about the need for
national security secrecy, although it relies as well on framing-era
practice. As Gerhard Casper put it in congressional testimony:
In view of th[e] early history and in view of my general sense of the
attitude of the framers toward secrecy, I find it difficult to believe that
the statement and account clause mandates annual disclosures of
intelligence expenditures if it is the considered judgment of the
Congress that publication would harm the national security.156

In a legal memorandum submitted to Congress during the same
congressional hearings, the CIA’s Office of General Counsel agreed,
relying on the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Richardson
to support the view that Congress has plenary power to decide what
information should be disclosed to the public under the Statement and
Account Clause.157 Indeed, this view is suggested by dicta in
Richardson, when the Supreme Court, while acknowledging that it
“need not reach or decide precisely what is meant by ‘a regular
Statement and Account,’” nevertheless opined that “Congress has
plenary power to exact any reporting and accounting it considers
appropriate in the public interest,” adding that “historical analysis of
the genesis of [the Statement and Account Clause] suggests that it was
intended to permit some degree of secrecy of governmental
operations.”158
Yet, it is enormously difficult to square this assertion of vast, if not
entirely unlimited, congressional power over the manner and extent to
which information about governmental expenditures will be disclosed
with the Constitution’s text, original understanding, and the Statement
and Account Clause’s place in constitutional ethos and structure. The
text of the clause grants discretion over the timing of disclosure, but it
admits of no categorical exception from the duty of disclosure for
intelligence or national security-related spending. The evidence of the

156. 1977 Senate Intelligence Funds Disclosure Hearings, supra note 59, at 91.
157. Id. at 9 (Memorandum of Law from Office of General Counsel, CIA).
158. United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 178 n.11 (1974). To similar effect, see
Harrington v. Bush, 553 F.2d 190, 194 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (dictum) (“This clause is not selfdefining and Congress has plenary power to give meaning to the provision.” (footnote omitted)).
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original understanding of the clause indicates that it means what is says.
Although opponents feared that congressional discretion related to
frequency of publication might facilitate secrecy, the clause’s
proponents uniformly denied that assertion. Not one of them even
hinted at the view that the clause admitted of any exception for national
security or other sensitive types of spending, and they denied that it
conferred unfettered discretion to delay disclosure indefinitely. Postratification commentary similarly discerned no broad power to treat
some types of expenditures as confidential. The clause was understood
to grant Congress a degree of discretion on the timing of disclosure, but
not discretion about whether some expenditures were too sensitive to be
disclosed.
Constitutional ethos and structure point to the same conclusion. The
clause is coherent only as a check on the ability of elected officials to
insulate themselves from political accountability; if Congress was to
enjoy plenary power to conceal whatever it deems appropriately
confidential about the manner in which public funds are spent, there
would hardly have been a place in the Constitution for a provision
imposing a mandatory duty of disclosure with respect to receipts and
expenditures. To be sure, the Constitution plainly tolerates secrecy in
some circumstances, such as with the Journal Clause, which expressly
confers power on Congress to keep secret what it regards as sensitive
information.159 The Statement and Account Clause, however, confers
no parallel authority.160
Indeed, the Statement and Account Clause is a remarkably

159. See supra text accompanying note 63.
160. In its 1977 legal memorandum, ignoring the textual difference between the two clauses,
the CIA’s Office of General Counsel endeavored to make some use of the Journal Clause as a
vehicle for interpreting the Statement and Account Clause: “It would appear foolish to attribute to
the framers an intention to include in the Constitution an absolute obligation that every
appropriation and expenditure be publicized, even though the Constitution explicitly authorizes
each House to keep secret its debates and decisions on these very matters.” 1977 Senate
Intelligence Funds Disclosure Hearings, supra note 59, at 12. This, however, seems more a
pragmatic argument against the clause itself; as we have seen, the two clauses employ strikingly
different formulations, and there is no evidence that anyone understood the Statement and
Account Clause to admit of an exception for confidential information. Nor is it necessary to
conclude that the Framers must have believed that the Journal Clause and the Statement and
Account Clause reflected identical considerations when it came to secrecy. The closest anyone
came during the process of framing to addressing that issue was when George Mason, at the
Virginia ratifying convention, argued that information about government expenditures was
different from other types of information that is properly treated as confidential. See supra text
accompanying notes 82–85.
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inappropriate vehicle to support a claim of effectively unfettered
congressional power. By its terms, it delegates no power to Congress or
the President, and is framed as a mandatory duty. Beyond that, this
view makes the clause virtually meaningless. It suggests that if
Congress found that disclosure of military or diplomatic spending, or
spending of virtually any other type, would harm national security,
Congress could prevent disclosure. On this view, the clause is deprived
of efficacy. If the clause only requires disclosure when Congress thinks
it prudent, the clause requires nothing more than the same policy
judgment Congress would doubtless make about the propriety of
disclosure in the clause’s absence. In terms of constitutional ethos and
structure, the clause becomes comprehensible only if it imposes a
mandatory duty—if it treats disclosure as a precondition to ordinary
politics to ensure they are conducted in a manner that facilitates
accountability.
As for the evidence of framing-era practice invoked by Professor
Casper and other defenders of confidential spending, it provides little in
the way of support for the current regime of confidential intelligence
spending. The First Congress authorized the President’s confidential
account, but the amount and the character of the confidential spending
from the account were hardly a secret. The appropriation made plain
that its purpose was to support individuals acting on behalf of the
government abroad, it was widely understood that one of the functions
of diplomats abroad was to engage in espionage, and the amounts spent
on the basis of the President’s certification were disclosed.161
Thus, there was little mystery about the amount or the relatively
discrete purpose of the confidential expenditures from the confidential
account. The confidential account most likely protected the names and
locations of foreign agents from disclosure, and the precise salaries and
duties of each, but it did little to conceal from the public the nature,
purpose, and amount of these expenditures. Given the small size and
relative specificity of the appropriation, the subsequent disclosure of
what was spent from the account, and the relatively modest range of
tactics involved in the eighteenth-century world of espionage, it is
surely more plausible to regard the specificity of the appropriation and
the subsequent certification procedure as representing a framing-era
judgment about the type of disclosure that was deemed sufficient to

161. See supra text accompanying notes 103–08.

DOCUMENT 2 (DO NOT DELETE)

42

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

10/9/15 6:17 PM

[Vol. 47

comply with the Statement and Account Clause, rather than to suggest
that the clause admits of a broad national security exception inconsistent
with its text. The framing-era handling of the President’s confidential
account may offer convincing evidence that the specifics, down to the
penny, of every single instance in which public funds are spent need not
be disclosed, but it is far from convincing evidence to support a broad
national security exemption from the Statement and Account Clause’s
disclosure obligation.
Perhaps, as Professor Casper believed, the more significant framingera precedent was when the Third Congress increased the sum available
to the President to one million dollars without further specifying the
purpose of the appropriation, in an apparent effort to conceal the fact
that the money was used to pay ransom.162 Still, the appropriation was
accompanied by a public statement of its purpose—relating to
intercourse with foreign nations—and Congress ultimately came down
on the side of disclosure, publishing the documents supporting its
decision to appropriate the money at issue and disclosing the funds
spent for ransom within about a year.163 The 1811 secret appropriation
covering the costs of preparations to occupy territory south of Georgia
involved a military operation in which secrecy was essential, and the
House also voted to make it public within about a year.164 The
historical evidence regarding the President’s confidential fund, in short,
offers scant support for concealing the vast sums incorporated in
today’s intelligence spending.
Beyond all this, caution is required when assessing the interpretive
significance of this evidence. Even most originalists draw a distinction
between original meaning and original expected applications, and
regard only the former as binding.165 Michael McConnell, for example,

162.
163.
164.
165.

See supra text accompanying notes 109–110.
See supra text accompanying notes 111–15.
See supra text accompanying notes 116–17.
See, e.g., BALKIN, supra note 122, at 6–14; Randy E. Barnett, Underlying Principles, 24
CONST. COMMENT. 405, 410 (2007); Mitchell N. Berman, Originalism and Its Discontents (Plus
a Thought or Two About Abortion), 24 CONST. COMMENT. 383, 385–89 (2007); Steven G.
Calabresi & Livia Fine, Two Cheers for Professor Balkin’s Originalism, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 663,
668–72 (2009); Christopher R. Green, Originalism and the Sense-Reference Distinction, 50 ST.
LOUIS U. L.J. 555, 580–82 (2006); Michael W. McConnell, The Importance of Humility in
Judicial Review: A Comment on Ronald Dworkin’s “Moral Reading” of the Constitution, 65
FORDHAM L. REV. 1269, 1284–87 (1997); Michael Stokes Paulsen, How to Interpret the
Constitution (and How Not to), 115 YALE L.J. 2037, 2059–62 (2006); James E. Ryan, Laying
Claim to the Constitution: The Promise of the New Textualism, 97 VA. L. REV. 1523, 1539–46
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has written that “[n]o reputable originalist . . . takes the view that the
framers’ assumptions and expectation about the correct application of
their principles is controlling,” explaining that “[m]ainstream
originalists recognize that the Framers’ analysis of particular
applications could be wrong, or that circumstances could have changed
and made them wrong.”166 For his part, Justice Scalia, likely the current
Court’s foremost originalist, has agreed that constitutional interpretation
should be based on the original meaning of the text itself, rather than
“the concrete expectations of lawgivers.”167
Thus, it is the Statement and Account Clause’s text and not framingera practice that reflects the obligation imposed by the clause; we
should be skeptical of an approach to framing-era practice that argues
for an exception to the obligation imposed by the clause inconsistent
with its text. Framing-era practice is best understood to illuminate the
type of disclosures that were regarded as consistent with the clause,
rather than to support a categorical national security exception to the
obligation of disclosure stated in the clause lacking textual support.
Viewed in this light, framing-era practice is illuminating, and
reconcilable with the clause’s text. It suggests that the clause imposes
no obligation to disclose every penny spent, or every covert operation
undertaken abroad. But in none of the framing-era precedents was the
public deprived of information that enabled it to hold its representatives
accountable for the manner in which public funds were spent—the
public knew roughly what was spent on the salaries of foreign agents
supporting its diplomatic efforts; roughly what those agents were doing;
and when the confidential account was used for another purpose—the
payment of ransom—those payments were disclosed, even over the
President’s objection.
Confidential spending—primarily intelligence spending—mushroomed in the twentieth century. Nothing fairly comparable to a vast
intelligence community engaging in electronic surveillance of
American’s telephone habits or operating a fabulously expensive
satellite system was secretly funded in the framing era. Yet, the Court

(2011); Ronald D. Rotunda, Original Intent, the View of the Framers, and the Role of the
Ratifiers, 41 Vand. L. Rev. 507, 513–14 (1988); Lawrence B. Solum, District of Columbia v.
Heller and Originalism, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 923, 935 (2009).
166. McConnell, supra note 165, at 1284.
167. Antonin Scalia, Response, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND
THE LAW 129, 144 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997).
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tells us that even absent framing-era support, “‘[l]ong settled and established practice is a consideration of great weight in a proper
interpretation of constitutional provisions’ regulating the relationship
between Congress and the President.”168 This observation, however,
was made about the relationship of the legislative and executive
branches. In that context, each branch of government has ample
incentive to protect its prerogatives, and accommodations they reach
may well be entitled to deference. The Statement and Account Clause,
in contrast, functions to constrain and hold accountable the political
branches to the public. It protects the interests of the people, not their
elected representatives. Therefore, it should be unsurprising if the
practices of the political branches have, over time, watered down the
clause’s force. Accordingly, political branches’ judgment concerning
the potency of a mechanism which holds them accountable to voters
should surely be taken with a grain of salt.
There are certainly powerful policy arguments favoring national
security secrecy. But, as the Supreme Court has reminded us, “the
enshrinement of constitutional rights necessarily takes certain policy
choices off the table.”169 So too does a constitutional disclosure
obligation. Given the Statement and Account Clause’s demand for
disclosure without categorical exception, pragmatic arguments about the
justification for exempting intelligence spending from the constitutional
obligation of disclosure are ultimately policy and not legal arguments.
Perhaps, if it were clear that intelligence spending disclosures would
amount to Justice Jackson’s suicide pact, a construction of the clause
which demanded such disclosures should be rejected as absurd. But, as
the discussion above demonstrates, pragmatic considerations yield no
simple answer about the consequences of such a disclosure obligation.
This does not mean that the Constitution compels disclosure of
everything that would not, if disclosed, produce an imminent and
serious threat to national safety. The Statement and Account Clause
does not demand unlimited disclosure; it requires only “a regular
statement and account.” It may well be that the clause permits spending
to be stated at a sufficiently high level of generality that disclosure of
either aggregate appropriations or spending is constitutional, or at least
permits some alternative that would obviate the concerns of the
168. NLRB v. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550, 2559 (2014) (quoting The Pocket Veto Case,
279 U.S. 655, 689 (1929) (alteration in original)).
169. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 636 (2008).
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intelligence community about the perils of more detailed disclosure. It
is to that question that we turn next.
2. The Argument that Disclosure of Aggregate Annual Appropriations
Is Sufficient
The argument that disclosure of aggregate annual appropriations as
required by current law is sufficient to satisfy the constitutional
obligation of disclosure encounters two threshold problems. First,
current law requires disclosure of aggregate appropriations, not
spending; yet, the Statement and Account Clause requires disclosure of
expenditures, not appropriations. Perhaps disclosure of aggregate
spending would be sufficient, but spending does not inevitably track
appropriations, especially given the power of the intelligence
community to transfer appropriated funds.170 Second, it is doubtful that
current law produces accurate disclosure because intelligence spending
is hidden within military and other appropriations.171 Spending levels
disclosed in the Combined Statement and elsewhere are therefore
artificially high because they include funds actually transferred to and
then spent by the intelligence community. The Statement and Account
Clause’s objective of enabling the people to understand how their
money is spent is not achieved when published accounts of expenditures
include funds actually spent for other purposes.172
Beyond these threshold problems, the case for deeming aggregate
disclosure of aggregate spending as satisfying the Statement and

170. See supra text accompanying note 153; see also S. REP. No. 95-274, at 15 (1977)
(minority view of Sens. Chafee, Garn, Goldwater, Hathaway, Lugar, Moynihan, Pearson, and
Wallop) (“[T]here is no way in which the [Statement and Account C]lause may be read as
requiring publication of the annually appropriated amount as the majority of this Committee has
recommended.”).
171. See supra text accompanying notes 51–54.
172. Professor Casper, despite his sympathy with the governmental interest in confidentiality,
acknowledged the problem. After stating his view that Congress could decline to disclose
intelligence spending, he added:
This is not to say that what is apparently the present system of deceptive appropriations
and accounting is constitutionally bearable . . . . Accounting to serve any purpose must
be accurate. This requirement may be served by allocating funds to relatively
nonspecific governmental functions; it cannot be served, however, by pretending to
spend money for one purpose while in reality it is spent for a totally different purpose.
The present system for hiding intelligence appropriations should be scrutinized very
closely as to what it does in terms of poor accounting and bad constitutional practices.
1977 Senate Intelligence Funds Disclosure Hearings, supra note 59, at 88 (statement of Gerhard
Casper).
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Account Clause remains fraught. The framing-era acceptance of the
President’s confidential fund powerfully suggests that the clause was
not understood in the framing era to demand a precise accounting of
every penny, but rather that the account had a fairly clear, discrete, and
widely understood purpose. Indeed, a much larger ransom-related
expense from the same account was separately disclosed with
reasonable speed. Framing-era practice hardly supports the view that
the clause permits the government to tell the public nothing about
intelligence spending beyond aggregate annual figures. Plainly, at some
point, spending is disclosed at such a high level of generality that it
achieves compliance with the clause in only the most formal sense. If
the government disclosed no more than total federal spending each year,
its “statement and account” would be of no assistance in determining
the purposes for which public funds were spent, or whether they were
spent consistent with applicable appropriations. Disclosure at such a
level of generality would effectively deny the public the information
required to assess the benefits of public spending, even if it is apprised
of the total cost.
As we have seen, there are powerful arguments based on original
meaning and constitutional ethos and structure against reducing the
Statement and Account Clause to a mere formality that denies the public
information about how public funds are spent. Even as he defended
confidential spending in his congressional testimony, Professor Casper
acknowledged the point: “[I]t is obvious that some detailed breakdown
has to occur because otherwise the people would not know for what
purpose their money was expended.”173
It follows that the Combined Statement does not comply with the
Statement and Account Clause. Because intelligence spending is
hidden in other appropriations, the Combined Statement is seriously
misleading—intelligence expenditures are not reported as such, but
instead are concealed within other heads of appropriation. If one were
to consult the Combined Statement without more, one might conclude
that the United States does not have an intelligence community.174

173. Id. at 91.
174. This is not the only respect in which current practice may be problematic. For an
argument that reporting practices related to federal insurance programs and government-related
entities violate the clause, see Katherine Clark Harris, Note, The Statement and Account Clause:
A Forgotten Constitutional Mandate for Federal Reporting, 32 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 505, 529–
35 (2014).
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Even putting these problems aside, to the extent that the disclosure of
aggregate annual figures creates a misleading impression about the
performance of the intelligence community—concealing, for example,
substantial waste and inefficiency, or serious costs to the public’s
privacy and liberty—the public is deprived of material information that
could otherwise be used to hold incumbents accountable through the
electoral process. Omissions that create a materially false impression
about the overall performance of the intelligence community therefore
fall short of the constitutional duty of disclosure.
In fact, aggregate figures are a terribly unsatisfactory way for
providing the public sufficient information to assess intelligence
spending. Disclosure of aggregate spending can reveal overall trends,
and they can be compared to trends in other areas of spending, but
beyond that, little more can be discerned.175 For example, when
aggregate spending increases sharply, it is impossible to know whether
this reflects added capabilities or waste. Among the intelligence and
congressional officials who have publicly addressed the question, there
seems to be unanimity of opinion that the disclosure of aggregate
figures is of little value in understanding intelligence spending. When
Congress considered disclosure of intelligence spending in the 1970s,
every intelligence official who addressed the matter agreed that
disclosing only aggregate spending would provide no meaningful
insight; most opposed disclosure precisely because it would be so
unhelpful.176 The same assessment was offered by the chairs of the
175. For an illustration of the limited insight that the aggregate annual budget data provides,
see ERWIN & BELASCO, supra note 51, at 2–7.
176. See, e.g., Disclosure of Funds for Intelligence Activities: Hearings Before the Permanent
H. Select Comm. on Intelligence of the H.R., 95th Cong. 102 (1978) [hereinafter 1978 House
Intelligence Funds Disclosure Hearings] (testimony of William E. Colby) (“[T]here would be
little public benefit in the revelation of an overall figure.”); id. at 147 (testimony of Admiral
Daniel J. Murphy) (“[T]he activities and programs encompassed by the aggregate figure are so
many and diverse, and the expenditures for them so often fluctuate over time, that we believe
relatively little can be learned by observing changes in the overall figure.”); 1977 Senate
Intelligence Funds Disclosure Hearings, supra note 59, at 52 (testimony of William Colby) (“I
believe that it is not necessary, that it would not be helpful to the public . . . and that it would be
unwise for our Nation to be the first in the world to reveal its intelligence budget.”); id. at 74
(testimony of Richard Helms) (“[T]he thing that tilted me on the side of nondisclosure as against
disclosure, was the idea that more and more information would be required to explain this and
that figure.”); id. at 82 (statement of George Bush) (“I have concluded that one figure, standing
alone, is all but meaningless.”). The Director of Central Intelligence did not oppose disclosure of
the aggregate appropriation for nonmilitary intelligence on the ground that the disclosure would
enhance the credibility of the CIA, but rather because it would facilitate public accountability.
See id. at 17–18, 28–29, 30 (testimony of Admiral Stansfield Turner); see also 1994 House
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House and Senate Appropriations Committees.177 In 1993, Director of
Central Intelligence James Woolsey similarly opined: “coming forth
with a single number communicates really nothing until one knows
what goes into the number,”178 a view embraced by a number of his
predecessors at hearings the following year.179 In a 1993 debate about
disclosure of intelligence spending, members of the Senate took a
similar position.180 And, even as it recommended disclosure of
aggregate appropriations in 2006, the 9/11 Commission acknowledged
that this “top-line figure by itself provides little insight into U.S.
intelligence sources and methods.”181
Significantly, when the
intelligence community’s proposed budget summary for fiscal year
2013 was leaked by Edward Snowden, it weighed in at 178 pages, and
broke down spending in a manner that enabled an assessment of the

Intelligence Funds Disclosure Hearings, supra note 59, at 91 (testimony of Admiral Stansfield
Turner) (“It isn’t this number itself is going to illuminate the world for the American public. It is
that the American public does not trust the intelligence community and the way it is managed.”).
To similar effect, see COMM’N ON ROLES AND CAPABILITIES OF U.S. INTELLIGENCE CMTY.,
PREPARING FOR THE 21ST CENTURY: AN APPRAISAL OF U.S. INTELLIGENCE 142 (1996) (“While
disclosure [of the aggregate intelligence budget] would necessarily convey limited information, it
would let the American public know what is being spent on intelligence as a proportion of federal
spending. This in itself is a worthwhile purpose, and may, to some degree, help restore the
confidence of the American people in the intelligence function.”).
177. See 1978 House Intelligence Funds Disclosure Hearings, supra note 176, at 95
(testimony of George H. Mahon) (“Another reason I oppose publishing the intelligence budget
total is that I do not believe it would substantially improve congressional handling of intelligence
matters. . . . By itself the mere total would be somewhat meaningless and perhaps even
misleading.”); id. at 117 (testimony of William D. Hathaway) (“[N]o one is going to learn
anything from publication of a single figure.”).
178. Director Woolsey—Future of the Intelligence Community: Hearing Before the
Permanent Select S. Comm. on Intelligence, 103d Cong. 13 (1993) (testimony of R. James
Woolsey).
179. See, e.g., 1994 House Intelligence Funds Disclosure Hearings, supra note 59, at 73
(statement of Robert Gates) (“I do not know how you would defend [the aggregate intelligence
budget] once it is made officially a part of the public debate without breaking it down . . . .”); id.
at 92 (testimony of Richard Helms) (“I don’t think the number by itself in the aggregate really
enlightens anybody about anything.”); see also id. at 164 (statement of Robert F. Turner) (“[J]ust
releasing a general figure . . . is going to be about as useful as saying the score is nine; and, if
nothing else, it is going to lead people to want to ask questions.”).
180. See, e.g., 139 CONG. REC. S28418 (1993) (Sen. Cohen) (“[D]isclosing the bottom-line
figure of what we spend on intelligence will not contribute one iota to the public’s understanding
of what goes into the makeup of that intelligence budget . . . .”); id. at S28421 (Sen. Chafee) (“It
seems to me that all that can come of the Senator’s amendment, if approved, is that with the
details of the budget remaining secret, as it does under his amendment, it only frustrates the
public, which wants to find out more about how the money is spent.”).
181. 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 152, at 416.
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extent to which the intelligence community had achieved goals
identified by Congress.182 Some thirty-two categories of expenses were
detailed.183 Such a disclosure, of course, permits far more meaningful
analysis than is possible when only a single aggregate figure is released.
As we have seen, the Statement and Account Clause is properly
understood to permit the people to hold their officials accountable for
the manner in which public funds are spent. Disclosing only aggregate
annual spending is a plainly inadequate means to that end. The
aggregate figure provides no meaningful basis for an assessment of
whether the intelligence community provides benefits that justify its
enormous cost.
3. The Presumptive Obligation to Disclose Material Facts Annually
If the current disclosure regime falls short of constitutional standards,
it remains to identify a constitutionally sufficient disclosure regime.
Consider, as a basis for ascertaining the scope of the constitutional
duty of disclosure, an analogy to the duty to disclose material facts in
the law of fraud. Under the federal securities laws, for example, the
Supreme Court has concluded that a duty to disclose is breached by “a
material misrepresentation or omission,”184 and a misrepresentation or
omission is considered material “when there is ‘a substantial likelihood
that the disclosure of the omitted fact would have been viewed by the
reasonable investor as having significantly altered the “total mix” of
information made available.’”185 Similarly, the Second Restatement of
Torts provides that a representation should be regarded as “material”
when “a reasonable man would attach importance to its existence or
nonexistence in determining his choice of action in the transaction in
182. See Barton Gellman & Greg Miller, “Black Budget” Summary Details U.S. Spy
Network’s Successes, Failures and Objectives, WASH. POST, Aug. 30, 2013, at A1.
183. See Wilson Andrews & Todd Lindeman, 52.6 Billion: The Black Budget, WASH. POST
(Aug. 29, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/special/national/black-budget/.
184. E.g., Amgen, Inc. v. Conn. Ret. Plans & Trust Funds, 133 S. Ct. 1184, 1192 (2013); see
also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 525 (1977) (“One who fraudulently makes a
misrepresentation of fact, opinion, intention or law for the purpose of inducing another to act or to
refrain from action in reliance upon it, is subject to liability to the other in deceit for the pecuniary
loss caused to him by his justifiable reliance upon the misrepresentation.”); id. § 551(1) (“One
who fails to disclose to another a fact that he knows may justifiably induce the other to act or
refrain from acting in a business transaction is subject to the same liability to the other as though
he had represented the nonexistence of the matter that he has failed to disclose, if, but only if, he
is under a duty to the other to exercise reasonable care to disclose the matter in question.”).
185. Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. v. Siracusano, 131 S. Ct. 1309, 1318 (2011) (quoting Basic Inc.
v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 231–32 (1988)).
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question.”186 In the context of the Statement and Account Clause, this
standard would mean that the constitutional duty to disclose is breached
by misstatements or omissions relating to intelligence spending when
the undisclosed facts would alter a reasonable person’s assessment of
the overall performance of the intelligence community.
To be sure, an analogy between disclosures required by anti-fraud
laws and the Statement and Account Clause is imperfect. For one thing,
the public does not seek to maximize profits from the operations of
government in the way that investors seek to profit from their
investments. For another, the duty to disclose imposed by the Statement
and Account Clause is affirmative and absolute rather than the more
limited duty to refrain from fraudulent misstatement or concealment
found in the law of fraud. Under the clause, the government is required
to disclose, rather than merely to refrain from fraudulent misstatements
when it chooses to disclose. Indeed, the absolute nature of the
obligation imposed by the clause renders irrelevant the justifications
that might be proffered for nondisclosure. We can presume that the
government discloses only aggregate expenditures not in an effort to
defraud, but in order to preserve what it regards as appropriate
confidentiality. The clause, however, while granting the government a
measure of discretion about timing, imposes an absolute duty to make
disclosure.
Accordingly, the concept of materiality has much to commend it.
The Statement and Account Clause is properly understood as a
constitutional vehicle enabling the public to assess the performance of
government. The clause therefore imposes a duty to disclose material
facts necessary to such an assessment, just as the requirement of
disclosure in the securities laws is properly understood as an effort to
enable the public to assess the performance (and prospects) of the issuer
of the securities. Materiality offers a helpful conceptual vehicle for
determining what must be disclosed to give the public fair notice of
pertinent financial facts with respect to how public funds are spent.
It is doubtless true that neither the text of the Statement and Account
Clause nor the evidence of its original meaning refers to the concept of
materiality. Still, framing-era practice lends it a bit of support. The
framing-era treatment of the President’s confidential fund suggests that
not every expense must be detailed, although the character and amount

186. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 538(2)(a) (1977).
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of significant categories of expense must be disclosed, especially when
they involve types of spending of political and policy significance that
are not fairly discernable from the public record—such as the payment
of ransom.187 This suggests a framing-era endorsement of using a
threshold of significance to trigger the duty of disclosure. Beyond that,
even many originalists agree that there are occasions on which original
meaning must be supplemented to operationalize a constitutional
command, necessitating resort to what they call constitutional
“construction.”188
Nonoriginalists, for their part, cheerfully acknowledge that the
interpretation of constitutional text must often be supplemented by
judicially created doctrine because of the inadequacy of the text to
resolve any number of issues about how the Constitution should be
implemented.189 Canvassing the nonoriginalist considerations, we have
seen that the clause’s place in constitutional ethos and structure require
that some standard be used to assess whether disclosures are adequate to
produce meaningful political accountability, while pragmatism offers
little clear guidance beyond avoiding disclosures that would create a
manifest danger to national security.190 Pragmatism counsels caution,
but the pragmatic considerations are surely not so clear that they justify
truncating the disclosure obligation in a manner inconsistent with any

187. See supra text accompanying notes 102–118.
188. See, e.g., BALKIN, supra note 122, at 14, 31–32, 256–59; RANDY E. BARNETT,
RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION OF LIBERTY 118–30 (2004); KEITH E.
WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION: TEXTUAL MEANING, ORIGINAL INTENT,
AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 5–14 (1999); Lawrence B. Solum, Originalism and Constitutional
Construction, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 453, 467–72 (2013); Grégoire C.N. Webber, Originalism’s
Constitution, in THE CHALLENGE OF ORIGINALISM: THEORIES OF CONSTITUTIONAL
INTERPRETATION 147, 173–76 (Grant Huscroft & Bradley W. Miller eds., 2011). Likely the
leading academic dissenters from this view among originalists are Professors McGinnis and
Rappaport, who argue that constitutional interpretation should be confined to interpretive
methods in use in the framing era, though they agree that in the framing era, it was an
understanding that some constitutional provisions might be unclear and present interpretive
difficulties. See John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, The Abstract Meaning Fallacy,
2012 U. ILL. L. REV. 737, 757–60. Even on this view, however, something along the lines of a
standard of materiality commends itself, given the evidence that the Statement and Account
Clause was regarded as binding and required sufficiently robust disclosure to facilitate political
accountability, though not requiring that every aspect of spending be disclosed.
189. See, e.g., RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., IMPLEMENTING THE CONSTITUTION 7–101 (2001);
Mitchell N. Berman, Constitutional Decision Rules, 90 VA. L. REV. 1, 79–107 (2004); Kermit
Roosevelt III, Constitutional Calcification: How the Law Becomes What the Court Does, 91 VA.
L. REV. 1649, 1655–67 (2005).
190. See supra Parts I.A.3, I.A.4.
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coherent account of the clause’s test, history, and purpose, and
producing a legal regime little different from what we would have in the
clause’s absence.
Thus, for the Statement and Account Clause, the concept of
materiality commends itself as a vehicle for evaluating the adequacy of
a financial disclosure, as it does in other areas of the law. Yet, as in
other areas of the law, there is no precise formula for determining what
constitutes sufficiently detailed disclosure to discharge a duty to
disclose material facts. Moreover, the concerns addressed by the clause
are not merely financial, but instead involve an assessment of the
performance of the government. In this fashion, the clause is concerned
with disclosure of information that is politically and not merely
financially material. There are, however, some objective indicia that
can be used to identify the minimum bounds of a constitutionally
acceptable disclosure, in order to produce a constitutional construction
that fleshes out the meaning of a constitutional text stated at a high level
of generality but which nevertheless is properly understood as imposing
a binding obligation.
The level of detail reflected in intelligence appropriations offers a
useful starting point. If Congress regards a category of expense as
sufficiently important to merit separate line-item treatment in classified
intelligence appropriations, especially when it also identifies a particular
goal or reporting requirement to benchmark the efficacy of spending in
a discrete area, then presumably this is a politically material category of
spending, at least in the judgment of the very officials that are
politically accountable for that spending. Beyond that, although we
cannot know what confidential activities might be revealed if all
material information about intelligence spending were disclosed
precisely because so much about intelligence spending is currently
undisclosed, the examples that begin this Article provide useful
illustrations of the concept of materiality for these purposes.191 Each
involved a failure of the government to disclose what would seem to be
material information about the manner in which the government spends
public funds; in all three examples, information had been concealed
about the manner in which intelligence dollars are spent, and once that
information came to light, it rendered intelligence-gathering programs
politically untenable, and produced significant reforms. For just that

191. See supra text accompanying notes 1–20.
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reason, in the political sense most pertinent to the Statement and
Account Clause, these disclosures brought material information to the
public’s attention—information could not be gleaned from aggregate
spending levels alone.192
These disclosures offer paradigmatic
examples of material information that offer a starting point for fleshing
out this standard.
As for the frequency with which material information about
intelligence spending must be disclosed, although the Statement and
Account Clause recognizes discretion by requiring disclosure “from
time to time,” the clause’s proponents consistently offered assurances
that the discretion over timing was not unlimited and would not
undermine the integrity of the disclosure obligation.193 In terms of
constitutional structure, and function as well, given the clause’s role in
securing political accountability, the discretion over timing implicit in
the phrase “from time to time” should not be understood to justify a
delay in disclosure so lengthy that it would render the information
effectively useless in holding officials politically accountable for public
spending. Delays on this order would convert the obligation of
disclosure into one of more interest to historians than voters—a wholly
implausible view of the constitutional role of the clause.
In no other context would an obligation to make periodic financial
disclosure be viewed as granting unfettered discretion, much less
discretion to permit delays so lengthy as to undermine the utility of
disclosure. For example, if a loan were made pursuant to a contract in
which a borrower pledged to provide the lender with an accounting of
its financial condition “from time to time,” that would likely be
construed to impose an enforceable rather than a fatally indefinite
obligation.194 There is little reason to view the Statement and Account
Clause differently. Its inclusion in the Constitution doubtless reflects
192. Cf. TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976) (defining “an omitted
fact” in a proxy solicitation as “material if there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable
shareholder would consider it important in deciding how to vote. . . . It does not require proof of a
substantial likelihood that disclosure of the omitted fact would have caused the reasonable
investor to change his vote. What the standard does contemplate is a showing of a substantial
likelihood that, under all the circumstances, the omitted fact would have assumed actual
significance in the deliberations of the reasonable shareholder.”).
193. See supra text accompanying notes 72–84.
194. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 33 cmt. a (1981) (“[T]he actions of the
parties may show conclusively that they have intended to conclude a binding agreement, even
though one or more terms are missing or are left to be agreed upon. In such cases courts
endeavor, if possible, to attach a sufficiently definite meaning to the bargain.”).
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the binding character of a periodic disclosure obligation. Thus, in light
of the clause’s original meaning and its role in the Constitution’s ethos
and structure, the obligation to report “from time to time” is properly
understood not as a grant of unfettered discretion; but instead, much as
Richard Henry Lee explained to the Virginia ratifying convention, this
phrase “must be supposed to mean, in the common acceptation of
language, short, convenient periods.”195
History not only confirms that discretion over the timing of
disclosure is limited, but suggests what is likely the most obvious way
to implement the periodic disclosure mandate. A requirement of annual
disclosure dates to the framing era, is still in use, and is also employed
for disclosure of aggregate intelligence appropriations under current
law.196 As we have seen, framing-era and even longstanding practice
are of considerable aid in fleshing out the meaning of otherwise vague
or ambiguous constitutional provisions.197 The longstanding practice of
annual disclosure confirms that that discretion over timing is properly
regarded as limited, and given that the clause does not seem to
contemplate different treatment for different categories of spending, the
practice of annual disclosure for all other categories of spending
suggests its soundness in this category as well. Moreover, annual
disclosure offers a reasonable guarantee that disclosure is sufficiently
prompt to facilitate meaningful political accountability through the
electoral process.198
To offer a more concrete account of required disclosure, consider the
Combined Statement, which represents the political branches’ effort to
comply with the Statement and Account Clause.199 Given that the text

195. 3 ELLIOT, supra note 81, at 295.
196. See supra text accompanying notes 47–50, 53.
197. See supra text accompanying notes 90, 168; cf. Nelson, supra note 90, at 527 (“Madison
and his contemporaries expected the practice that developed under the Constitution to liquidate
and settle the meaning of these contestable provisions.” (footnote omitted)).
198. The Constitution employs the phrase “from time to time” in three other places: in the
Journal Clause with respect to Congress’s obligation to publish a journal of its proceedings, U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 3; the President’s obligation to “give Congress Information of the State of
the Union,” id. art. II, § 3, cl. 1; and Congress’s power to create “inferior courts,” id. art. III, § 1.
Because the context in which this phrase appears in these provisions is so different from a
financial reporting requirement, caution is required when using them to shed light on the
Statement and Account Clause, but it is of some significance that in the framing era, the
President’s report on the State of the Union was thought to be an annual duty. See, e.g., Vasan
Kesavan & Gregory Sidak, The Legislator-in-Chief, 44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1, 13–15 (2002).
199. See supra text accompanying note 50.
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of the Statement and Account Clause contemplates no special rules for
particular types of spending, much less a categorical exemption for
intelligence spending, the standards for and frequency of disclosure
deemed appropriate by the political branches for all other purposes in
the Combined Statement offer a baseline for identifying the scope of the
duty to disclose intelligence spending. Moreover, with respect to
specificity, the detail reflected in the Combined Statement for nonintelligence spending provides an objective baseline for specificity and
frequency of disclosure consistent with the practicalities entailed in
accounting for federal spending.
In particular, the Combined Statement’s handling of defense spending
presumably reflects an effort to discharge the constitutional obligation
of disclosure in light of legitimate concerns about national security
confidentiality. After all, concerns about alerting adversaries to national
security initiatives and capabilities are not unique to the intelligence
community, but arise in the military as well. Moreover, any number of
intelligence functions could be performed through ordinary military or
law enforcement agencies, the spending of which would be subject to
disclosure under the Statement and Account Clause. If essentially
identical functions could be moved into the intelligence community and
subjected for that reason alone to a less demanding regime of
disclosure, incumbent officials would have an anomalous incentive to
channel activities into the intelligence community in order to reduce the
transparency of spending.200 The approach to military spending taken
by the Combined Statement accordingly offers a baseline for the
specificity required in disclosure.
The Combined Statement breaks down expenditures for the
Departments of the Army, Navy, and Air Force, and within each
department, procurement is broken down, in the Army, for example, for
aircraft, missiles, weapons and tracked combat vehicles, ammunition,
and other procurement, identifying both spending and appropriated
amounts.201 This suggests a need to break down intelligence spending

200. A number of scholars have pointed out the anomalies that are produced when essentially
identical activities are subject to different regimes of oversight based on whether they are
conducted by the military or the intelligence community, albeit without reference to the issues of
disclosure of appropriations and spending considered here. See, e.g., Philip Alston, The CIA and
Targeted Killings Beyond Borders, 2 HARV. NAT’L SEC. J. 283, 352–65 (2011); Robert Chesney,
Military-Intelligence Convergence and the Law of the Title 10/Title 50 Debate, 5 J. NAT’L SEC. L.
& POL’Y 539, 583–628 (2012).
201. See COMBINED STATEMENT, supra note 50, at tbl.Department of Defense—Military, at
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beyond aggregate figures. Yet, requiring disclosure that tracks the
Combined Statement is likely insufficient. Disclosure of intelligence
spending alone, even if broken down at the level of specificity reflected
in the Combined Statement’s report on defense spending, reduces
transparency because intelligence appropriations, unlike defense
appropriations, are classified.
We have seen both that one of the purposes of the Statement and
Account Clause is to determine if spending has been properly
authorized by law, and that congressional judgments about how to
control intelligence spending by appropriation offer a guideline for
assessing what types of spending should be regarded as material. If
intelligence appropriations remain classified, however, it is impossible
to determine if the intelligence community’s spending has been
authorized by law, or whether all aspects of spending that Congress
regards as sufficiently politically material to warrant a separate
appropriation have been disclosed.
Moreover, when appropriations are public, they provide additional
insight into the manner in which public funds are spent. For example,
the National Defense Authorization Act for 2014 not only contains a
detailed breakdown of authorized spending,202 but also discloses a
variety of military initiatives as well as congressional efforts to contain
their costs and assess their effectiveness.203
These disclosures

22–24.
202. See National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014, Pub. L. No. 113-66, §§
4001–701, 127 Stat. 672, 1086–163.
203. See, e.g., id. § 111, 127 Stat. at 690 (requiring a report on the status of Stryker vehicle
spare parts); id. § 121, 127 Stat. at 691–92 (imposing cost limitation on aircraft carrier
construction); id. § 124, 127 Stat. at 693–94 (imposing cost limitation on littoral combat ships);
id. § 134, 127 Stat. at 695 (imposing limitation on purchasing C-27J aircraft); id. § 146, 127 Stat.
at 700–01 (requiring consideration of alternative means to procure personal protection
equipment); id. § 212, 127 Stat. at 703–04 (requiring report prior to purchasing new ground
combat vehicle); id. § 213, 127 Stat. at 704 (limiting acquisition of unmanned carrier-launched
surveillance and strike system); id. § 214, 127 Stat. at 704 (requiring report on Air Force logistics
information technology modernization); id. § 216, 127 Stat. at 706 (limiting funds available for
precision extended range munition program); id. § 217, 127 Stat. at 706–07 (requiring
development of new air-launched cruise missile); id. § 231, 127 Stat. at 710-11 (requiring
improvements to cost-estimate system for missile defense); id. § 237, 127 Stat. at 717–18
(requiring improved kill assessment capability for ground-based mid-course defense system); id.
§ 253, 127 Stat. at 723–24 (requiring report on strategy to improve body armor); id. § 325, 127
Stat. at 734–35 (requiring sustainment plan for littoral combat ship program); id. § 326, 127 Stat.
at 735–36 (requiring asset-tracking plan); id. § 824, 127 Stat. at 810 (requiring Comptroller
General’s review of processes and procedures for weapons acquisition); id. § 904, 127 Stat. at
816–17 (requiring plan to streamline Department of Defense management headquarters).
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importantly supplement those found in the Combined Statement, and
surely would be considered in assessing whether the government has
complied with the Statement and Account Clause when it comes to
military spending. The lack of parallel disclosures for intelligence
spending, however, leaves the Combined Statement without the
supplementation available for military and other categories of spending
in which appropriations are publicly disclosed.
Accordingly, at least presumptively, disclosure should be made as
frequently and at a level of specificity roughly equivalent to the
information made publicly available about defense spending annually in
the Combined Statement and appropriations legislation. Prudential
concerns about alerting adversaries to capabilities and covert operations
are similarly present, and hence we can have some confidence that the
political branches do not err on the side of excessive disclosure in that
realm.
This does not mean that the clause demands disclosure so frequent
and detailed that all ongoing confidential initiatives of the intelligence
community are routinely publicized.
Surely a wide variety of
information about intelligence sources and methods can remain
confidential without creating a materially false impression about
intelligence spending. The obligation to disclose “from time to time”
does not require immediate disclosure, and the standard of materiality
does not require that the public be apprised of the performance of each
discrete undertaking of the intelligence community, but rather that it
receive sufficient information to make an assessment of its overall
performance. As long as material facts are disclosed with sufficient
promptness so that the disclosure has political salience, ample care can
be taken to protect the confidential operational details of intelligence
gathering.
The obligation to disclose only material facts accordingly permits a
great deal of information—especially about specific ongoing covert
activities—to remain confidential. The standard of materiality only
requires that the public receive a fair overall impression of the manner
in which the intelligence community spends appropriated funds; surely
that is possible without disclosing the names of agents, where they are
operating, or particular tactics that are employed to gather intelligence.
Individual covert actions, for example, need not be disclosed unless
they are so expensive or raise such serious issues that their existence or
cost would be material to an overall assessment of intelligence
spending.
As we have seen, the current disclosure regime, in which nothing
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beyond aggregate annual appropriations are disclosed, falls far short of
constitutional standards. This conclusion, however, leaves Congress
free to enact a new statutory regime as long as it satisfies constitutional
standards for disclosure.204 Congressional efforts to tailor disclosure
obligations that represent reasonable efforts to balance constitutional
norms and prudential concerns might even be entitled to a modicum of
deference to the extent that they are rooted in legitimate institutional
expertise.205 Moreover, the Statement and Account Clause grants a
measure of discretion over the timing of disclosure, and a constitutional
disclosure regime could afford officials discretion to delay disclosures
in compelling circumstances. Perhaps, just as a prior restraint on
publication may be justified in extraordinary circumstances, an initiative
of importance and cost comparable to the Manhattan Project might
warrant a departure from ordinary practices because of the demonstrable
and immediate threat that disclosure would present to national
security.206 Such a rule would preclude an interpretation of the clause
that could produce Justice Jackson’s suicide pact.
The standard of materiality as a trigger for disclosure, even allowing
for exigencies that might permit confidentiality in compelling
circumstances, does not drain the Statement and Account Clause of its
efficacy. As the examples opening this Article make plain, many covert
intelligence-gathering programs have great political salience—once they
are disclosed, they cannot stand the light of day without reform. These
examples not only flesh out how materiality operates, but demonstrate
that disclosure, even of an ongoing intelligence program, does not
inevitably amount to a suicide pact. If the American people are to be
compelled to fund a massive program that exposes them to warrantless
wiretapping in the sole discretion of the executive or that vacuums up
all of their telephone call records, or a gold-plated satellite program that
offers highly debatable value, they are entitled to fair notice. The
204. Cf. Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 436–42 (2000) (holding that Congress is
free to regulate custodial interrogation by statute as long as such regulation satisfies constitutional
requirements).
205. Cf. Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 34 (2010) (“[C]oncerns of national
security and foreign relations do not warrant abdication of the judicial role. We do not defer to
the Government’s reading of the First Amendment, even when such interests are at stake. . . . But
when it comes to collecting evidence and drawing factual inferences in this area, ‘the lack of
competence on the part of the courts is marked,’ and respect for the Government’s conclusions is
appropriate.” (citation omitted) (quoting Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 65 (1981)).
206. For a discussion of the doctrinal basis for a limitation on the disclosure obligation in such
circumstances, see supra text accompanying notes 149–51.
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Statement and Account Clause says so.
II. JUDICIAL ENFORCEMENT OF THE STATEMENT AND ACCOUNT CLAUSE
In its only encounter with a lawsuit endeavoring to enforce the
Statement and Account Clause, the Supreme Court held the suit
nonjusticiable in United States v. Richardson.207 That outcome, of
course, leaves enforcement of the Statement and Account Clause to the
tender mercies of the political branches. As we have seen, there is
reason to doubt the political branches’ appetite for disclosure. The
Statement and Account Clause is a constitutional feature that facilitates
the process by which the public holds incumbent officials politically
responsible for the manner in which public funds are spent; we can
hardly expect public officials to approach the task of facilitating
accountability with enthusiasm. When a plausible justification such as
national security presents itself to withhold disclosure, incumbent
officials have ample incentive to seize on it. The judiciary, of course,
lacks the incentive that incumbent officials have to insulate themselves
from political accountability. But, the judiciary has not to date enforced
the Statement and Account Clause, instead leaving that task to the
politically accountable branches. The clause, in short, is a classic
example of what Lawrence Sager once labeled “underenforced
constitutional norms.”208

207. 418 U.S. 166 (1974). Before Richardson, the closest that the Court had come to treating
with confidential spending was in Totten v. United States, 92 U.S. 105 (1875), an action to
enforce an alleged contract with President Lincoln by which one Lloyd allegedly agreed “to
proceed South and ascertain the number of troops stationed at different points in the
insurrectionary States, procure plans of forts and fortifications, and gain such other information as
might be beneficial to the government of the United States, and report the facts to the President;
for which services he was to be paid $200 a month.” Id. at 105-06. The Court did not doubt the
authority of the President, as Commander in Chief, to enter the contract, but given its confidential
nature, the Court held that the alleged contract could not be enforced in a judicial proceeding
which would necessarily compromise its confidentiality, without reaching any question about
how payments under such an agreement should be disclosed under the Statement and Account
Clause. See id. at 106-07. Totten was subsequently followed, again without reaching any
question under the Statement and Account Clause, in an action brought against the Director of
Central Intelligence to enforce an alleged confidential contract. See Tenet v. Doe, 544 U.S. 1, 8–
11 (2005).
208. Lawrence Gene Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of Underenforced Constitutional
Norms, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1212, 1226 (1978). For an elaboration, see LAWRENCE G. SAGER,
JUSTICE IN PLAINCLOTHES: A THEORY OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL PRACTICE 86–128
(2004). This conception of underenforced constitutional norms enjoys considerable support
among legal scholars. See, e.g., FALLON, supra note 189, at 31–34; Frank B. Cross, Institutions
and Enforcement of the Bill of Rights, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1529, 1594–96 (2000); Daryl J.
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Accordingly, the discussion above is largely academic unless the
Statement and Account Clause is judicially enforceable. There is,
however, an emerging doctrinal avenue to judicial enforcement.
A. The Justiciability of Litigation to Enforce the Statement and
Account Clause
Richardson can be understood to erect barriers to justiciability under
two related doctrines—the standing requirement and the bar on
adjudicating what are regarded as political questions. Subsequent
doctrinal developments, however, have greatly narrowed Richardson’s
force.
1. Standing
Richardson requested information that had been published pursuant
to the Statement and Account Clause concerning the CIA’s
expenditures, and when he received only the Combined Statement, he
brought suit seeking injunctive relief against the CIA’s statutory
exemption from financial reporting requirements.209
In its opinion holding Richardson’s suit nonjusticiable on the ground
that he lacked standing to sue, the Court began by observing that “the
question of standing in the federal courts is to be considered in the
framework of Article III [of the Constitution] which restricts judicial
power to ‘cases’ and ‘controversies.’”210 The Court then wrote that to
have standing, “[t]he party who invokes the [judicial] power must be
able to show not only that the statute is invalid but that he has sustained
or is immediately in danger of sustaining some direct injury as the result
of its enforcement.”211 Richardson claimed standing as a taxpayer, and
the Court acknowledged that in Flast v. Cohen,212 it had held that
taxpayers have standing to challenge exercises of the taxing and
spending power when “there is a logical nexus between the status

Levinson, Rights Essentialism and Remedial Equilibration, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 857, 866–69
(1999); Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Equal Protection Law: Federal Antidiscrimination
Legislation After Morrison and Kimel, 110 YALE L.J. 441, 467–73 (2000); Stephen F. Ross,
Legislative Enforcement of Equal Protection, 72 MINN. L. REV. 311, 321–24 (1987).
209. United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 168–69 (1974).
210. Id. at 171 (quoting Ass’n of Data Processing Serv. Org. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 151
(1970) (quoting U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1)).
211. Id. at 172 (quoting Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 488 (1923) (second alteration
in original)).
212. 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
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asserted and the claim sought to be adjudicated.”213 But, Richardson,
the Court wrote, “ma[de] no claim that appropriated funds are being
spent in violation of a ‘specific constitutional limitation upon the . . .
taxing and spending power,’” but rather sought “information on
precisely how the CIA spends its funds.”214 It followed that “there is no
‘logical nexus’ between the asserted status of taxpayer and the claimed
failure of the Congress to require the Executive to supply a more
detailed report of the expenditures of that agency.”215 Richardson was
merely “seeking ‘to employ a federal court as a forum in which to air
his generalized grievances about the conduct of government.’”216
Richardson is hardly unassailable. In his dissenting opinion, Justice
Douglas argued that because the Statement and Account Clause is part
of the process by which officials are held politically accountable for
spending, there was a sufficient nexus between taxpayer status and
Richardson’s claim to support his standing to sue.217 The soundness of
this position, however, is open to question. Flast involved an
appropriation to support religious schools, and the use of tax revenues
to support religion has long been regarded as a form of coercion
forbidden by the First Amendment’s Establishment Clause.218 A
violation of the Statement and Account Clause, however, may well not
involve the same type of ideological coercion thought to inhere in the
extraction of taxes to support religion; and without a coercive injury of
this character, a complaint about the manner in which the government
taxes and spends may not properly support taxpayer standing. At a
minimum, mere citation to Flast will not do; one must construct an
argument that a denial of information that must be disclosed under the
Statement and Account Clause works the kind of injury that should
afford taxpayers a right to sue.219 The soundness of Justice Douglas’s

213. Richardson, 418 U.S. at 174 (quoting Flast, 392 U.S. at 102).
214. Id. at 175 (quoting Flast, 392 U.S. at 104).
215. Id. (footnote omitted).
216. Id. (quoting Flast, 392 U.S. at 106).
217. Id. at 197–201 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
218. See, e.g., Ariz. Christian Sch. Tuition Org. v. Winn, 131 S. Ct. 1436, 1445–47 (2011).
For helpful scholarly explication of the type of coercive injury experienced by taxpayers
compelled to fund governmental aid for religious activities, see William P. Marshall & Gene R.
Nichol, Not a Winn-Win: Misconstruing Standing and the Establishment Clause, 2011 SUP. CT.
REV. 215, 232–38; and Mark C. Rahdert, Forks Taken and Roads Not Taken: Standing To
Challenge Faith-Based Spending, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 1009, 1055–96 (2011).
219. Cf. William A. Fletcher, The Structure of Standing, 98 YALE L.J. 221, 271–72 (1988)
(“[W]e should not make the mistake of thinking that there is something about federal taxpayer
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argument along these lines is far from obvious; although a violation of
the Statement and Account Clause undermines the Constitution’s
infrastructure of political accountability, linking standing to taxpayer
status seems to miss something important about that infrastructure—
elected officials are expected to be accountable to the electorate as a
whole, not merely taxpayers.
In any event, even if Flast’s nexus test, properly understood,
supported standing in Richardson, the soundness of the nexus test itself
is open to question. Taxpayer standing has long been regarded as
problematic because of its inconsistency with the constitutional
requirement that an alleged injury be redressed by a favorable
judgment; in most cases, the Court has observed it is highly speculative
whether a judgment identifying a constitutional deficiency in the
process of taxing and spending will ultimately reduce the plaintiff’s tax
liability.220 Indeed, in his separate opinion in Richardson, Justice
Powell called for the repudiation of Flast’s nexus test,221 a view that
members of the Court have reiterated more recently.222
Defenders of Richardson also argue that its rejection of standing for
those who assert generalized grievances common to the public at large
properly identifies the types of claims properly addressed through the
political rather than legal process.223 Richardson’s critics respond,
however, that an injury involving a denial of protections offered by
status, considered in isolation, that will allow us to arrive at the correct standing decision in
particular cases. Nor, when federal taxpayers are granted standing, as in Flast, should we make
the related mistake of thinking that the decision has changed the essence of federal taxpayer
standing. Rather, we are dealing only with a presumption, which may be overcome when the
purposes of the particular clause at issue will be best served by permitting federal taxpayers to sue
to enforce its obligations.”).
220. See, e.g., Winn, 131 S. Ct. at 1442–44; DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332,
342–46 (2006).
221. Richardson, 418 U.S. at 183–85 (Powell, J., concurring); see also Flast, 392 U.S. at 121–
29 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (objecting to the view that standing should turn on the character of the
plaintiff’s claim).
222. See Hein v. Freedom From Religion Found., Inc., 551 U.S. 587, 633–37 (2007) (Scalia,
J., concurring in the judgment). For scholarly criticism of Flast, see, for example, ALEXANDER
M. BICKEL, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE IDEA OF PROGRESS 63–65 (1970); Kenneth E. Scott,
Standing in the Supreme Court—A Functional Analysis, 86 HARV. L. REV. 645, 660–62 (1973);
and Steven L. Winter, The Metaphor of Standing and the Problem of Self-Governance, 40 STAN.
L. REV. 1371, 1465–67 (1988).
223. See, e.g., Rebecca L. Brown, Separated Powers and Ordered Liberty, 139 U. PA. L. REV.
1513, 1549–53 & n.185 (1991); Gerald E. Frug, The Judicial Power of the Purse, 126 U. PA. L.
REV. 715, 736–40 (1978); Eugene Kontorovich, What Standing Is Good For, 93 VA. L. REV.
1663, 1699–700 (2007).
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structural features of the Constitution, such as the Statement and
Account Clause, should not be deemed insufficient to confer standing
merely because it is widely shared.224
Whatever one’s assessment of Richardson, its broadest language
surely calls into doubt the justiciability of any litigation seeking access
to information about the operations of government. The desire to obtain
information about how the government functions may well be properly
characterized as a generalized grievance, and given the language in
Richardson suggesting that generalized grievances about an inability to
obtain information about government operations are nonjusticiable, it
becomes difficult to see how the federal courts could entertain any
litigation seeking access to information about government—such as
claims brought under the FOIA.
In his dissenting opinion in
Richardson, Justice Stewart made just this point; he argued that the
government’s refusal to provide Richardson information that he sought
was indistinguishable from a case in which a litigant seeks to challenge
an agency’s refusal to provide requested information under the FOIA.225
Perhaps the distinction between standing to enforce the FOIA and
standing to enforce the Statement and Account Clause lies in the
FOIA’s statutory grant of standing to persons seeking information about
government. Richardson acknowledged that “Congress could grant
standing to taxpayers or citizens, or both, limited, of course, by the
‘cases’ and ‘controversies’ provisions of Art. III.”226 Richardson’s
reference to Article III as a limitation on congressional power, however,
suggests that Congress might be constitutionally precluded from
conferring standing on those who seek information about government
224. See, e.g., Susan Bandes, The Idea of a Case, 42 STAN. L. REV. 227, 271–79 (1990);
Donald L. Doernberg, “We the People”: John Locke, Collective Constitutional Rights, and
Standing To Challenge Government Action, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 52, 98–102 (1985); David Dow,
Standing and Rights, 36 EMORY L.J. 1195, 1209–15 (1987); Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Injury and the
Disintegration of Article III, 74 CALIF. L. REV. 1915, 1936–39 (1986); Jeremy Patrick, A Polemic
Against the Standing Requirement in Constitutional Cases, 42 CAP. U. L REV. 603, 613–17
(2013); Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Fortuity and the Article III “Case”: A Critique of Fletcher’s The
Structure of Standing, 65 ALA. L. REV. 289, 342–46 (2014); Winter, supra note 222, at 1495–
503. For scholarship contending that the framing-era understanding of judicial power permitted
courts to entertain suits asserting an interest in compelling the government to obey the law, see,
for example, Raoul Berger, Standing to Sue in Public Actions: Is It a Constitutional
Requirement?, 78 YALE L.J. 816 (1969); Louis L. Jaffe, Standing To Secure Judicial Review:
Public Actions, 74 HARV. L. REV. 1265, 1269–82 (1961); and Winter, supra note 222, at 1394–
425.
225. Richardson, 418 U.S. at 203–05 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
226. Id. at 178 n.11.
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operations. Indeed, relying on Richardson and other cases articulating
the rule against entertaining generalized grievances, the Court
subsequently explained that Congress cannot, consistent with Article
III, rely on “the public interest in proper administration of the laws” to
create “an individual right by a statute that denominates it as such, and
that permits all citizens (or, for that matter, a subclass of citizens who
suffer no distinctive concrete harm) to sue.”227
In the wake of Richardson and its progeny, some wondered whether
this line of cases suggested that all litigation seeking access to
information about the performance of government—such as claims
seeking information under the FOIA—was nonjusticiable.228 After all,
the FOIA purports to grant about the broadest standing imaginable; it
provides that federal agencies, “upon any request for records which (i)
reasonably describes such records and (ii) is made in accordance with
published rules stating the time, place, fees (if any), and procedures to
be followed, shall make the records promptly available to any
person.”229 It goes on to provide that “[o]n complaint,” the federal
district courts “ha[ve] jurisdiction to enjoin the agency from
withholding agency records and to order the production of any agency
records improperly withheld from the complainant.”230 In this fashion,
the FOIA confers a right to request information from a federal agency
on virtually everyone, and if the requested information is improperly
withheld, the requestor has a concomitant right to bring suit to compel
disclosure.231 This seems to be a right to obtain whatever information
one wishes about the operations of government, without any
requirement of an individualized injury; any “generalized grievance”—
or even abstract curiosity—would seem sufficient. If Richardson and

227. Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 576–77 (1992); see also Summers v. Earth
Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 497 (2009) (“[I]t would exceed [Article III’s] limitations if, at the
behest of Congress and in the absence of any showing of concrete injury, we were to entertain
citizen suits to vindicate the public’s nonconcrete interest in the proper administration of the
laws. . . . [T]he party bringing suit must show that the action injures him in a concrete and
personal way.” (quoting Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 580–81 (Kennedy, J., concurring)
(alterations in original))).
228. See, e.g., Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife: Standing as a Judicially
Imposed Limit on Legislative Power, 42 DUKE L.J. 1170, 1189–90 (1993).
229. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3) (2012) (emphasis added).
230. Id. § 552(a)(4)(B).
231. For helpful discussions of the breadth of standing to seek information under the FOIA,
see O’REILLY, supra note 58, §§ 4:29–39; and Evan Tsen Lee & Josephine Mason Ellis, The
Standing Doctrine’s Dirty Little Secret, 107 NW. U. L. REV. 169, 193–97 (2012).
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its progeny erected a rule against the justiciability of what are regarded
as generalized grievances, it would seemingly follow that FOIA claims
are nonjusticiable.
And yet, despite Richardson and its progeny, the FOIA seems to have
survived. Although the Supreme Court has never addressed the precise
question whether Richardson and the bar on adjudicating what are
regarded as “generalized grievances” renders suits seeking information
under the FOIA nonjusticiable, it has been all but resolved by a pair of
decisions addressing the justiciability of other statutes that similarly
confer standing on those who seek information from the government.
In Public Citizen v. United States Department of Justice,232 the suit
was brought by organizations contesting the refusal of the American
Bar Association to disclose a variety of information about its Standing
Committee on the Federal Judiciary’s consideration of potential
nominees for federal judgeships, alleging that disclosure was required
under the Federal Advisory Committee Act (“FACA”).233 The Court
held that the organizations had standing to sue despite a claim that they
failed to “allege[] injury sufficiently concrete and specific to confer
standing” and instead “advanced a general grievance shared in
substantially equal measure by all or a large class of citizens.”234 The
Court made short work of this attack on standing: “As when an agency
denies requests for information under the Freedom of Information Act,
refusal to permit appellants to scrutinize the ABA Committee’s
activities to the extent FACA allows constitutes a sufficiently distinct
injury to provide standing to sue.”235 The Court added:
The fact that other citizens or groups of citizens might make the same
complaint after unsuccessfully demanding disclosure under FACA
does not lessen [the organizations’] asserted injury, any more than the
fact that numerous citizens might request the same information under
the Freedom of Information Act entails that those who have been
denied access do not possess a sufficient basis to sue.236

Public Citizen straightforwardly rejects the view that when one
claims a legal entitlement to receive information, a refusal to disclose it
is not a sufficiently concrete and specific injury to confer standing.

232.
233.
234.
235.
236.

491 U.S. 440 (1989).
Id. at 447–48.
Id. at 448–49.
Id. at 449.
Id. at 449–50.
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Indeed, one young lawyer with a big future named John Roberts saw
just this implication in Public Citizen, citing it to support his conclusion
that “[w]hen an agency wrongfully denies an individual’s FOIA request,
that particular individual has suffered injury in fact under Article III and
has standing to sue in federal court to redress that injury.”237 Public
Citizen did not, however, address Richardson, and the very brevity of its
analysis might suggest that the Court had not considered the full
implications of its holding.
The same cannot be said for the decision in FEC v. Akins.238 In that
case, a group of voters sought judicial review of the Federal Election
Committee’s refusal to treat the American Israel Public Affairs
Committee (“AIPAC”) as a “political committee” within the meaning of
the Federal Election Campaign Act (“FECA”), and it required to
disclose a variety of information that the statute provides that such
committees must make public.239 The voters prevailed in the court of
appeals, but in the Supreme Court, as respondents, their standing to
bring suit was challenged.240 The Court observed that the injury on
which the respondents’ standing was predicated consisted of “their
inability to obtain information that, on [their] view of the law, the
statute requires that AIPAC make public.”241 Citing Public Citizen, the
Court concluded that the respondents had identified an injury sufficient
to confer standing:
There is no reason to doubt their claim that the information would
help them (and others to whom they would communicate it) to
evaluate candidates for public office, especially candidates who
received assistance from AIPAC, and to evaluate the role that
AIPAC’s financial assistance might play in a specific election.
Respondents’ injury consequently seems concrete and particular.
Indeed, this Court has previously held that a plaintiff suffers an
“injury in fact” when the plaintiff fails to obtain information which
must be publicly disclosed pursuant to a statute.242

As for Richardson, the Court distinguished it: “Here, there is no
constitutional provision requiring the demonstration of the ‘nexus,’” but

237. John G. Roberts, Jr., Article III Limits on Statutory Standing, 42 DUKE L.J. 1219, 1228
n.60 (1993).
238. 524 U.S. 11 (1998).
239. Id. at 15–18.
240. Id. at 19.
241. Id. at 21.
242. Id.
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instead, “there is a statute which . . . seek[s] to protect individuals such
as respondents from the kind of harm they say they have suffered.”243
Moreover, “[t]he fact that the Court in Richardson focused on taxpayer
standing, not voter standing, places that case at still a greater distance
from the case before us.”244 As for the claim that the respondents
advanced only a “generalized grievance,” the Court responded: “[T]he
informational injury at issue here, directly related to voting . . . is
sufficiently concrete and specific such that the fact that it is widely
shared does not deprive Congress of constitutional power to authorize
its vindication in the federal courts.”245
a. Voter Standing
In Richardson, the Court stressed that only taxpayer standing was at
issue.246 Akins could be read as confining Richardson to cases asserting
taxpayer and not voter standing. In Akins, the plaintiff-voters alleged
that the information they sought would assist them in casting their
votes, and for that reason the Court concluded that their injury was
sufficiently particularized to support standing, and not merely an
assertion of the generalized interest in promoting compliance with the
law. The injury suffered by voters unable to learn anything of
significance about intelligence spending, while seeking to hold
incumbent officials accountable for such spending, seems, if anything,
even more concrete and particularized than the injury asserted in Akins,
which involved only information about the activities of a single alleged
political committee and not budgetary decisions for which incumbent
officials bear more direct accountability.
Even if the relationship between disclosure of information about
government spending and the obligation to pay taxes is too tenuous to
support taxpayer standing, Akins suggests that the relationship between
disclosure and voting may well be sufficiently robust to support voter
standing to enforce the Statement and Account Clause. The clause
functions as a mechanism to enhance elected officials’ political
accountability to the voters, and therefore a denial of information to
which voters are entitled under the clause seems to work an injury no
less direct and concrete as the injury that supported standing in Akins,

243.
244.
245.
246.

Id. at 22.
Id.
Id. at 24–25. To similar effect, see Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 522 (2006).
United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 167–68 & n.1 (1974).

DOCUMENT 2 (DO NOT DELETE)

68

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

10/9/15 6:17 PM

[Vol. 47

which similarly rested on a statute that endeavored to enhance elected
officials’ political accountability to the voters.
To be sure, Richardson argued that “without detailed information on
CIA expenditures—and hence its activities—he could not intelligently
follow the actions of Congress or the Executive, nor could he properly
fulfill his obligations as a member of the electorate,” and the Court
characterized this as “a generalized grievance . . . since the impact on
him [was] plainly undifferentiated and ‘common to all members of the
public.’”247 This discussion, however, was a dictum offered in the
context of a claim of taxpayer standing. Even more important, as this
dictum suggests, the rule against entertaining what are regarded as
generalized grievances is properly understood as a rule against “suits
‘claiming only harm to [the plaintiff’s] and every citizen’s interest in
proper application of the Constitution and laws, and seeking relief that
no more directly and tangibly benefits him than the public at large.’”248
An action by a voter seeking disclosures about intelligence spending
required by the Statement and Account Clause is not premised on a
generalized interest in requiring the government to comply with the law,
but rather on a constitutional mechanism that facilitates the
accountability of the political branches for a discrete government
function.249 Indeed, in Akins, the Court wrote that had Richardson
claimed standing as a voter, “the Richardson Court would simply have
had to consider whether ‘the Framers . . . ever imagined that general
directives [of the Constitution]. . . would be subject to enforcement by
an individual citizen,’” an inquiry that “would have rested in significant
part upon the Court’s view of the Accounts Clause.”250 Given the role
that the clause serves in producing accountability through the electoral
process, Akins suggests a powerful argument that voters have standing
to enforce the clause. Taxpayer standing to enforce the clause, in
contrast, is problematic.251
It is doubtless true that in Richardson the Court suggested that

247. Id. at 176–77 (quoting Ex parte Leavitt, 302 U.S. 633, 634 (1937)).
248. Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1377, 1387 n.3 (2014)
(quoting Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 573–74 (1992) (alteration in original)).
249. Cf. Richard Re, Relative Standing, 102 GEO. L.J. 1191, 1212 & n.119 (2014) (arguing
that Akins properly recognized standing based on the failure to disclose information to the
plaintiffs “that would have helped them cast votes” while Richardson involved “the mere denial
of information”).
250. Akins, 524 U.S. at 22 (alteration in original) (quoting Richardson, 418 U.S. at 178 n.11).
251. See supra text accompanying notes 218–22.
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enforcing the Statement and Account Clause is none of the judiciary’s
business: “[T]he absence of any particular individual or class to litigate
these claims gives support to the argument that the subject matter is
committed to the surveillance of Congress, and ultimately to the
political process.”252 In his extrajudicial writing, Justice Scalia has
elaborated, arguing that it is not the function of the judiciary to entertain
the claims of majorities asserting the interest of the general public in
enforcement of the law, which are instead appropriately left to the
political process.253 And, of course, one might argue that the relief
issued in a case brought to enforce the Statement and Account Clause
provides only a generalized benefit to the public at large. There are,
however, serious problems lurking within these claims.
As the discussion in Part I above demonstrates, the Statement and
Account Clause treats disclosure of public spending not as a matter for
resolution through the ordinary political process, but rather as a
precondition for ordinary politics. The clause requires that politics be
conducted under circumstances in which the voters are provided with
sufficient information about government spending.
Indeed, the
objective of fostering political accountability is of greatest concern to
those who are dissatisfied with incumbent officials and orthodoxies. If
critics of the status quo cannot dislodge from the bowels of the
government information about its operations, it may be difficult to make
the case for change—the task of today’s minority in making the case
that it should be tomorrow’s majority becomes that much harder.254
Accordingly, the injury identified by a voter who has been denied
information about intelligence spending is not merely the generalized
concern of the body politic as a whole, as the Court held in Akins.255
Whether Richardson would have come out differently had it involved
voter rather than taxpayer standing is a question that the Court noted but
252. Richardson, 418 U.S. at 179.
253. See Antonin Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing as an Essential Element of the Separation
of Powers, 17 SUFFOLK L. REV. 881, 894–97 (1983). But cf. Siegel, A Theory of Justiciability,
supra note 132, at 101–02 (discussing collective action problems involved in remediating
constitutional violations that can be characterized as generalized grievances); Cass R. Sunstein,
What’s Standing After Lujan? Of Citizen Suits, “Injuries,” and Article III, 91 MICH. L. REV. 163,
219–20 (1992) (same).
254. Cf. The Supreme Court, 1973 Term, 88 HARV. L. REV. 41, 242 (1974) (“[T]he failure of
the CIA to account for any of its expenditures suppresses public indignation and may hinder the
arousal of political opposition.”). For a more elaborate argument along these lines, see Steven G.
Gey, The Procedural Annihilation of Structural Rights, 61 HASTINGS L.J. 1, 60–62 (2009).
255. See supra text accompanying notes 238–45.
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did not decide in Akins.256 If so, this would convert Richardson into
little more than a technical rule about the difference between taxpayer
and voting standing, a view that perhaps gives too little weight to
Richardson’s concerns about litigating generalized grievances. Yet, the
Statement and Account Clause may identify a type of duty to the public
that the judiciary appropriately enforces to preserve the Constitution’s
conception of political accountability. Even if this reduces Richardson
to a rule of pleading, the Court has often made standing turn on niceties
of pleading.257 Still, the Court has expressed concern about entertaining
suits based on what are regarded as generalized grievances, not merely
in addressing taxpayer standing, but also to limit voter standing, at least
when they are not brought be voters who allege that they reside in
districts drawn in violation of one-person, one-vote principles.258
Perhaps, however, in cases in which the constitutional infrastructure for
enabling the voters to hold officials accountable through the electoral
process—such as the Statement and Account Clause—is at issue, the
Court would conclude that Akins governs, rather than Richardson and
its progeny, much as the Court held voters may attack “congressional
apportionment laws which debase a citizen’s right to vote.”259 When
the mechanisms that produce political accountability are at stake, after
all, voters are asserting their own prerogatives as voters, not merely a
generalized interest in securing obedience to the law.260

256. FEC v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 22–23 (1998).
257. See, e.g., Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 495 (2009) (rejecting standing
based on “a failure to allege that any particular timber sale or other project claimed to be
unlawfully subject to the regulations will impede a specific and concrete plan of Bensman’s to
enjoy the National Forests”); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 504 (1975) (“We may assume, as
petitioners allege, that respondents’ actions have contributed, perhaps substantially, to the cost of
housing in Penfield. But there remains the question whether petitioners’ inability to locate
suitable housing in Penfield reasonably can be said to have resulted, in any concretely
demonstrable way, from respondents’ alleged constitutional and statutory infractions. Petitioners
must allege facts from which it reasonably could be inferred that, absent the respondents’
restrictive zoning practices, there is a substantial probability that they would have been able to
purchase or lease in Penfield and that, if the court affords the relief requested, the asserted
inability of petitioners will be removed.” (citation omitted)).
258. See, e.g., Lance v. Coffman, 549 U.S. 437, 439–42 (2007) (per curiam); United States v.
Hays, 515 U.S. 737, 742–46 (1995)); see also Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. To Stop the War,
418 U.S. 208, 216–27 (1974) (rejecting standing of citizens to challenge members of Congress
from holding commissions in the military under the Incompatibility Clause); Harrington v. Bush,
553 F.2d 190 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (rejecting legislator’s standing to challenge statutory funding and
reporting provisions governing the CIA under the Statement and Account Clause).
259. Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 5 (1964).
260. In addition to the constitutional dimensions of standing, the Court has articulated
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b. FOIA Standing
A contrasting reading of Akins would reject Richardson’s standing
even if he had asserted injury as a voter, but would render Richardson
and other cases rejecting standing to press what are regarded as
generalized grievances inapplicable to cases in which Congress has
authorized the plaintiff to bring suit, on the view that Congress has
authority to create by statute legally cognizable injuries sufficient to
confer to standing to sue. This reading of Akins as resting on a statutory
right to information has been embraced by a number of
commentators.261 There is ample precedential support for the view that
Congress has the power to create legally cognizable injury by statute; it
has long been settled that “[t]he . . . injury required by Art. III may exist
solely by virtue of ‘statutes creating legal rights, the invasion of which
creates standing.’”262 This rule had even been applied to an assertion of

prudential aspects of standing that “encompass[] ‘the general prohibition on a litigant’s raising
another person’s legal rights, the rule barring adjudication of generalized grievances more
appropriately addressed in the representative branches, and the requirement that a plaintiff’s
complaint fall within the zone of interests protected by the law invoked.’” Elk Grove Unified
Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 12 (2004) (quoting Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751
(1984)). In light of the discussion above, it should be plain that voters are the proper parties to
complain about a violation of the Statement and Account Clause and lie within the zone of
interests protected by the clause because its disclosure requirement implicates the process by
which elected officials are to be held accountable to them. The discussion above also explains
why an action brought by voters to enforce the clause should not be regarded as a generalized
grievance, at least in terms of the constitutional aspects of the standing inquiry under Article III.
The Court has never squarely held this doctrine also implicates distinct nonconstitutional
prudential concerns about judicial interference with the judgments of the political branches on
matters of national security. If a claim were advanced along these lines, however, it is unclear
how, in a case in which relief is sought against an ongoing constitutional violation,
nonconstitutional considerations of this character could trump a court’s obligation to enforce a
constitutional command such as the Statement and Account Clause. Cf. Susan B. Anthony List v.
Driehaus, 134 S. Ct. 2334, 2347 (2014) (“To the extent that respondents would have us deem
petitioners’ claims nonjusticiable ‘on grounds that are prudential rather than constitutional,’ ‘that
request stands in some tension with our recent reaffirmation of the principle that a federal court’s
obligation to hear and decide cases within its jurisdiction is virtually unflagging.’” (citations
omitted) (quoting Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1377, 1386
(2014))). See generally S. Todd Brown, The Story of Prudential Standing, 42 HASTINGS CONST.
L.Q. 95, 127–32 (2014) (advocating abolition of prudential standing requirements). Additional
discussion of the anomalies in a conclusion that a court could elevate nonconstitutional prudential
considerations over the constitutional disclosure mandate is found in Part II.B.1 below.
261. See, e.g., Kimberly N. Brown, What’s Left Standing? FECA Citizen Suits and the Battle
for Judicial Review, 55 U. KAN. L. REV. 677, 715–28 (2007); Lee & Ellis, supra note 231, at
197–201; Cass R. Sunstein, Informational Regulation and Informational Standing: Akins and
Beyond, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 613, 641–48 (1999).
262. Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 578 (1992) (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S.
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standing based on an informational injury prior to Public Citizen and
Akins. The Court earlier held that in the Fair Housing Act, Congress
properly conferred standing to contest discriminatory rental practices on
testers who had no intention of renting or purchasing a home, but who
were nevertheless deprived of a statutory right to accurate information
about the availability of housing.263 It follows that although Richardson
might bar voter-standing suits that have not been statutorily authorized,
such as Richardson’s action, it would not bar a suit seeking information
about intelligence spending predicated on the statutory right to the
disclosure in the FOIA.
The view that Congress can create by statute sufficient, legally
cognizable injuries that confer standing on those who otherwise have no
justiciable claim has considerable appeal. If Congress has the
constitutional power to enact the FOIA as a means of enhancing the
accountability of the Executive Branch by requiring executive agencies
to disclose information about their activities, surely an appropriate
vehicle for achieving accountability would be to delegate to interested
individuals the means to enforce the FOIA’s disclosure requirement.
After all, if enhancing accountability through public disclosure is a
permissible legislative objective, then one logical way to pursue it is to
grant to the public a right to enforce a statutory disclosure
requirement.264 Moreover, the FOIA particularizes both injury and right
in a way that the Statement and Account Clause alone does not. The
clause imposes a duty running to the public at large; the legal duty to
disclose information articulated in the FOIA, in contrast, is triggered
only when a particular individual requests specified information, and
the resulting duty to disclose runs only to the individual FOIA
requestor. In this sense, a failure to disclose information under the
FOIA has the character of a particularized injury—not a generalized
grievance, as Akins and Public Citizen conclude.
In addition, restrictions on standing can be understood as preserving

490, 500 (1975) (quoting Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 617 n.3 (1973))); see also id. at
580 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“In my view, Congress has the power to define injuries and
articulate chains of causation that will give rise to a case or controversy where none existed
before . . . .”).
263. See Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 373–75 (1982).
264. Cf. Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 185–88
(2000) (holding Article III permits Congress to authorize private litigants to bring suit to enforce
environmental laws seeking civil penalties payable to the government as a means of deterring
violations of law).
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the executive’s prerogative to enforce the law. Standing to enforce the
FOIA, however, does not amount to an effective transfer of
prosecutorial discretion from the executive. The FOIA is not a
delegation of prosecutorial discretion to the public; instead, as the Court
has explained, “[t]he basic purpose of FOIA is to ensure an informed
citizenry, vital to the functioning of a democratic society, needed to
check against corruption and to hold the governors accountable to the
governed.”265 Therefore, FOIA requestors are properly understood as
serving an oversight, rather than a prosecutorial function. Hence, they
do not undermine executive prerogatives in the same way as a statutory
grant of standing to members of the public to enforce the law.
Accordingly, if Congress has the power to enact the FOIA in order to
promote executive accountability, than there is no reason to regard the
FOIA as impermissibly intruding on executive power.266 It follows that,
because Richardson was not a case involving a congressional grant of
standing to those who have been denied access to agency records, it
does not control cases in which such a statutory right—and statutorily
defined injury—is at issue.267
There are, however, constitutional limits on congressional power to
confer standing to assert statutory claims. The Court has long insisted:
265. John Doe Agency v. John Doe Corp., 493 U.S. 146, 152 (1989) (quoting NLRB v.
Robbins Tire & Rubber Co., 437 U.S. 214, 242 (1978)).
266. For a discussion along similar lines, see Tara Leigh Grove, Standing as an Article II
Nondelegation Doctrine, 11 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 781, 827–29 & n.205 (2009). For a more general
discussion of congressional power to regulate judicial practice and procedure under the Necessary
and Proper Clause, see David E. Engdahl, Intrinsic Limits of Congress’ Power Regarding the
Judicial Branch, 1999 BYU L. REV. 75.
267. Some have argued that the rule against entertaining generalized grievances is properly
understood as a prudential consideration rather than a constitutional bar and accordingly Congress
can repudiate it by statute. See, e.g., Kimberly N. Brown, Justiciable Generalized Grievances, 68
MD. L. REV. 221, 239–46 (2008). Indeed, the Court has sometimes characterized the problem
with suits based on generalized grievances as a prudential consideration protecting the political
branches against unwarranted judicial interference. See, e.g., Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v.
Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 12 (2004); Devlin v. Scardelletti, 535 U.S. 1, 6–7 (2002); Allen v. Wright,
468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984); Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church
& State, 454 U.S. 464, 474–75 (1982); Gladstone, Realtors v. Vill. of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91,
120–21 (1979). But, on other occasions, the Court has characterized the rule as of constitutional
dimension. See, e.g., Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1377,
1387 n.3 (2014); Lance v. Coffman, 549 U.S. 437, 439 (2007) (per curiam); Lujan v. Defs. of
Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 573–76 (1992). At best, the law seems unsettled on this point, and a
consideration of whether the rule is properly regarded as constitutional or prudential goes well
beyond the scope of this discussion. But, to the extent that the rule against hearing generalized
grievances is regarded as prudential, the FOIA represents a legislative rejection of such prudential
considerations.

DOCUMENT 2 (DO NOT DELETE)

74

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

10/9/15 6:17 PM

[Vol. 47

“In no event . . . may Congress abrogate the Art. III minima: A plaintiff
must always have suffered ‘a distinct and palpable injury to himself,’
that is likely to be redressed if the requested relief is granted.”268
Moreover, the Court has also held that Congress may not confer
standing based on “the public interest in proper administration of the
laws” and thereby “permit . . . all citizens (or, for that matter, a subclass
of citizens who suffer no distinctive concrete harm) to sue.”269 FOIA
standing, however, rests on individualized and concrete harm; the FOIA
imposes a duty to disclose to an individual requestor that, if breached,
gives rise to a concomitantly individualized injury rather than a
generalized grievance. There is accordingly ample reason to regard the
denial of information that is useful both to voters and the public at large
in holding officials politically accountable as a “distinct and palpable”
injury to the requestor, and a judicial order compelling release of that
information unquestionably redresses that injury. Moreover, as we have
seen, the FOIA is not premised on an abstract interest in the proper
administration of the law but rather facilitates processes of political
accountability.
Accordingly, a denial of information sought under the FOIA
produces a sufficiently concrete and particularized injury to support
standing to sue, even if, absent the statutory right to disclosure created
by the FOIA, such a claim would be regarded as a nonjusticiable
generalized grievance. There is no novelty in this conclusion. It is
often the case that a statute creates individual rights that would not
otherwise exist.270
It is common as well that an individual’s
dissatisfaction with an allegedly unlawful government policy that might
otherwise represent a nonjusticiable generalized grievance can support
standing to sue once that policy is applied in a manner that produces a
sufficiently concrete and particularized injury to that individual.271

268. Gladstone, 441 U.S. at 100 (footnote and citations omitted) (quoting Warth v. Seldin,
422 U.S. 490, 501 (1975)).
269. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 576–77.
270. See supra text accompanying notes 260–261.
271. See, e.g., Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1154–55 (2013) (although
litigants lacked standing to challenge electronic surveillance without proof that it had intercepted
their conversations, if the fruits of surveillance were used to bring proceedings, defendants whose
conversations were intercepted would have a basis to establish standing to sue); Friends of the
Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 181–84 (2000) (although standing
to challenge alleged violations of environmental laws cannot be based on general claims that
plaintiffs use wildlife areas, allegations that alleged violations have harmed specific wildlife areas
used by the plaintiffs are sufficient to establish standing); Allen, 468 U.S. at 761–63 (although
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Indeed, Public Citizen and Akins make both points.
One might agree that claims under the FOIA are usually justiciable,
but still resist that conclusion when it comes to classified information
about intelligence spending on the ground of redressability. After all,
the FOIA treats virtually all information about intelligence spending as
exempt from disclosure.272 The availability of a statutory exemption
from the general duty of disclosure seemingly means that an action
brought pursuant to the FOIA would fail to redress the injury asserted
by a FOIA requestor seeking information about intelligence spending.
But, the existence of a potential or even a meritorious defense to an
action seeking disclosure of information does not defeat standing to sue.
Instead, it is regarded as a defense on the merits.273
In Akins, for example, after the Court rejected the attack on the
respondents’ standing, it remanded the case to the Federal Elections
Commission to consider whether new regulations it had proposed would
defeat the claim for disclosure.274 Thus, the existence of a potential
defense did not defeat standing. In Public Citizen, the Court actually
reached the defense tendered on the merits and concluded that it
prevailed. Yet, this conclusion did not somehow operate to defeat the
plaintiff’s standing to sue.275
Thus, the availability of a defense on the merits does not operate to
defeat the plaintiff’s standing. A meritorious defense may win the
lawsuit for the defendant, but it does not undermine the plaintiff’s
standing to sue, which turns only on whether redress would likely occur
“if the requested relief is granted.”276 If standing could be defeated by
the availability of a defense on the merits, in contrast, then presumably
a federal court could never enter judgment for a defendant; the existence

claims by parents of public school students that state aid to discriminatory private schools
produce “abstract denigration injury” do not confer standing, allegations that such aid produces
unequal access to public goods or deprives litigants of rights under desegregations decrees confer
standing); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 481 (1965) (although doctors lacked standing
to sue for a declaratory judgment that statute prohibiting use of contraceptives was invalid, once
they had been convicted under the statute they had standing to attack it).
272. See supra text accompanying notes 57–58.
273. See, e.g., Bond v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2355, 2362 (2011) (“[T]he question whether a
plaintiff states a claim for relief ‘goes to the merits’ in the typical case, not the justiciability of a
dispute . . . .” (quoting Steel Co. v. Citizens for Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 92 (1998))).
274. FEC v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 26–29 (1998).
275. Pub. Citizen v. U.S. Dep’t. of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 451–67 (1989).
276. Gladstone, Realtors v. Vill. of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 100 (1979) (emphasis added and
footnote omitted).
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of a meritorious defense would defeat the plaintiff’s standing to bring
the case, and therefore render it outside the federal judicial power over
“cases” and “controversies.”277
There is one final problem with an effort to use a statutory exemption
from disclosure to defeat the standing of a litigant seeking information
about intelligence spending under the Statement and Account Clause.
The statutory exemption, to the extent that it permits the government to
conceal information that must be disclosed under the clause, may well
be unconstitutional. But, before we consider that point, one more

277. Indeed, standing, at least in its constitutional dimensions, is required for a federal court to
exercise jurisdiction over a case. See, e.g., FW/PBS, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 493 U.S. 215, 230–31
(1990). Nevertheless, prior to Public Citizen and Akins, the D.C. Circuit, after treating with a
FOIA requestor’s suit seeking information about the CIA’s legal bills and agreements with law
firms on the merits insofar as the requestor premised his claim on the FOIA, then relied on
Richardson to hold that the requestor lacked standing to challenge the statutes on which the CIA
relied to defend its refusal to disclose the information at issue under the Statement and Account
Clause, reasoning that the requestor’s attack on the statutes on which the CIA’s defense was
predicated was a nonjusticiable generalized grievance: “For a FOIA plaintiff as well as a
taxpayer, the constitutional objection to the CIA’s fiscal secrecy is shared in common with all
members of the public, and under the logic of Richardson this factor bars standing.” Halperin v.
CIA, 629 F.2d 144, 153 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (alternate holding) (footnote omitted). More recently, a
district court in that circuit followed the Halperin holding. See Aftergood v. CIA, 355 F. Supp.
2d 557, 562–63 (D.C. Cir. 2005). Halperin’s approach is deeply confused. If the court has
jurisdiction over the case because Halperin had standing to sue for information under the FOIA, it
is entirely unclear how he could not somehow lose that standing—with the court therefore
somehow losing its jurisdiction—only insofar as Halperin attacked the constitutionality of the
statutes on which the CIA had relied to mount its defense. After all, if Halperin had a sufficiently
concrete and particularized interest in acquiring information about the CIA’s spending to grant
him standing to sue under the FOIA, he did not lose that concrete and particularized interest
merely because he also challenged the statutory basis on which the CIA relied to defend the case.
Standing inquires into the plaintiff’s interest in bringing suit, not whether a court can consider
particular defenses or responses thereto in the ensuing litigation; as the discussion above
demonstrates, even the availability of a defense on the merits—such as the CIA asserted in
Halperin—does not deprive the plaintiff of standing. Richardson explains that “a federal court
cannot ‘pronounce any statute . . . void, because irreconcilable with the constitution, except as it
is called upon to adjudge the legal rights of litigants in actual controversies.’” United States v.
Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 171 (1974) (citation omitted) (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186,
204 (1962)). It follows that in an otherwise justiciable action involving the legal rights of a FOIA
requestor, a court may indeed consider the constitutionality of statutes that exempt the material at
issue from disclosure. The flaws in Halperin’s reasoning become even more evident in light of
the subsequent decisions in Public Citizen and Akins, which conclude that even what would
otherwise be generalized grievances become justiciable when a specific request for information is
made and refused under a statute that creates an individual right to information. To the extent
that Halperin concluded that the justiciability problem in the case involved not the plaintiff’s
standing to sue but the nonjusticiability of a particular constitutional issue that the plaintiff sought
to litigate, that goes not to the plaintiff’s standing but rather to the political question doctrine,
which is considered below.
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barrier to justiciability must be addressed.
2. The Political Question Doctrine
Although the precise holding of Richardson involved standing, there
is considerable language in the opinion suggesting that the political
question doctrine might also preclude justiciability of claims seeking
enforcement of the Statement and Account Clause. For example, as the
Court acknowledged that its holding might mean that no one could
bring a claim seeking judicial enforcement of the Statement and
Account Clause, it observed that “the absence of any particular
individual or class to litigate these claims gives support to the argument
that the subject matter is committed to the surveillance of Congress, and
ultimately to the political process.”278 The Court added, albeit in dicta,
that “Congress has plenary power to exact any reporting and accounting
it considers appropriate in the public interest.”279 These comments
seem to imply that the judiciary has no role in enforcing the Statement
and Account Clause.
If this language in Richardson was intended to suggest that
enforcement of the Statement and Account Clause might involve a
nonjusticiable political question, the hint was soon taken. In a
memorandum to the President subsequently submitted to the House
Intelligence Committee in 1978, Attorney General Griffin B. Bell
opined: “[T]he constitutionality of any particular manner of accounting
presents a ‘political question’ which could not be resolved by a court
even if the Supreme Court were to conclude that an individual might
have standing to institute a lawsuit for this purpose.”280 The District of
Columbia Circuit subsequently accepted this view in a case in which
disclosure of financial records of the CIA was sought under the
Statement and Account Clause, holding that “the decision to disclose
material[] . . . is a nonjusticiable political question.”281 There is
academic support for this view as well. Jesse Choper, for example, has
suggested that when an alleged constitutional violation affects the
public at large, such as an alleged failure to comply with the Statement
and Account Clause, it is properly treated as nonjusticiable under the

278. Richardson, 418 U.S. at 179.
279. Id. at 178 n.11.
280. 1978 House Intelligence Funds Disclosure Hearings, supra note 176, at 32
(memorandum for the President of May 23, 1977).
281. See Halperin, 629 F.2d at 161 (alternate holding).
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political question doctrine because all members of the electorate have
an interest in redressing the alleged wrong, making the appropriate
remedy political and not legal.282
What should be striking about the view that the Statement and
Account Clause presents a nonjusticiable political question is that it is at
utter odds with the purpose and function of the clause reflected in its
text and original understanding, and constitutional ethos and structure.
As we have seen, the clause is a check on the political branches rather
than a grant of power to them. The clause operates as a precondition to
politics under the Constitution, rather than identifying a matter to be
addressed through the political process. Instead of leaving disclosure to
the mercies of the political process, the clause represents one of the
Constitution’s checks on the operations of the political process—it
reflects a judgment that neither legislators nor executive officials can be
trusted to spend the people’s money only if they are required to disclose
those expenditures. To leave the clause’s enforcement to the political
branches, in short, is to let the fox guard the henhouse.
Thus, although all voters may have an interest in encouraging
disclosure of the manner in which public funds are spent, if disclosure
were left to the political process, it would occur only if voters were
willing to put sufficient political pressure on officials to produce
disclosure. The Statement and Account Clause, however, obviates the
need to exert political pressure in this fashion; it represents a
constitutional guarantee of disclosure without requiring the electorate to
make special and insistent demands for information.
The point can be made in doctrinal terms. The test for a
nonjusticiable political question involves a two-part inquiry: “[A]
controversy ‘involves a political question . . . where there is “a textually
demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate
political department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and
manageable standards for resolving it.”‘“283 As for the first prong of the
inquiry, perhaps the classic example of a textual commitment to a
political branch involves impeachments: “The Senate shall have the sole

282. See Jesse H. Choper, The Political Question Doctrine: Suggested Criteria, 54 DUKE L.J.
1457, 1472–74 (2005).
283. Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 132 S. Ct. 1421, 1427 (2012) (alteration in
original) (quoting Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 228 (1993) (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369
U.S. 186, 217 (1962))).
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power to try all [i]mpeachments.”284 Stressing this textual commitment
of exclusive authority to the Senate, the Supreme Court has held that
this provision deprives the judiciary of authority to review the manner
by which the Senate tries an impeachment.285
By comparison, there is no textual commitment of the responsibility
for discharging the constitutional obligation of publishing a statement
and account of receipts and expenditures to the political branches. In
contrast to the Impeachment Clause, the Statement and Account Clause
contains no textually demonstrable commitment of responsibility to the
political branches.286 At most, the clause implies a measure of
discretion to the political branches with respect to the timing and detail
of disclosure. It is doubtful that this implication amounts to a “textually
demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate
political department,”287 but even if so, the political question doctrine
does not bar judicial resolution of the question whether the political
branches have exceeded the authority conferred by the Constitution’s
text. For example, although the Constitution grants each House of
Congress authority to “be the Judge of the . . . Qualifications of its own
Members,”288 the Court held that because the Constitution did not grant
Congress the authority to add qualifications other than those enumerated
in the Constitution, the question of whether the House of
Representatives violated the Constitution by expelling a member for
impermissible reasons was justiciable.289 The Court also held that a
noncitizen whose application for suspension of deportation was vetoed
by one House of Congress could challenge that action despite
Congress’s “plenary power” over matters of immigration because the

284. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 6.
285. See Nixon, 506 U.S. at 228–36. At one time, the Court regarded Congress’s obligation to
guarantee the states a republican form of government the classic example of a political question
lacking in judicially manageable standards. See Baker, 369 U.S. at 223–29. More recently,
however, the Court has expressed uncertainty about whether claims under the Guarantee Clause
are justiciable. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 183–86 (1992).
286. In contrast, if a member of Congress used the Statement and Account Clause to challenge
the rules prohibiting disclosure of classified information, see supra text accompanying note 153,
the textual commitment of authority to the Houses of Congress to make and enforce their own
rules might well render such a challenge nonjusticiable. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 2 (“Each
House may determine the Rules of its Proceedings, punish its Members for disorderly Behaviour,
and, with the concurrence of two thirds, expel a Member.”).
287. Zivotofsky, 132 S. Ct. at 1427.
288. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5.
289. See Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 518–49 (1969).
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question of whether the Constitution permitted one House of Congress
to exercise its power over immigration in this fashion was justiciable.290
Similarly, the Court has held that Congress’s plenary power over Indian
affairs did not render nonjusticiable claims that Congress has exercised
that power in a manner inconsistent with the equal protection
requirement of the Fifth Amendment.291 Thus, even on the dubious
assumption that the clause should be read as reserving exclusively to the
political branches the power to make decisions about the timing and
detail of disclosure, the question whether they have utilized their
discretion within constitutional bounds remains justiciable.
As for the second prong, although the extent and frequency of
disclosure required by the clause cannot be stated with mathematical
certainty, this is no bar to justiciability. It is the routine business of the
judiciary to address a myriad of questions of constitutional
interpretation and application in which the Constitution’s text does not
articulate precise standards. As the Court has explained, the judiciary is
regarded as “capable of determining when punishment is ‘cruel and
unusual,’ when bail is ‘excessive,’ when searches are ‘unreasonable,’
and when congressional action is ‘necessary and proper’ for executing
an enumerated power.”292 The standards for compliance with the
Statement and Account Clause are no less capable of judicial resolution.
As the discussion in Part I demonstrates, the clause requires disclosure
sufficiently frequent and detailed to enable the public to assess the
manner in which public funds are spent. The boundaries of this
obligation are surely capable of judicial resolution—especially
inasmuch as the clause represents a constitutional judgment that the
disclosure obligation cannot be left to the very officials whose powers
are constrained by the clause.293

290. See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 940–43 (1983).
291. See Del. Tribal Bus. Comm. v. Weeks, 430 U.S. 73, 83–85 (1977). Indeed, Professor
Henkin once questioned whether decisions to reject a constitutional attack on the basis of a
textual commitment of the question to a political branch reflected a “political question doctrine”
or merely a more straightforward conclusion that the political branch had not exceeded the
powers granted it by the Constitution. See Louis Henkin, Is There a “Political Question”
Doctrine?, 85 YALE L.J. 597, 604–06 (1976).
292. United States v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385, 396 (1990). For a useful discussion
explaining the grounds for skepticism when it comes to claims that the judiciary lacks
manageable standards for resolving an issue, see Martin H. Redish, Judicial Review and the
“Political Question,” 79 NW. U. L. REV. 1031, 1046–52 (1985).
293. Cf. Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 132 S. Ct. 1421, 1430 (2012) (the question
whether a statute directing the Secretary of State to identify the country of birth on passports of
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With respect to financial disclosure obligations in particular, the
judiciary has had no difficulty in developing manageable standards; as
we have seen in Part I.B.3, the concept of materiality has proven of
particular use. There is little reason to believe that the judiciary is
incapable of developing standards to govern the constitutional
disclosure obligation reflected in the Statement and Account Clause. It
would surely surprise lawyers who deal in financial fraud—not to
mention the entire accounting profession—to learn that that there are no
judicially manageable standards for determining what amounts to an
adequate accounting of receipts and expenditures. It may be difficult in
individual cases to determine if a firm has made adequate disclosure
under the securities laws, but this does not render the matter
nonjusticiable.
Nor is it impossible to determine how frequently disclosure must be
made. As the discussion in Part I.B.3 demonstrates, the clause is
comprehensible only if, as its framing-era advocates contended, it
requires disclosure at reasonable intervals rather than granting
unbounded power to delay disclosure.
That discussion also
demonstrates that both history and congressional treatment of nonintelligence spending powerfully suggest a presumption in favor of
annual disclosure. Under the current disclosure regime, moreover,
Congress has not merely limited the times at which intelligence
expenditures are disclosed; it has instead granted intelligence spending a
blanket exemption from any disclosure requirement. Instead, only
aggregate appropriations are annually disclosed—a standard of
disclosure that the judiciary is fully competent to test against
constitutional standards.294
individuals born in Jerusalem as Israel unconstitutionally infringed on the Executive’s powers
over foreign relations “demands careful examination of the textual, structural, and historical
evidence put forward by the parties . . . . This is what courts do. The political question doctrine
poses no bar to judicial review of this case.”).
294. In addition to the two-pronged inquiry into whether there is a textually demonstrable
commitment of the issue to the political branches and the existence of judicially manageable
standards, Baker v. Carr added four other factors:
[T]he impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly
for nonjudicial discretion; or the impossibility of a court’s undertaking independent
resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of
government; or an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision
already made; or the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements
by various departments on one question.
369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962). The Court nevertheless concluded that the claim before it seeking
reapportionment of congressional districts of unequal population was justiciable. See id. at 226–
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It is doubtless true that there are likely a variety of means by which
disclosure could be made consistent with the clause, but this too is no
bar to justiciability. In a case challenging the method by which
Congress apportions seats in the House of Representatives by state, for
example, the Court, after noting that “the Constitution places
substantive limitations on Congress’ apportionment power and that
violations of those limitations would present a justiciable controversy,”
concluded that it had authority to “determine whether Congress
exercised its apportionment authority within the limits dictated by the
Constitution.”295 The Court reached this conclusion even though, as it
upheld the method of apportionment chosen by Congress, it
37. It is unclear whether any of the final four indicia have continued vitality given the Court’s
more recent adherence to only the first two. See, e.g., Carol Szurkowski, Recent Development,
The Return of the Classical Political Question Doctrine in Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v.
Clinton, 132 S. Ct. 1421 (2012), 37 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 347, 357–61 (2014). In any event,
since Baker, the only case in which the Court has placed any weight on any of the final four
indicia sought ongoing judicial supervision of the Ohio National Guard, and in that context, the
Court wrote:
[I]t is difficult to conceive of an area of governmental activity in which the courts have
less competence. The complex, subtle, and professional decisions as to the
composition, training, equipping, and control of a military force are essentially
professional military judgments, subject always to civilian control of the Legislative
and Executive Branches.
The ultimate responsibility for these decisions is
appropriately vested in branches of the government which are periodically subject to
electoral accountability.
Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1, 10 (1973). As one eminent scholar observed, the Court seems to
be “saying that no judgment can be made on the merits of the constitutional claim, because the
judiciary is effectively incapable of questioning the expertise of the professionals involved in the
making of the original decisions.” Redish, supra note 292, at 1056. Judicial enforcement of the
Statement and Account Clause involves quite different considerations; as we have seen, the
judiciary has developed standards for addressing the sufficiency of financial disclosures, and a
judgment invalidating the disclosure practices of the political branches would seem to involve no
greater potential for interbranch conflict than any other case in which the judiciary is asked to
invalidate a statute that the political branches are likely to regard as important. Moreover,
enforcement of the Statement and Account Clause operates to enhance rather than undermine
political accountability, and in that sense it is entirely consistent with the manner in which the
politically accountable branches are expected to operate under the Constitution. Beyond this, as
Professor Henkin observed, these aspects of the political question doctrine seem to be premised
on the same types of prudential considerations that traditionally warranted courts to deny
equitable remedies. See Henkin, supra note 291, at 617–22. To the extent that disclosures
required by the Statement and Account Clause might pose a serious threat to national security, at
least putting aside the likelihood that the clause itself might accommodate this concern, see supra
text accompanying notes 202–204, a court might be warranted in withholding relief, but there is
little reason to believe that the great bulk of the disclosures that are likely required by the clause
are any more sensitive than the type of information that is routinely disclosed about defense
spending.
295. U.S. Dep’t. of Commerce v. Montana, 503 U.S. 442, 458, 459 (1992).
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acknowledged that when assessing competing methods, “[n]either
mathematical analysis nor constitutional interpretation provides a
conclusive answer,” and that the Constitution “does not provide
sufficient guidance to allow us to discern a single constitutionally
permissible course.”296
No different approach is appropriate for constitutional provisions
involving the structural features of government, such as the Statement
and Account Clause. For example, the Court has held that an
individual’s claim that legislation raising revenue did not originate in
the House of Representatives in violation of the Constitution’s
Origination Clause was justiciable, explaining that even claims
involving structural features of the separation of powers, implicated
individual rights and not merely interbranch politics: “What the Court
has said of the allocation of powers among branches is no less true of
such allocations within the Legislative Branch . . . . [T]he Framers’
purpose was to protect individual rights.”297 This observation is even
more plainly applicable to the Statement and Account Clause, which is
part of the constitutional infrastructure by which members of the public
are able to hold officials accountable for the performance of their
duties.298
It follows that the question whether the current disclosure regime

296. Id. at 463.
297. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. at 394, 395.
298. To be sure, the existence of textual imprecision can be part of the political question
inquiry; as it held that the question whether the procedures used by the Senate to try an
impeachment was nonjusticiable, the Supreme Court concluded that “the use of the word ‘try’ in
the first sentence of the Impeachment Trial Clause lacks sufficient precision to afford any
judicially manageable standard of review of the Senate’s actions.” Nixon v. United States, 506
U.S. 224, 230 (1993). Yet, this conclusion rests on the textual delegation of “sole” authority to
the Senate to determine how to implement its power to try impeachments:
The commonsense meaning of the word “sole” [in the Impeachment Clause] is that the
Senate alone shall have authority to determine whether an individual should be
acquitted or convicted. The dictionary definition bears this out. “Sole” is defined as
“having no companion,” “solitary,” “being the only one,” and “functioning . . .
independently and without assistance or interference.” If the courts may review the
actions of the Senate in order to determine whether that body “tried” an impeached
official, it is difficult to see how the Senate would be “functioning . . . independently
and without assistance or interference.
Id. at 231 (alterations in original and citation omitted). Conversely, not only is there no textual
commitment of authority to the political branches in the Statement and Account Clause to
determine how disclosure should be made, but recognizing authority in those branches to conceal
facts about public spending material to the public’s assessment of that spending would also be
inconsistent with the Constitution itself, as we have seen.
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meets constitutional requirements, as well as an assessment of whether
an alternative would fall within constitutional boundaries, are legal, and
not political questions. Indeed, if the clause were thought to contain no
manageable standards, then the discretion that it (perhaps) impliedly
delegates to the political branches would be effectively boundless, in
turn, making the clause essentially an illusory guarantee of disclosure—
surely not a plausible interpretation of a provision that makes sense only
if it imposes meaningful constraint on the political branches. We
should be skeptical of the view that there are no judicially manageable
standards for enforcing the Statement and Account Clause when the
result of that conclusion would be to leave its enforcement to the
discretion of the very elected officials that it is supposed to constrain.
Even if there may on occasion be difficult questions about the
sufficiency and frequency of disclosure in which deference to the
judgment of the political branches is appropriate, this does not mean
that the question of whether disclosure has fallen within constitutional
bounds is nonjusticiable.
B. Actions To Enforce the Statement and Account Clause
The remaining question, assuming litigation to enforce the Statement
and Account Clause is justiciable, involves the avenue for achieving
enforcement. Two are available.
1. Actions Under the Constitution
As we have seen, there is a substantial argument that after Akins,
Richardson bars only suits asserting taxpayer standing; a plaintiff
asserting injury as a voter could well establish standing to enforce the
Statement and Account Clause. Still, if suit were brought on this
theory, the question whether the plaintiff has a right to bring suit in the
absence of statutory authorization would necessarily arise.
The Court has been willing to recognize an implied right to sue for
damages directly under the Constitution even absent statutory
authorization unless there are what it characterizes as “special factors
counseling hesitation in the absence of affirmative action by
Congress.”299 Some lower courts have concluded that when an asserted
constitutional right of action involves litigation that would require the

299. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 396
(1971); accord, e.g., Wilkie v. Robbins, 551 U.S. 537, 550 (2007); FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471,
486 (1994); United States v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669, 678–84 (1987).
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disclosure of confidential information implicating matters of national
security, this is the type of “special factor” that weighs strongly against
recognizing an implied right of action.300 In an action brought to
enforce the Statement and Account Clause, a court would be faced with
an argument that a suit seeking disclosure of classified information
about intelligence spending is a factor that counsels against recognition
of a right to sue, or otherwise supplies a basis to withhold a remedy.
Yet, within that argument are serious problems.
At the outset, it bears noting that the Supreme Court has never
indicated that its reluctance to imply a right of action under the
Constitution when “special factors counseling hesitation” are present
applies to actions seeking injunctive relief against an ongoing
constitutional violation. There is instead a long history of affording
injunctive relief against constitutional violations even absent express
statutory authorization.301
The explanation for this apparent
inconsistency may well be that a court’s obligation to halt an ongoing
constitutional violation and direct the government to comply with an
affirmative constitutional obligation such as the Statement and Account
Clause trumps prudential concerns about recognizing an implied right of
action. The Supremacy Clause, for example, powerfully suggests that a
constitutional obligation overrides countervailing prudential concerns
such as those involving confidential intelligence gathering.302 There are
particularly powerful reasons to reach that conclusion when it comes to
a claim that the government’s interest in preserving confidentiality
should defeat recognition of a right to sue under the Statement and
Account Clause.
Consider what would happen, for example, if a court recognized a
right to sue under the Statement and Account Clause, and the

300. See, e.g., Lebron ex rel. Padilla v. Rumsfeld, 670 F.3d 540, 552–56 (4th Cir. 2012); Arar
v. Ashcroft, 585 F.3d 559, 574–77 (2d Cir. 2009) (en banc); Wilson v. Libby, 535 F.3d 697, 710
(D.C. Cir. 2008).
301. See, e.g., Bivens, 403 U.S. at 404 (Harlan, J., concurring in the judgment).
302. The Supremacy Clause provides:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance
thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the
United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State
shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the
Contrary notwithstanding.
U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. For a more complete canvass of the considerations supporting
injunctive relief against constitutional violations, see Michael T. Morley, Public Law at the
Cathedral: Enjoining the Government, 35 CARDOZO L. REV. 2453, 2475–80 (2014).
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government then proffered as a defense in the ensuing litigation the
state secrets doctrine, which, the Supreme Court has held—at least in
civil litigation brought on nonconstitutional claims—prevents disclosure
of information considered confidential for reasons of national security
in the course of otherwise justiciable litigation.303 Some lower courts
have applied the doctrine to claims seeking damages for an alleged
constitutional violation.304 But, in an action seeking disclosures
required by the Statement and Account Clause, it should be plain that no
argument about state secrets could be entertained—the clause, after all,
is a constitutional prohibition on treating certain information as secret.
If considerations regarding state secrecy have no place in the defense of
litigation under the Statement and Account Clause, in turn, it is hard to
understand why they counsel against recognizing the right to bring such
a claim in the first place, or supply any other basis for withholding a
remedy requiring constitutionally mandated disclosures based on
prudential considerations.
To be sure, the Statement and Account Clause grants the government
discretion over the timing and perhaps even the level of specificity of
disclosure, but as we have seen, the intelligence community has been
granted a statutory exemption from laws requiring the disclosure of
government spending other than a requirement of disclosing aggregate
appropriations. The clause, however, does not permit the government to
treat the intelligence community’s expenditures as a state secret—
whether through the use of the common-law state secrets privilege, or
through any other defense that seeks to keep secret information that the
Constitution mandates be published.
For just this reason, the
Constitution forbids a court from treating a governmental assertion of a
need to preserve secrecy as a basis to deny a disclosure remedy in an
action brought directly under the Statement and Account Clause.
2. Actions Under the FOIA
We have seen that there is a strong basis for concluding that
Richardson does not defeat standing to sue under the FOIA—the FOIA
creates a legal duty of disclosure which does not run to the public at

303. See, e.g., Gen. Dynamics Corp. v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 1900, 1905–08 (2011).
304. See, e.g., Doe v. CIA, 576 F.3d 95 (2d Cir. 2009); Al-Haramain Islamic Found., Inc. v.
Bush, 507 F.3d 1190 (9th Cir. 2007); El-Masri v. United States, 479 F.3d 296 (4th Cir. 2007);
Tenenbaum v. Simonini, 372 F.3d 776 (6th Cir. 2004); In re Sealed Case, 494 F.3d 139 (D.C. Cir.
2007).
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large, but to a particular requestor. As such, a denial of requested
information sought under the FOIA is regarded as a sufficiently
concrete and particularized claim to support standing. Neither is the
political question doctrine a bar to justiciability.
Yet, one might wonder what bringing litigation under the FOIA
offers for those seeking disclosure of intelligence spending because the
FOIA provides an expansive exemption from the statutory duty of
disclosure reaching virtually all information about intelligence
spending.305 Even if a FOIA claim were justiciable, it would seem to
founder on the merits in light of the statutory defense. To the extent
that a statutory exemption would prevent a court from ordering
disclosure of information that must be disclosed to the public under the
Statement and Account Clause, however, the clause forbids a court from
enforcing the exemption.
The FOIA grants requestors a justiciable right to obtain information
from the government. To be sure, the FOIA’s exemption for
information statutorily exempted from disclosure, coupled with the
government’s statutory power to classify information as confidential
and nonpublic, might defeat the asserted statutory right to disclosure—
unless the government lacks the constitutional power to exempt the
information sought from disclosure. The government, however, lacks
constitutional power to use a FOIA exemption if it is applied to defeat
disclosure that must be made available to the public under the Statement
and Account Clause.
The Statement and Account Clause, as we have seen, limits the
ability of the government to treat information as confidential. A judicial
order issued under the FOIA requiring an agency to disclose
information that must be made available to the public by virtue of the
clause, therefore, enforces the clause’s constitutional requirement of
disclosure. An order directing the release of information in the custody
of intelligence agencies about their spending, to the extent that it must
be disclosed under the Statement and Accounts Clause, accordingly
amounts to a form of constitutionally mandated publication of
information as required by the clause—one form by which a “regular
Statement and Account” could be published with respect to intelligence

305. See supra text accompanying notes 57–58. In Richardson itself, the Court wrote, citing
the FOIA, “Congress has taken notice of the need of the public for more information concerning
governmental operations, but at the same time it has continued traditional restraints on disclosure
of confidential information.” Richardson, 418 U.S. at 175 n.8.
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expenditures could be its provision to FOIA requestors.306 Beyond that,
if the government has unconstitutionally failed to publish material
information about intelligence spending, the Constitution could hardly
permit it to resist an effort to use the FOIA to compel publication of
information it has unconstitutionally treated as secret to a FOIA
requestor.
On this view, although nothing obligated Congress to create a
statutory right of access to information, once it did so by enacting the
FOIA, any limitations Congress places on the scope of that right must
comport with applicable constitutional restrictions.
Surely the
government cannot use a statute that, at least as applied to the case
before it, exceeds the government’s constitutional power to maintain
secrecy, in order to defeat a justiciable request for information under the
FOIA.
In this conclusion there is also little that is novel—this approach is
commonplace in other areas of constitutional law. For example,
although the government is under no obligation to grant the public
access to government property that does not qualify as a public forum,
once it does so, the First Amendment limits its ability to impose
restrictions to public access on the basis of the viewpoint of those who
seek access to the property.307 The same is true when the government
chooses to dispense public funds to subsidize private activities.308
Jurisprudence under the Appropriations Clause provides a particularly
good example.
Although, the Appropriations Clause forbids
expenditures of public funds without an appropriation, when Congress
has placed unconstitutional restrictions on the use of appropriated funds,
the Court has invalidated them and permitted the expenditure of public
funds pursuant to an appropriation cleansed of the invalid restriction.309

306. Under the FOIA, an agency has no obligation to create records. See, e.g., Forsham v.
Harris, 445 U.S. 169, 182–85 (1980). Intelligence agencies, however, presumably create and
retain records reflecting their spending which could be produced if required by the Statement and
Account Clause. To the extent that agency records reflecting spending for intelligence purposes
also contain information that need not be published under the clause, the FOIA requires that
“[a]ny reasonably segregable portion of a record shall be provided to any person requesting such
record after deletion of the portions which are exempt under this section.” 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(9)
(2012).
307. See, e.g., Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch. Dist., 533 U.S. 98, 107–12 (2001);
Lamb’s Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 390–94 (1993).
308. See, e.g., Bd. of Reg. of Univ. of Wis. Sys. v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 228–36 (2000);
Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 828–37 (1995).
309. See, e.g., Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 549 (2001) (appropriation
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It follows that if Congress places an unconstitutional limitation on the
ability of FOIA requestors to obtain information from the government
that it is constitutionally obligated to disclose, that restriction is properly
invalidated, leaving only the statutory right of access to information.
In this fashion, the FOIA is an example of what Adam Samaha once
labeled “constitutionally optional platforms” that “facilitate judicial
implementation of norms drawn from the Constitution.”310 Although
Professor Samaha did not have the Statement and Account Clause in
mind when he introduced this concept, the clause is, after all, the
provision of the Constitution that most clearly expresses a norm in favor
of disclosure. Thus, even if Congress is not subject to a legally
enforceable obligation to subject governmental records to public
scrutiny under the FOIA, once it creates a legally cognizable right to
disclosure, surely the Supremacy Clause requires that records be made
available consistent with the disclosure norm embodied in the Statement
and Account Clause.
CONCLUSION: TAKING THE STATEMENT AND ACCOUNT CLAUSE
SERIOUSLY
There can be little doubt that secrecy has a place in our constitutional
order. As Professor Pozen put it, “[h]ardly a law review article on the
unitary executive theory goes by without referencing Alexander
Hamilton’s or John Jay’s tributes to the ‘secrecy and despatch’ that only
the executive branch can provide.”311 But, the prerogative of the
political branches to keep secrets is not unlimited; perhaps it is the only
provision of the Constitution of this character, but the Statement and
Account Clause unambiguously rejects secrecy as a governmental
entitlement when it comes to the disclosure of information material to
an overall assessment of the manner in which the intelligence
community spends public funds. The obligation imposed by the clause
is unqualified, with no room for an exception rooted in executive
prerogatives, national security, or the imperatives of the intelligence
community. The obligation may well be limited to disclosure of only
material facts, leaving a great deal of information about particular
operations and techniques secret but not information required for an

restriction invalidated under the First Amendment); United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 315–
18 (1946) (appropriation restriction invalidated as an unconstitutional Bill of Attainder).
310. Samaha, supra note 126, at 963–64.
311. Pozen, supra note 26, at 298 (footnote omitted).
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intelligent assessment of the overall performance of the intelligence
community.
Of course, it is possible to reconcile the disclosure of only aggregate
intelligence appropriations with the Statement and Account Clause if
one is determined to do so. Aggregate annual appropriations are likely
a reasonable proxy for aggregate annual spending, and if an aggregate
figure is released, there has been in a formal sense a “statement and
account” of expenditures.
One can reach this conclusion, however, only by treating the
Statement and Account Clause as a mere formality. If one is willing to
take the clause seriously, however, mere formality will not do. In terms
of its text, original meaning, and its place in constitutional ethos and
structure, the clause is comprehensible only if it is understood as a
mechanism that enables the people to effectively hold the government
accountable for its use of public funds. Disclosing an aggregate figure
without more makes the clause a bit of foolscap. Indeed, it is surely
remarkable that no one—and certainly no intelligence official—has ever
been willing to argue that the disclosure of aggregate appropriations
enables the public to assess in a considered fashion the performance of
the intelligence community. If the clause requires only a meaningless
and ineffectual disclosure, however, it becomes impossible to explain
what it is doing in the Constitution.
Perhaps the level of disclosure required if we take the clause
seriously would put the United States at a disadvantage when compared
to other nations that fund their intelligence communities in secret. Or
perhaps the resulting accountability would make our intelligence
community stronger; we will never know unless we adopt a more
transparent regime. Ultimately, however, the constitutional question
about disclosure of intelligence spending does not turn on
considerations of policy but on the Statement and Account Clause itself.
If we take the clause seriously, the current regime cannot stand.

